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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This Fly-By-Light (FBL) Augmentation Plan is specifically intended to
facilitate the introduction and certification of U.S. built
Fly-By-Wire/Fly-By-Light (FBN/FBL) commercial transport aircraft, a
significant U.S. aircraft industry issue. While the applications of this
program are ostenslvely for aircraft, the technologies and approaches
resulting from it will benefit a broad crossectlon of U.S. industry.
The proliferation of critical digital fly-by-wlre aircraft systems has
evidenced a number of new potentially catastrophic failure modes not
encountered wlth conventional mechanical and analog control systems. The most
dramatic news to hit the EMC (electromagnetic compatibility) community in some
time is the recent revelation that a number of flight critical fly-by-wire
systems are highly susceptible to radiated electromagnetic energy. Despite
this, the performance and weight requirements imposed on military aircraft
have necessitated the use of fly-by-wire flight and engine controls. The
problem of designing highly reliable, maintainable, and lightweight
fly-by-wlre flight controls is further complicated by such factors as:
0 The increasing complexity (hardware and software) and number of aircraft
digital systems yields new types of failure modes;
0 The increasing use of composites for aircraft skins decreases the first
llne of shielding provided by their metal counterparts;
0 The worsening EM (electromagnetic) environment due to the proliferation
of radar, microwave, television, and radio sources, as well as the
introduction of directed energy weapons;
0 New high speed integrated circuits require less power to change state (or
be upset).
The extensive application of FBL technology for data transfer and sensing
functions can substantially reduce the electromagnetic susceptibility of
critical digital flight control systems. Since fiber optics are virtually
immune to electromagnetic interference (EMI) the need for special shielding is
eliminated and the number of conductive paths into the digital electronics is
substantially reduced. Extensively shielding a critical digital flight
control system is costly, heavy, and difficult to maintain. The use of fiber
optics will reduce system weight and shielding maintenance.
In general, fly-by-llght refers to a wide range of complementary technologies,
concepts, design approaches, and computer based tools needed for next
generation flight critical digital flight control systems (FCS). While fiber
optics are a major part of FBL, many other aspects need to be evaluated,
integrated, and balanced to optimize these FCSs.
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Nuclear Electromagnetic Pulse
Non-Homogeneous Polsson Process
Optical Propulsion Management Interface System
Operating System (Flight OPS - Flight Operations)
Modeling System
Power-By-Fiber
Power-By-Light
Printed Circuit
Program Design Language
Primary Flight Control
Primary Flight Control Bus
Points of Entry
Research and Development
Radio Frequency
Rate Of Occurrence Of Failure
Read-Only Memory
Rapid Prototyplng Technologies
Rotary Variable Differential Transducer
Society of Automotive Engineers
Sperry Commercial Flight Systems Group
Software Engineering
Simulated Electromagnetic Pulse
Standard Networks and Protocols
Sidestick Controller
Small Scale Integration
Supplemental Type Certificate
Semi-Markov Unreliability Range Evaluator
Three Dimensional Finite Difference
Time Division Multiplexed
Throttle Lever Angle
Thrust Management Computer
Time To Failure
Verification and Validation
Very High Level Description Language
Very High Speed Circuit
Very High Speed Integrated Circuit
Very Large High Integrated Circuit
Very Large Scale Integration
Vibro-Mechanlcal Interference
Voice of America
Verification, Validation, and Certification
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
l.l Background
1.2
This report discusses the driving factors and developments which
make fly-by-llght viable. It also provides documentation,
analyses, and recommendations on the major issues pertinent to
facilitating the U.S. implementation of commercial FBL aircraft
before the turn of the century. To accomplish this goal a unified
national effort is required. This plan would be coordinated by
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and would
involve both government and industry participation.
In this report "FBL" is used in a general sense, referring to a
wide range of complementary technologies, concepts, design
approaches, and computer based tools needed for next generation
flight critical digital flight control systems (FCS). While fiber
optics are a major part of FBL, many other aspects need to be
evaluated, integrated, and balanced to optimize these FCSs.
It should be noted that continuous involvement of Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) engineers is essential in both planning and
executing the proposed FBL Program.
The introduction of fly-by-wlre/fly-by-llght technology into
U.S. manufactured commercial transport aircraft places
unprecedented demands upon airframe companies, equipment
suppliers, and regulatory agencies. These demands necessitate a
high degree of cooperation between all parties involved.
Areas of particular concern include:
o Ultra-rellable computing (hardware/software)
o EME
o Verification and Validation
o Optical techniques
o Life-cycle maintenance
o Basis and procedures for certification
Ultra-reliable computing
Ultra-rellable computing (i.e., extremely fault tolerant
systems) is an area that has received significant Research and
Development (R&D) emphasis in past years. This work includes
concepts such as "zero unscheduled maintenance" and "extended
availability".
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1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
Electromagnetic Effects
Protectlon/quantiflcatlon relative to the effects of the
electromagnetic environment (EME) is a design problem coupled to
environmental conditions that has received inadequate attention in
the past but now has been elevated to prominence. Such a late
recognition of the magnitude of this problem has left industry
with major near term design and Verification & Validation related
problems to solve. Figure 1.3-1 illustrates the levels of
electrlcal/electronlc systems for which EME must be addressed.
Optical Techniques
Optical techniques show potential to resolve significant aspects
of the EME problem mentioned previously. Size and weight savings
are also expected. It is anticipated that optical networking and
data links will be applied to first generation U.S. commercial
FBW/FBL aircraft. Subsequent generations will likely make
extensive use of optical sensing technologies.
Verlflcatlon and Validation
Verification, Validation, and Certification (VVC) must also come
to the forefront. It is generally agreed by equipment suppliers
now developing FBW/FBL systems that state-of-the-art VVC
methodologies are inadequate. Of particular interest is the role
of modeling the system response to faults (functional and gate
level) in VVC as commercial FBW/FBL is introduced. The work
already done at NASA-LARC (i.e., HARP, CARE III, SURE, GGLOSS)
must be expanded and matured. Software verification and aspects
of certification are also areas of concern that must continue to
be emphasized.
Life-Cycle Maintenance
Life-cycle maintenance issues become safety issues when
considering commercial FBW/FBL. It is anticipated that
requirements for flight llne maintenance must be sharply reduced.
This can only be achieved through new design methodologies which
facilitate increased system effective mean-time-between-
unscheduled-removals (MTBUR) through the application of "secondary
redundancy" techniques. Redundant elements are included and can
fall without the need for removal of the line replaceable
unit (LRU). Accordingly mean-tlme-between-failure (MTBF)
decreases while MTBUR is sharply increased. That is, additional
system redundancy is included not for safety but for "extended
system availability." This means that a number of simple faults
can be accumulated and tolerated in redundant elements of a system
for an extended period of time without impacting system safety.
The net result is less unscheduled box removals for minor and
oftentimes elusive squaks.
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.? Basis and Procedures for Certification
One of the major goals of this program is to provide guidance to
the FAA in the development of certification criteria. Generally,
noncritical avionic systems for commercial transport aircraft have
been designed to various Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) such
as FAR 25.1309. However, rules or guidance materials are not
available for designing flight critical systems using
FBL technology. Therefore, it is Important that the FAA be
involved throughout thls technology verification program.
In order to accomplish this, FAA certification speclallsts will be
directly Involved In the development of advanced technologies.
This Involvement will assist the FAA in the development of the
certification criteria outside of the typical adversarial
relationship between the FAA and industry In an actual
certification project.
With the FAA establishing the FBL/FBW certification criteria
early, the typical uncertainty of certification for the airframe
manufacturers will be eliminated. This uncertainty comes from
advanced designs not meeting the exact requirements that would be
contained in a special condition that does not exist at the
beginning of the design process. Since these systems are normally
developed for new airplanes, thls uncertainty has in the past
forced the airframe manufacturer Into parallel development of a
conventional system for the new aircraft model, thus protecting
themselves against the possibility that the new system would not
be developed. This practice has proved to be costly in time and
money to the manufacturer, the FAA, and the customer.
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2.0
2.1
2.2
REQUIREMENTS FOR FLY-BY-LIGHT FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEMS
Background
Douglas Aircraft Company (DAC) studies conducted in early 1984
showed that a transport aircraft fly-by-wlre (FBW) flight control
system (FCS) would provide significant benefits in terms of
increased performance, weight reduction, and cost effective
manufacture, and operation. These studies also indicated that a
transport FBW system could be designed for hlgh reliability,
maintainability, and fault survivability. Furthermore, if
properly designed, no mechanical backup would be required and
dlspatchabillty would not be Jeopardized.
M1lltary helicopters and fighter aircraft have employed FBW flight
and engine controls for years, but the higher reliability,
maintainability, and safety requirements of transport aircraft
have precluded the use of FBW technologies until recently. Recent
demands for increased performance and operational capabilities of
transport aircraft have encouraged the development of FBW flight
controls.
The Airbus A320, introduced In 1987, has full authority dlgltal
FBW in the pitch and roll axis, partial FBW in the yaw axis,
partial mechanical in the yaw axis, and a mechanical horizontal
stabilizer. The rudder and the mechanical trlm stabilizer
controls provide minimal mechanical backup for flight control
following a complete failure of the primary FBW system, with the
goal of maintaining flight until the primary system can be
reactivated or until landing.
Safety Requirements
Safety Requirements for a full time, flight critical commercial
aircraft fly-by-wlre/fly-by-llght (FBW/FBL) system with no
mechanical backup exceed the requirements asserted for any
previous commercial system in the area of probability of loss of
function. The probability of loss-of-alrcraft demanded by the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is lO-g fllght/hour.
Loss-of-alrcraft can result for a variety of reasons; including
FBW/FBL system failure, various structural failure modes, and
certain propulsion related failures. The issue of concern here is
the FBW/FBL system.
(Note that the A320 has a rudimentary mechanical backup system but
it is not given any credit in probability of loss of function
calculations.)
2-I
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2.3
2.4
2.4.l
2.4.2
2.5
System Electromagnetic Environment (EME) Effects Protection
System EME effects protection is required and must receive
elevated emphasis in this program. Recent alleged EME-related
aircraft losses have revealed a major problem that will likely get
worse. Accordingly, the EME effects problem has gone from
relative obscurity to perhaps the pacing problem relative to the
introduction of U.S. built FBW/FBL commercial aircraft. Both
design and verification and validation (V&V) requirements will
require emphasis. Recent trends in the EME threat are depicted in
Figure 2.3-I.
Fiber Optics
Optical Data Bus
Optical busses, particularly for avionics and primary flight
controls, are of great interest for first generation FBL
aircraft. The avionics bus, which links the aircraft's main
flight boxes, must provide bidirectional communication between all
(32 to 50) terminals. The primary flight control bus must provide
bidirectional communication between one flight control computer in
each of 9 to 24 smart actuator terminals; communication between
actuators is not requlred.
In order to achieve fiber optic data bus flight readiness,
protocol and architecture requirements must be established for
each bus application, component technologies (e.g., connector
type, fiber composition, size, etc.) must be evaluated and
certified, and installation and maintenance procedures must be
developed.
Optical Sensors
Optical sensors will be required to be as accurate, reliable and
maintainable as the devices which they replace. An evaluation of
various sensor technologies is needed to determine their
applicability to flight critical avionics.
System Functionality
The system functionality requirements for a first generation
U.S. built FBW/FBL system are anticipated to resemble those of the
A320. That is, in normal operation, both inertial data and air
data would be fully utilized and full envelope protection would be
provided. Autoland capability would not be considered part of the
FBN/FBL computer's function. However, the impact of its inclusion
should be studied. A sldestlck interface should be assumed.
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2.5.1
2.5.2
2.6
FBW/FBL Computer to Sldestlck Interface
The sldestlck to flight control computer interface requires study
and requlrement development. These requirements would address
Captaln/First Officer sldestlck coupling, reliability requirements
for sldestlck design, sldestlck to FBW/FBL interface, and
sldestlck ergonomics. Other areas of study would include
alternatives to sldestlcks and the pilot/sldestIck interface.
FBW/FBL Computer to Actuator Interface
The FBW/FBL computer to actuator interface is an area of
particular importance if a "smart" (i.e., computer controlled)
actuator is assumed. A smart actuator allows a digital bus
Interface media and local monitoring of actuator operation with
attendant advantages. However, this could open up the possibility
of simultaneous loss of all actuators of a given type due to a
"generic" fault. To help enhance safety, a concept under study by
Douglas Aircraft Company and Honeywell, Inc. (DAC/HI) is referred
to as a smart "actuator override" In which the FBW/FBL computer
would be capable of bypassing all computerized internal actuator
monitoring functions to either force the actuator to engage or
force the actuator to disengage. It is believed that such a
capability should be required. The flight control computer has
access to aircraft sensor data, comprehensive monitoring, and
degradation strategies.
System Availability
System availability for a FBW/FBL system without mechanical backup
becomes a safety issue. It has been argued that routine flight
llne maintenance of FBW/FBL computer systems should not be
permitted. Rather, repairs should be restricted to dedicated
repair facilities. It can be argued that the mean-tlme-between-
failure (MTBF) of the FBW/FBL computers should be at least as good
as the equipment they replace. The above issues lead to
requirements such as "no unscheduled maintenance" or possibly
"deferred maintenance". To preclude to a high probability the
necessity of unscheduled maintenance requires redundant elements
within the computers with an associated reconflguratlon capability.
Such redundancy is therefore not directly safety related and
accordingly has come to be called "secondary redundancy" This
secondary redundancy may be required because it is anticipated
that a FBW/FBL computer assembly might require a mean-tlme-
between-unscheduled-removal (MTBUR) approaching lO0,O00 hours;
thus achieving zero unscheduled maintenance.
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2.7
2.8
2.9
2.10
Graceful Degradation
Graceful degradation In the context of FBW/FBL systems refers to
control law reconflguratlon in flight after the loss of a sensor
set being used to control flight. The system must be capable of
gracefully and automatically transitlonlng from fully augmented
flight to levels of lesser augmentation and to stlck-to-surface
operation or even activation of a backup system. Pilot override
of this feature should be provided.
Generic Fault Tolerance
Design provisions must permlt the system to remain operational in
the presence of generic faults. Areas of concern include
hardware, software generation, and system specification. Relative
to these fault classes, N-verslon techniques are now widely used
in the commercial aircraft industry (i.e., DAC, BCAC, British
Aerospace [BAe], Airbus). It should be noted that although
generally regarded as effective In relation to certain specific
fault c_asses, N-version techniques lack both an establlshed set
of design rules and a clear quantification of benefits.
It Is widely agreed that a major area of problems and potential
safety hazards relates to the specification itself. Specific
requirements for V&V of system specifications must be developed.
System Recovery from Upset (Soft Fault Tolerance)
Automatic system recovery from upset must be addressed. It Is now
becoming increasingly clear that most system faults are
Intermlttent, rather than permanent hardware fallures. However,
little attention has been given to this area. Upsets can result
from many causes, not the least of which is EME. DAC/HI are
actively working on techniques which will permlt the system to
operate through a disturbance via a methodology referred to as
"Transparent Recovery" Note that we are not talking about
eventual reinstatement of a failed FBW/FBL computer but rather
designing FBW/FBL computers which can tolerate the disturbance
wlth no external effect (i.e., "transparent").
Backup Systems
Backup flight control will likely be included in a first
generation FBW/FBL systems. An electrical implementation (as
opposed to mechanical) is assumed. No safety credit should be
taken for this backup during certification. The backup can be
slngle-thread (i.e., no primary redundancy). It would take
control automatically in the event of complete loss of the primary
system. Note that It can be argued that no means need to be
provided to permit the airline pilot to activate the backup. This
entire issue warrants further study.
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3.2
3.2.1
3.2.2
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Background
The proliferation of flight critical digital flight control
systems (FCSs) has evidenced a number of new potentially
catastrophic failure modes not encountered with conventional
mechanical and analog control systems. Recent evidence has
indicated that flight critical fly-by-wlre (FBW) systems are
highly susceptible to radiated electromagnetic (EM) energy.
The extensive application of fiber optic technology for data
transfer and sensing functions will substantially reduce the EM
susceptibility of flight critical digital FCS. Since fiber optics
are virtually immune to electromagnetic interference (EMI) the
need for special shielding is eliminated and the number of
conducted paths into the digital electronics is substantially
reduced. Extensively shielding a critical digital FCS Is costly,
heavy, and difficult to maintain. The use of fiber optics will
reduce system weight and shielding maintenance.
Safety Requirements
General Issues
Relative to the internal workings of commercial transport
fly-by-wlre/fly-by-light (FBW/FBL) systems, extensive
investigations of ways to guarantee availability of lO-9/hour or
better have been pursued. Still there remain unanswered questions
as noted in Section 2. Specific to the FBW/FBL flight control
computer system internal operation questions not fully resolved
include the following:
A. Quantification of benefits gained from software development
methodologies (e.g., N-verslon).
B.
C.
The effects of long term field maintenance on safety level
degradations.
The benefits and risks associated with design for "extended
availability" through secondary redundancy.
D. Validation of system fault tolerance/redundancy management
methodologies with new and proposed system fault effects
modeling methodologies.
Generic Fault Concerns
Several approaches to protection from "generic" faults have been
suggested. These include:
o N-verslon software and/or hardware
o Performance assessment monitor
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3.2.2
3.2.2.1
3.2.2.2
3.2.2.3
Generic Fault Concerns (Continued)
o Proof of correctness
A review of articles documenting numerous N-verslon software
experiments, results in no clear quantification of benefits.
Further, it appears likely, even to the casual observer, that the
specific type of implementation methodology adopted will heavily
impact the effectiveness of thls technique. The following two
needs relate to our understanding, first of N-verslon
effectiveness experienced in industry, and secondly of the
implementation methodologies that have been adopted.
A. Survey and document industry experience with the application
of N-version techniques.
B, Based upon experience gained in both industrial applications
and research experiments, one or more development
methodologies should be documented. It is essential that
formal, mature methodologies be established.
N-verslon Techniques
Currently N-verslon techniques are being applied to numerous
critical commercial aircraft FCS. Examples include:
o MD-II
o 737-300
o B777 (currently in development)
o BAe-146-300 (currently in development)
o A310
o A320
Performance Assessment Monitors
This technique defines specific monitor functions to detect event
system behavior. Thls technlque has been applied by Honeywell and
others in both commercial and military avionics. To date the
benefits and limitations of this technique have not been
thoroughly explored.
Proof of Correctness
Methodologies to rigorously provide the validity of a
specification have been suggested In the literature. The
applicability of such techniques has, in general, been viewed
negatively. However, no documented study has been conducted to
date.
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3.3
3.3.1
System Electromagnetic Environment Protection
Introduction
Electromagnetic environments produce electrical energy of the same
type that is used by electrical/electronic equipment to process
and transfer information. As such, this environment represents a
fundamental threat to the proper operation of systems that depend
on such equipment. For systems providing flight critical
functions that depend upon information processed by electronic
equipment, the electromagnetic threat to systems translates to a
threat to the airplane itself. Specifically, the EM environment
is a top level system issue that must be conscientiously accounted
for In any airplane design where control is provided by a
FBW system architecture. Although the substantial coupling paths
resulting from wiring running throughout the aircraft fuselage is
eliminated by a FBL data llnk architecture, the primary means of
processing information is still electronic, and the
electromagnetic environment (EME) Is still a significant threat.
In general the EM environment elements of interest for aircraft
Include the following:
A Lightning
B Hlgh Intensity Radio Frequency (HIRF)
C Electrostatic Discharge (ESD)
D Intrasystem EMI
E P-statlc
F Special Military Requirements
I. Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP)
2. High Power Microwave (HPM)
For commercial aircraft, the emphasis should be on lightning and
HERF, because most of the energy and system hazards arise from
these threats. Their interaction wlth aircraft systems is global
and also the most complex, requiring more effort to understand.
ESD is of interest from an operational viewpoint, but is
especially of concern in the development of latent defects, which
are usually controlled during manufacture and assembly stages.
EMI Is an intrasystem problem which Is locally controlled, but
still requires sound knowledge and practice. P-static is also
usually controlled by rather well known design practices.
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3.3.1 Introduction (Continued)
3.3.2
Therefore, for this effort It is assumed that the lightning and
HIRF envlronments are those of concern. The other environments
may be of occasional interest, but do not drive this technology
development.
In addition to the fundamental trend of relying on electronic
equipment for flight critical functions, another trend that has
increased the concern about EME is the increased percentage of
composite materials in aircraft construction. Because of their
decreased conductivity, composite materials result in less
inherent shielding by the aircraft structure.
EME Threat
Lightning and HIRF are two extraordinarily severe EME threats to
the overall aircraft. Of the two, lightning produces the most
intense EME. The llghtnlng-produced environment is relatively
instantaneous (exists for less than 0.5 msec for each lightning
stroke occurrence). During a lightning strike (one lightning
strike or flash can contain several individual strokes),
relatively large currents flow In the wing structure, fuselage, or
empennage, which In-turn induce relatively large voltages and
currents in the aircraft wiring. Such voltages and currents
appear at equipment interface circuits. In an all metal aircraft,
induced voltages are usually less than 200 V although lO00 V or
more have been projected for some aircraft wiring when excited by
the EM environment of a severe stroke. For aircraft employing the
extensive use of composite materials, the llghtning-produced
voltages and currents could increase substantially. Whether they
do or not depends upon the shielding measures provided in the
aircraft.
In addition to the large currents associated with return strokes,
high rates of rise short duration pulses (noise pulse) have been
found to occur randomly throughout a lightning flash, interspersed
with the other current components. The current amplitude of such
pulses are much less than those of a return stroke (first or
subsequent) and while not likely to cause physical damage to the
aircraft or electronic components, the random and repetitive
nature of these pulses may cause interference or upset to certain
systems. As previously noted, a typical cloud-to-ground lightning
flash contains more than one restrike. In fact, flashes
containing up to 24 strokes randomly spaced have been recorded.
For evaluation of indirect effects (damage and upset) it is
necessary to consider the multlple-stroke nature of an actual
lightning flash, because the succession of strokes may induce
corresponding pulses in data transfer circuits (for example)
causing cumulative damage (in some special interface circuit
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3.3.2 EME Threat (Continued)
configurations) or upset to sensitive systems or devices.
Figure 3.3-I shows the wave shape of two natural lightning events
and Figure 3.3-2 shows the waveshape of engineering waveforms that
reproduce important lightning waveform parameters (amplitude, rise
time, action integral). Figure 3.3-3 shows severe engineering
representations of the environments associated with a multiple
stroke and bursts of noise pulses.
Even though lightning produces the most intense EM levels, the
radio frequency (RF) environment dramatically exposes
electrlcal/electronlc system susceptibility to the effects
(induced voltages and currents) of EME. This discovery of system
susceptibility was probably made possible because the RF
environment is deterministic (not instantaneous, random, and
capricious as is the case for lightning), and therefore relatively
traceable to the catastrophic events it caused.
The EM spectrum associated with radio frequencies is vast. The
radio frequency/electromagnetlc (RF/EM) field strength from
numerous sources (measured in volts per meter) varies widely.
Figure 3.3-4 shows various sources associated with the RF
spectrum. Figure 3.3-5 shows the envelope of peak field strengths
that could be encountered within the U.S, U.K. and France during a
flight scenario. While all aspects of a flight scenario are
vital, the takeoff and landing portions exhibit the most potential
for catastrophic occurance due to the short reaction times.
Therefore absolute safety in takeoff and landing environment shown
in Figure 3.3.5 must be assured.
The wiring lengths (of interest from an RF coupling perspective)
anticipated to be encountered within aircraft of the MD-91 size
class will be roughly in the 0.5 m to 50 m range. This translates
to resonant frequencies of 300 MHz to 3 MHz, respectively.
Aircraft wiring resonances could increase the induced voltages
produced by external RF to as much as 30 volts (as compared to the
less than l volt that would occur at nonresonant frequencies).
Induced voltages will be present as long as the interfering RF
persists. The spectrum of RF energy that penetrates aircraft
wiring and electrlcal/electronlc systems can be summarized in
three basic areas:
A. RF energy below l MHz - induced coupling at these frequencies
is inefficient and thus wlll probably be of lesser concern.
S. RF energy between l and 300 MHz is of major concern as
aircraft wiring at these frequencies acts as a highly
efficient antenna.
C. RF energy coupling to aircraft wiring drops off at frequencies
above 3DO MHz. At these higher frequencies the EM energy
tends to couple through box apertures rather than through
aircraft wiring.
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3.3.2
3.3.3
EME Threat (Continued)
Figure 3.3-6 shows (in the frequency domain) the lightning and
HERF components of the EME threat. The points that make up each
curve were derived by normalizing the threats to their equivalent
magnetic field spectral density at a fixed bandwidth of l KHz
(amps/meter/kilohertz). The HERF spectral envelope was derived by
assuming a far-fleld source modulated I00% by a BOO Hz square wave
with a carrier frequency equal to the frequency at which the
evaluation is made.
Response to EME Threat
It is clear that the of EME threats to avionic systems, either
digital or analog, are numerous. Although both types of avionics
system respond to the same threats, there are factors that make
the threat response to a momentary transient far more serious in
dlgltal systems than in analog. For example, the information
bandwidth and, hence, the upper noise response cutoff frequency in
analog devices is limited to, at most, 5 MHz, whereas in digital
systems it is often in excess of lO0 MHz. This bandwidth
difference, which is at least ten times more severe in digital
systems, allows substantially more energy and types of energy to
be coupled into the digital system. Moreover, the bandwldths of
analog circuits associated with autopllot and Flight Management
Systems (FMS) are on the order of 50 Hz for servo loops and much
less for other control loops (less than l Hz for outer loops).
Thus, if the disturbance is short relative to significant system
time constants, even though an analog circuit device possessing a
broad bandwidth is upset by an EM transient, the circuit will
recover to the proper state. Unlike analog circuits, digital
circuits and corresponding computational units, once upset,
probably will not recover to the proper state and will require
external intervention to resume normal operation.
It should be noted that in older digital systems using discrete
transistor devices the transient energy necessary to cause an
upset is on the order of lO-5 J. With the advent of VHSIC
technology digital systems, upset occurs at only lO-9 J or
less. This means that advanced technology systems will be four
orders of magnitude more sensitive to upset. In addition, these
digital devices can now be upset by transient disturbances that
last less than 2 nsec; previously, the disturbance had to last a
few microseconds to cause upset. Such upsets refer to digital
devices, that have been set to an illegitimate state which is
correctable (the device is still operational, as opposed to,
component damage which is a permanent failure state and the device
is no longer operational), are, in turn, referred to as soft
faults.
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3.3.3
3.3.4
Response to EME Threat (Continued)
In a normal operating environment, the occurrence of soft faults
within digital processing systems is relatively infrequent and
random. The condltlon should be treated as probabilistlc in
nature. From this perspective, the projected effect of a
substantial increase in the severity of the EME would be an
increased probability of a soft fault occurrence. That is, in
reality a soft fault may or may not occur at any particular point
In time, but that on the average soft faults would occur more
frequently with the new environmental level.
The criticality of functions would be the main factor that
determines the degree of EME protection for the design associated
with that function. To achieve a satisfactory degree of safety,
it appears that all EME protection options available will be
necessary for flight critical systems such as full authority
digital engine control or FBW primary FCS.
System/Topology Approach to EME Immunity
A balanced approach, that would be conducive to an optimum
protection design, is to view the protection objective from a
system topology perspective. From this perspective, the aircraft
is mapped into topology zones that contain a decreasing fraction
of the energy and corresponding effect associated with the
EME threat. These zones or regions are enclosed by boundary
layers that provide the energy attenuation. Such boundary layers
could even be extended to the regions within avionic equipment.
Within the aircraft the layers would be provided through a variety
of aircraft design options (e.g., llne filters, isolation
transformers, fiber optics, cable shleld, equipment enclosures,
and the airframe materials). Within equipment similar layers
would be provided by equipment design options (e.g., interface
circuit configurations, compartmentalization, shielded modules,
optical couplers, circuit board layout, wire routing,
hardware/software architectural provisions).
Figure 3.3-7 is a system level (block diagram) overview
representation of the transfer processes associated wlth the
interaction between EME and a flight critical system. Both the
transfer process and the topology perspective emphasize the system
level nature of the EME threat issue and they are complementary.
Figure 3.3-8 is a representation of an aircraft electrical/
electronic system from a topological perspective. The flgure
shows typical items corresponding to electromagnetic
considerations. Isolation of zones or topology levels must be
maintained by isolating power ground from signal grounds, primary
and secondary power isolation, single point circuit ground and
cable shields peripherally terminated (not necessarily grounded),
at a minimum, at both ends.
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3.3.4 System/Topology Approach to EME Immunity (Continued)
Within the topology framework the effectiveness and necessity of
various options could be assessed through appropriate trade
studies.
Immunity of electronic components to damage is a consideration
that occurs as part of the circuit design process. This circuit
characteristic (immunity to damage) is influenced by a variety of
factors: circuit impedances (resistance, inductance, capacitance)
which may be distributed as well as lumped; the characteristic
(surge) impedance of wiring interfacing wlth circuit components;
properties of the materials used in the construction of a
component (e.g., thick film/thln film resistors); threat level
(open circuit voltage/short circuit current) resulting in a
corresponding stress on insulation, integrated circuit (IC) leads,
printed circuit (PC) board trace spacing, etc.; and semiconductor
device nonlinearities (e.g., forward biased Junctions, channel
impedance, Junctlon/gate breakdown). Immunity to upset for analog
processors is achieved through circuit design measures, and for
digital processors it is achieved through architectural as well as
circuit design measures.
The use of composite materials in aircraft construction,
electronic computers that use VLSI-type electronic devices, and
reliance upon electronic computers for flight critical functions
are recent technology trends that have greatly magnified the
threat of EME relative to aircraft operations. As previously
noted, although a momentary (less than l sec) threat may cause
disruption in both analog and digital systems, analog systems
generally resume normal operation when the threat is removed.
Digital systems, on the other hand, when once perturbed, require
external intervention to resume normal operation. Unless
substantial fault tolerance is built into it, the digital system
is far more susceptible to system upset by momentary threats than
its predecessor analog device.
When the threat is not momentary, analog systems that contain VLSI
devices (e.g., operational amplifiers, comparators) will,
depending upon the amplitude of voltages/currents produced by the
threat, be disrupted and may take a substantial length of time to
recover to normal operation after the threat subsides. Digital
system disruption is a probablllstlc matter and may or may not
occur. Thus, for nonmomentary EME threats, digital systems may
offer more promise of achieving system immunity than their analog
counterparts.
As a general rule, optimum EME protection (hardening) occurs when
the protection burden is partitioned among the various options
available. An approach to optimum protection design is to view
protection from a system topology perspective. It should be noted
once again that it appears that use of all possible options may be
necessary to achieve an acceptable confidence level for
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3.3.4 System/Topology Approach to EME Immunity (Continued)
critical systems (e.g., full authority engine control, FBW primary
flight controls). If protection requirements are allocated In an
optimum matter, the impact of EME protection on airplane costs
(weight, power, performance, monetary) wlll be minimized and the
degree of immunity to lightning and RF effects Is maximized.
Ideally, system immunity to EME threat should be achieved through
system design measures that provide sufficient inherent immunity
so that reliance on dedicated protection devices can be
minimized. Such protection measures tend to be self-monltorlng
through noticeable degradation or actual loss of system function
when a protection measure has been degraded or lost.
When balanced protection is distributed throughout the various
levels of a FBL system methodologies and capabilities,
corresponding to the nature of such a protection strategy, must be
available to verlfy/valldate that the desired degree of immunity
to the EME threat has been achieved. Such capability would need
to be broad In scope and based upon a top down approach. It Is
perceived that assessments from the devlce/clrcult level would
need to be integrated Into subsystem and system level assessments.
State-of-the-Art of EME Analysis for Aircraft
The Role of Analysis
A fundamental understanding of the propagation of EM energy, Is
the contribution of an analytic resource to the EME effects
assessment process. Analysis involves the systematic application
of electromagnetic physics and associated mathematical models.
Empiric (testing) activity contributes the data from
electromagnetic measurement based upon experimentation under
controlled laboratory conditions. There should be a complementary
interplay between analysis and test throughout the assessment
process.
Although analysis can now play a major role In aircraft
validation, Its potential has not been realized. However,the role
of validation Is expected to Increase In the future. For several
reasons:
A. Hlgh fidelity mock-ups suitable for testing are frequently not
available. It Is expensive to develop mock-ups only for
EM evaluation purposes. Also, testing of airworthy prototypes
can usually only be done at reduced levels because of concern
that the testing may damage the prototypes.
B. Analysis Is generally less expensive than testing.
C. Analysis can be done using design drawings as input; the
hardware need not exist, and parametric variations can be
easily done.
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3.3.5.1 The Role of Analysis (Continued)
Do Because of the advanced state of numerical/analytical
techniques relatlve to the limitations in test techniques and
instrumentation, confidence in analysis results can be
equivalent to that of test results.
Eo Analysls tools are expected to become more accurate in the
future since the accuracy of the numerical tools is presently
limited by available computer capability. Computer capability
is rapidly increasing, which continues to make analysis more
accurate and cost effective.
Because of the above reasons, analysis will play the following
role:
• Design: Analysis can be used to evaluate designs and
perform trade studies• Analysis can be used to identify
the critical areas which require more design attention
and provide a high payback in EM hardness.
2, Deflnltlon of Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) Electromagnetic
Specifications (EMS): Analysis can be useful in the
development of voltage, current, and EM field
specifications for LRUs.
o Evaluation of EM Environment Mitigation Practices:
EM environment mitigation practices, such as volume and
cable shielding, and terminal protection designs can be
evaluated by analysis.
, Test Planning: It is not recommended that analysis
completely replace testing. Both testing and analysis of
systems or subsystems should be done, although the role
of analysis will be increasing. The first role of
analysis in this regard is to help with test planning.
The analysis can identify potentlally weak areas of the
system design which should be further investigated by
tests. The test setup can be analyzed and meaningful
test points and expected response levels can be
identified•
• Data Interpretation: Because modern aircraft are such
complex systems, test data is often dlfflcult to
understand, especlally with CFC/metal structures•
Analysis can help in understanding the data and the
related physical EM interaction processes.
o Aircraft Validation and Certification: Although partly
alluded to in the previous discussions, it should be
emphasized that analysis can be used to help validate and
certify aircraft. It is expected that analysis will
assume a bigger role in the future•
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3.3.5.2 Analysis State-of-the-Art
The issues of interest for EM analysis include the coupling to the
aircraft surface and structure, the penetration through seams and
apertures, and propagation along and through cable bundles.
Techniques exist for analysis of all these issues. The
EM analysis approaches must also have the ability to study the
peculiarities of lightning, including channel attachment
geometries, as well as the RF illumination of an aircraft in free
space or on the ground. Both transient and CW results are
required.
It is not the intent here to provide a detailed technical review
of each available analysis technique. Instead the purpose is to
review the general capabilities and deficiencies.
First of all, in order to cover the lightning and HERF
environments, one must note the large frequency range. The
HERF environment Is basically a CW or modulated CW having carrier
frequencies between 15 KHz and 40 GHz. The lightning environment
is a transient current waveform having significant spectral
content from DC to about 30 MHz. There presently is not a single
technique which can be used to completely solve the EM interaction
problem for an entire aircraft all at once. However, certain
related significant statements can be made:
A. Numerical techniques exist which could completely solve the
entire interaction problem all at once over the desired
frequency range if there were unlimited computational power.
That is, the present limit of the appllcatlon of numerical
solutions to Maxwell's equations for entire aircraft is caused
by limits in computer memory and speed. For example, with
available supercomputers (e.g., Cray II), the Three
Dimensional F1nlte Difference (TDFD) approach can accurately
determine the response from DC to about 200 MHz for commercial
size aircraft. Results up to lO0 MHz can now also be obtained
with minicomputer technology. Accuracy of this approach has
been validated in numerous instances. Significant amounts of
detail can also be put in this model, including apertures such
as windows, the structure of the interior, and internal
cables. The Inslde, outside and cable propagatlon, are solved
self consistently and simultaneously, thus eliminating two or
three extra calculations. Both time and frequency domain
responses are used to analyze aircraft sub-elements , such as
LRUs, modules, PC cards, and localized Points of Entry (POE)
on aircraft surfaces. Thus, an important part of the spectrum
is already covered by existing technologies, and the upper
frequency limit will increase with increased computer
capability.
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3.3.5.2 Analysls State-of-the-Art (Continued)
The required increase in computational power to completely
solve a commercial aircraft up to 40 GHz can be estimated.
For the TDFO approach, for example, the memory requirements go
up as the cube of the upper frequency limit (for the same slze
object), and the computation time requirements increase as the
fourth power of the upper frequency limit. Therefore, if
present technology limits the upper frequency to 200 MHz, and
the goal Is 40 GHz (factor of 200) memory requirements wlll
have to increase by a factor of 8 X lO6, and computer speeds
wlll have to increase by a factor of 1.6 X IOg . These are
huge numbers; however one may reasonably expect that within a
few years, the upper bandwidth may be extended to l GHz
(factor of 5), because of advances In supercomputer technology.
B. It is not necessary (although It would be nice) that the
entire aircraft interaction problem be solved all at once for
all frequencies. As mentioned above, present techniques are
band limited by computer capability to about 200 MHz, but
fortunately, however, all of the major structural resonances
of the aircraft are below thls frequency. Thls means that for
the higher frequencies It Is not necessary to include the
entire aircraft In the coupling problem. For example,
coupling through a cockpit window wlth lO GHz RF illumination
Is fairly independent of aircraft length and geometry, whereas
thls would not be the case at 3 MHz, especially If thls were
the first fuselage resonance frequency.
C. Techniques are available which can be used to solve the upper
frequency parts of the interaction. As mentioned, it is not
necessary to have the entire aircraft In the problem space.
In the example given in B. above, for example, the TOFD
approach can be now used to solve the coupling at a more local
level. Other techniques also exist such as Geometrical Theory
of Diffraction (GTD), physical optics, method of moments, and
finite elements.
In addition to the computational capability limitations, there are
several other limitations as well:
D. Present algorithms are not user friendly. Generally speaking,
the use of sophisticated numerical analysis techniques Is done
by skilled EM theoretlclans with extensive computer skills.
Although there are on-golng efforts to make these tools
friendly, much work needs to be done In the following areas:
l . Input of Geometry and Materials: Work needs to be done
In this area In which the user enters the aircraft shape
and materials. A CAD/CAM type of front end needs to be
developed which would make thls a relatively painless
process. Thls would also include internal cables, and
details of apertures, etc.
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3.3.5.2 Analysis State-of-the-Art (Continued)
, Debugging Capabillty: Capability needs to be built into
the software to tell the user of faults within his
problem. This can include help menus and information
such as the viability of his input data, possible
locations of sources of instabilities or inaccuracies,
possible problems with boundary conditions, and others.
The idea is to relax the requirement that the user be an
expert EM technologist.
. Interactive Graphics Output: Hlgh quality interactive
graphics output is required. 3D plotting routines,
videos showing temporal response development, and similar
capabilities are required to help the user easlly
visualize his data. Output points should be mouse or
menu selected, instead of by inputting x, y, z
coordinates.
E. High frequency models have not been fully developed. As
mentioned earlier, present techniques may now be accurately
applied to Jumbo Jet size aircraft up to 200 MHz. This is
primarily because much effort has been spent on developing
models for lightning and Nuclear electromagnetic Pulse (NEMP),
while the HERF environments have not been as thoroughly
considered. Therefore, development and applications of models
in these frequency regions to the aircraft hazard evaluation
problem is rather new territory.
F , The EM description of an aircraft is often not known in great
detail. This problem is not associated with the techniques
themselves, but Is associated with the input data. For
example, the layout of cables and branches within an airframe
Is not well controlled and is difficult to define. The
termination impedances are also difficult to determine. The
same is true with regards to bulkhead locations, box (LRU)
locations, and the like. Even though the numerical methods
may be capable of analyzing the configuration, the results
cannot be more accurate than the input data.
Two aspects of this problem need some discussion. First, one
may question the need to know this detail. Historically, the
approach has been to make worst case or typical models, and
this is generally thought to be adequate. However, if the
results are too worst case, unacceptable hardening penalties
may result.
Second, the approach has not been adequately verified on a
full scale aircraft. Therefore the possible hardening
penalties mentioned above have never been quantified.
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3.3.5.2
3.3.6
3.3.6.1
Analysis State-of-the-Art (Continued)
G. The models need extensive validation to be accepted by the
community. Validation of the TDFD approach under a variety of
circumstances has been accomplished. While the results from
this validation effort have been encouraging, none of the
cases examined included coupling to the cables and LRU pins
within commercial aircraft. Also, validation was achieved at
relatively low frequencies (appropriate for lightning and
NEMP), and there is none at the higher frequencies.
Therefore, an extensive effort must be made to validate the
models and quantify the errors.
Approach for the Development of an EME National Resource
Introduction
The proposed technical approach for this program is summarized in
Table 3.3-1. The essential features of this approach are as
follows:
A. To provide a credible solid technical scientific basis for the
EME national resource, the program emphasizes the development
of first principle EME models and rigorous testing for
validation.
B. The development of a I/lO scale model facility is
recommended. This requires a scaling of the frequency along
with the physical scaling of the model. A I/lO scale model
requires illumination frequencies that are ten times larger
than actual frequencies for full scale aircraft. Thus, with a
40 GHz facility, scale model aircraft interaction studies can
economically be accomplished for a variety of sources and
aircraft geometries and orientations for frequencies below
4 GHz (I/lO scale illumination frequencies below 40 GHz).
C. The scale model facility will also be used to evaluate
interactions with full scale LRUs, cable assemblies, and
printed circuit cards up to 40 GHz.
D. A full scale test bed will also be used for validation at the
low frequencies and also up to 40 GHz.
E. In addition to the EME models, another valuable product will
be produced, which is a definition of threat levels inside
aircraft for lightning and HERF environments.
F. The program's main output will be a set of scientifically
validated user friendly EME interaction codes.
G. LRU/alrcraft test and verification methods will be developed.
H. The project should be validated with the flight test aircraft
in a ground test demonstration.
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OBJECTTV_
To determine aru:l develop the best
numerical models to be used in the
Mat ionai Resource
To define and buitda scale axial
facility to cover ul=Twoxinmteiy 0 to &
GMZ for full size aircraft, end 0 to &O
GHZ for sup-elements (LRUs, cld:)tes,
sssemblies, printed circuit boards, etc.)
To validate and iq:covt ENE interaction
mcx:lels end mitigation practices up to
approximately 4 GHZ for full size
aircraft Imd 0 to 40 GHz for Igab-eLementl
To Define and implement u full scale test
bed to cover frequencies up to 40 GNz for
full size aircraft
To validate _d improve interaction
models and mitigation models end
mitigation practices up to 40 GNZ for
full size aircraft
To define a set of standard threat Levels
for cable coupling, interrmt fietds, etc.
to form the basis of In integrated EME
Standard
To make the numerical analysis codes user
friendly and well documented
To deveL® test methods for LRU/aircraft
ENE testing
To ciemanltrate that results Ird
mthodology apply to eiruorthy aircraft
Program Plan Overvlew
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3.3.6.1
3.3.6.2
3.3.6.3
3.3.6.3.1
3.3.6.3.2
Introduction (Continued)
Many of the items In Table 3.3-I are self-explanatory. However,
expansion of some of the key features is presented.
Interaction Technology Development
In Task I, and in many of the following tasks, attention will be
given to the development of numerical EME interaction models. At
first a literature search will be done, with particular emphasis
at the higher frequencies. A set of numerical models will be
determined and developed. They will be modlfled as appropriate by
the test results.
The Scale Model and Sub-Element Test Facility
Purpose
This facility will conduct EME tests up to 4 GHz for I110 scale
aircraft models in support of numerical models and to obtain data
for establishing threat levels. The tests include CW illumination
and direct current injection. In addition, full scale testing up
to 40 GHz will be conducted for LRUs, cable assemblies, and
printed circuit cards.
The facility description will address stimulus equipment, the
physical scale models, measurement probes and sensors and data
acquisition equipment.
Stimulus
The stimulus equipment in the facility will generate and apply
swept CW fields to reduced scale aircraft models. This equipment
will be reconflgured for current injection to slmulate lightning.
The stimulus generation equipment consists of network analyzers
and RF amplifiers.
The stimulus fields are applied to the models by means of a
parallel plate llne and a log periodic antenna. Lightning
currents are simulated by direct injection of CW test currents
into the model.
A. Parallel Plate Line: The parallel plate transmission llne
shown in Figure 3.3-9 will be used for frequencies up to
lO0 MHz. The aircraft will be initially replaced by a
reference probe to calibrate the illumination signal with the
power reference. The reference probe will be inserted in a
similar manner to the aircraft. Once the calibration has been
obtained, the reference probe will be removed and replaced by
the aircraft model. The dimenslons of the llne will be
determined by pretest analysis to optimize the useful
frequency range. Reconflguratlon of the termination end by
absorber materials and/or opening the end will extend the
upper frequency limit.
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3.3.6.3.2 Stimulus (Continued)
The response data from the aircraft can be taken out either by
Fiber Optics Link (FOL) or by hard wire. The fiber optics
approach is the best from a purely EM point of view. There
are two disadvantages, however. The first is the cost
associated wlth a FOL having several GHz bandwldths. The
second is that the FOL has a rather high noise floor, thus
limiting measurement dynamic range.
The data acquisition cables can be isolated from the test
object by the use of ferrlte beads and RF chokes. The choke
can be made by coiling the cable around a ferrite material.
Ferrlte beads can be used directly on the cable for
attenuation and isolation. The cable can be geometrically
attached to the test object in such a way that coupling to the
cable is very small. These attachment locations are at
E-fleld nulls on the test object, and are determined by
analysis. The cable will also be oriented normal to the
incident field so that there is very little coupling to it.
The current on the cable will be measured during test setup to
verify minimum interaction.
B. Antennas: A log periodic antenna will be used to illuminate
the model, as shown in Figure 3.3-I0, for frequencies above
the capabilities of the parallel plate llne up to 40 GHz. The
model pictured in this figure wlll be initially replaced by a
reference probe to calibrate the illumination signal wlth the
power reference. The reference probe will be inserted in a
similar manner to the aircraft. Once the calibration has been
obtained the reference probe will be removed and replaced by
the model. Data acquisition can be hard wired, with the same
considerations as described for the parallel plate llne, above.
C. Simulated Lightning Current Injection (up to 300 MHz):
Coaxial cables will connect the output of the RF amplifier to
the aircraft models as shown in Figure 3.3-II. The point of
connection will be at a probable lightning attachment
location. Again, data acquisition will be hard wired. Thls
is easier in this case than it is for the illumination cases.
Both the reference injected current and the test point
responses can be carried on shielded coaxes contained within
an overall shielded cable which forms the lightning current
detachment point, as shown.
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FIGURE 3.3-9
Parallel Plate Transmisslon for Frequencles Up to lO0 MHz
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FIGURE 3.3-I0
Log Perlodlc Antenna for Frequencies from lO0 MHz to 40 GHz
4788S 3-27
Fly-By-Light
Technology Development Plan
FINAL REPORT
30 August 1990
cJ_.
i
"r
w
(:
z
3
m
uJ
<
Q
0
,.J
_J
:lie
i
0
Ol
'V
I1.
FIGURE 3.3-II
Simulated Lightning Current Injection Set-up
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3.3.6.3.3
3.3.6.3.4
Aircraft Models
Three aircraft models wlll be used to determine current and
voltage amplitudes and electric and magnetic fields at the
avionics. The aircraft to be modeled will be a 747 or a DC-IO
size, an MD-80 slze, and a business size. It is possible that the
coupling can be studied for the smaller aircraft at higher
frequencies than for the large aircraft due to a larger scale size
for small aircraft. A B-747 has a length of about 70 M, which
results In a 7 m fuselage for a I/lO scale model, thus creating
the need for a large parallel plate line to study all significant
angles of illumination. Scale size issues will be resolved during
the planning activity. The models wlll have scaled apertures,
cables, and internal LRUs and will be as high fidelity as
possible. Skin thicknesses wlll not be scaled, and the models
wlll not be used to study diffusion or current redistribution
effects. These effects are especially Important for lightning and
will be studied with full scale test artlcles.
The reduced scale wlll allow the model to be oriented In each of
three orthogonal directions In the transmission llne and antenna
illumination cases, thereby assuring that all directions and
polarizations are provided. The longest dimension on the model
will be no larger than half the shortest dimension in the active
area in the cell to minimize the field perturbations. The model
will be large to provide adequate internal volume for placement of
the measurement probes and sensors.
Measurement
The use of scale models requires that the stimulus frequency be
extended by the corresponding amount (i.e., I/scale factor).
Therefore, measurement instrumentation must have adequate
frequency response. In order to obtain currents, voltages and
fields, the measurement probes and sensors wlll be made.
A. Current and Voltage Probes: Because the avionics system is
the object to which the internal fields inside couple, the
short circuit current and open circuit voltage probes will be
built as simulated scaled avionics as shown in Figures 3.3-12
and 3.3-13. Other avionics boxes are simulated by the load on
the other end of the simulated cables. The current probe
utilizes a l ohm resistor shunted to ground. The current
measured by a 50 ohm input network analyzer wlll thus be
1/50th of the actual current value. The voltage probe uses a
1 k ohm resistor in series with the simulated cable to reduce
the current and increase the voltage thereby approaching the
open circuit voltage value.
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LOAD SIMULATED AVIONICS CABLE
I
I TO 501;} NETWORKANALYZER
FIGURE 3.3-12
Short Circuit Current Probe
LOAD
SIMULATED AVIONICS CABLE I lkQ
,A_.,
I TO 50Q NETWORKANALYZER
P5420-16-16#
FIGURE 3.3-13
Open Circuit Voltage Probe
4788S 3-30
Fly-By-Llght
Technology Development Plan
FINAL REPORT
30 August lggO
3.3.6.3.4
3.3.6.3.5
Measurement (Continued)
B. Field Sensors: Field sensors wlll measure the fields at the
avionics box and act as a reference for the network analyzer.
The electric and magnetic field sensors are illustrated In
Figures 3.3-14 and 3.3-15. The electric field probe is
monopole above a ground plane where the center conductor of
the cable lead Is the antenna and the avionics box makes up
the ground plane. Two such sensors wlll be needed. The
first, as shown In Figure 3.3-14, wlll be rotated by
90 degrees for two orthogonal electrlc field components. The
second probe wlll be similar to the first except that the coax
conductor wlll pass straight through the box and penetrate the
vertical wall on the opposite side. This sensor wlll measure
the third orthogonal electrlc field component. The magnetic
field sensor Is a semicircular current loop. Three such
sensors will be needed, one for each of the three orthogonal
fleld orientations.
Co Probe and Sensor Cables: The cables which conduct the probe
and sensor signals to the network analyzer will be made of SMA
semi-rigid coax. The points on the scale model where these
cables penetrate the skin will be chosen to minimize the
perturbations of the surface current density and where the
minimum electric fields have been identified by numerical
modeling results. The points chosen will be different for
different scale model orientations in the illuminating fields
and for the injected current configurations. The shields on
the cables will be shorted to the inside surfaces of the scale
model metal struts. The cable exit from the scale model will
be through a connector Jack placed on the outside surface of
the skin. When a given connector is not in use a metal cap
wlll cover the connector thereby shielding the center
conductor of the probe/sensor from stray fields. For the
cable shield outside the scale model, an RF choke will be
incorporated Into the cable. Within 3 inches (G/4 for
f = l GHz) of the connector the seml-rlgid coax cable will be
coiled into several turns to block the RF signal on the shield
of the coax cable. The optimum inductive reactance will be
determined, but as an example, 6 turns with radius of 25 cm
will provide 50 ohms at lO MHz. In order to further minimize
the RF signals coupled to the cable shields, the cables wlll
be laid out for the parallel plate llne and the log periodic
antenna illumination areas with orientations perpendicular to
the electric fields produced by the test equipment.
Data Acqulsltlon
The data acquisition system will consist of the receive circuits
of the network analyzers, attenuators, a personal computer based
system controller/VAX terminal and Interface and local mass data
storage. An 80 dB screen room will contain this system as
discussed in Subsection A. below. The network analyzers will be
selected during procurement of the data acquisition equipment.
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L = (10 INCHES)/s
rl = L/4
s = SCALE FACTOR
L
TO NETWORK ANALYZER
FIGURE 3.3-14
Electric Field Probe
L = _10 INCHES)/s
(_ =L,,4
s --SCALE FACTOR
TO NETWORK ANALYZER
P5420-16-15#
FIGURE 3.3-15
Magnetic Field Probe
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3.3.6.3.5
3.3.6.3.6
3.3.6.4
3.3.6.5
Data Acquisition (Continued)
Figure 3.3-16 shows a functional block diagram of the data
acquisition system.
A. The data acquisition system will be contained in an 80 dB
shielded room or enclosure. The shields of the cables that
pass through the enclosure wall will be shorted to the inside
or outside of the wall for cables on the inside or outside,
respectively. The enclosure will be adequately grounded.
B* Attenuators: 60 dB of switchable attenuation will be provided
for the inputs to the network analyzer. Thls will assure a
safety margin for the network analyzer.
C, Data Acquisition Controller: The system controller will be
personal computer/mlcrocomputer based. The network analyzer
and attenuator control interfaces will be IEEE-488
implementations. The controller will be programmed to control
the test initiation, the frequency step size and sweep speed.
Signal to noise ratios wlll be monitored and the attenuators
adjusted for optimum S/N if adequate signal levels can be
maintained. At the completion of the sweep the data wlll be
stored on local mass storage and then uploaded to the VAX
computer by means of RS 232 serial interface in the personal
computer. Custom software will be written to implement the
control, monitoring and data manipulation.
Full Scale Sub-Element Testing
The facility would also have the capability of testing aircraft
sub-elements at full scale up to 40 GHz. One can evaluate cable
coupling, mitigation techniques, shielding of LRU enclosures, and
coupling to printed circuit (pc) boards.
Full Scale Validation
A full scale test bed will need to be developed to extend the
coupling validation to aircraft at the higher frequencies. Much
of the same instrumentation previously obtained can be used here.
The full scale test bed wlll also be used to spot check some of
the lower frequency scale model results at lower frequencies.
A full scale test bed is envisioned to consist of a full size
aircraft (not necessarily airworthy), plus perhaps some full scale
major aircraft structures (such as a wing). Here is where the
impact of composite structures wlll also need to be examined.
Threat Level Definition
One of the outputs of this effort will be a detailed knowledge of
internal EM environments, such as the current, voltages, and field
levels. These levels can then be used to define waveforms
suitable for LRU standards and testing specifications.
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FIGURE 3.3-16
Functional Block Diagram of the Data Acqulsltlon System
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3.3.6.6
3.3.6.7
3.3.6.8
3.3.7
3.4
Code Enhancements
Once the technical features of the code are in place, the next
step is to make them user friendly as described in Task 7. The
intent here is to make the codes easily usable to someone who is
not an EM theoretical expert.
Test Method Development
Another major output of this effort is the development of aircraft
EME test methods. The intent here is to define LRU specifications
and test methods so that entire aircraft testing will not be
required for certification.
Aircraft Demonstration
The methodology will be applied to the EME hardening of a
demonstration aircraft. Its EME hardness will be demonstrated by
the analysis and test methods developed under thls effort. The
approach here is to perform the EME demonstration with a ground
test that covers HERF and lightning. A full up airworthy vehicle
with all systems powered and functional wlll be the test object.
Test planning and analysis activities will be done to ensure
proper test configurations and procedures so that the test results
are applicable to an In-fllght aircraft.
EME Protection Technologles/Approaches
Listed below are some EME protection approaches.
CONVENTIONAL EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES
Shielding
Filtering
Redundancy
Mechanical Controls
(including Hydraullc)
Diversion Paths
Grounding
Balanced Circuitry
E1ectrlcal Bonding
Location
Fiber Optics
Transparent Recovery
Software Tolerance
Reconflguratlon
Hardened XCs
Conductive Composites
Immune Electronic Backup
Optical Computing and Storage
Fiber Optlcs/Optlcs
Over the past decade the effort to develop aircraft suitable fiber
optics has grown exponentlally. These efforts have provided
aircraft systems designers with a host of new fiber optic
components, cables, sensors, switches, and data llnks/buses needed
for viable FBL systems. Table 3.4-I provides a very partial llst
of fiber optic developments.
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High Temperature Glass and Plastic
Improved Bend Radius
Radiation Hardened
Polarization Preserving
Ribbon
CONNECTORS
Vibration and Shock Resistant
Repeatable Terminations
Crimp and Cleave
Environmentally Sealed
Temperature Insensitive
Ribbon
Multipin
MIL-STD
Automated Termination
Reduced Loss
COUPLERS
Temperature and Shock Resistant
Etched Glass
Temperature Insensitive
MultiChannel Waveleng_ Division Mulfiplexe_
Improved Packaging
Reduced Loss
EMITTERS/DETECTORS
Improved Launch Power/Sensitivity
Reduced Electrical Power Consumption
Reduced Temperature Drift
SENSORS AND SWITCHES
Viable Optical Powering
Digital and Analog Techniques
Improved Performance and Reliability
Parameter Sensitive
OTHER
Integrated Optics
Smart Skins
Optical Computing
TABLE 3.4-]
Partial L_st of Fiber Optlc Developments for Aircraft
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3.4
3.4.1
Fiber Optlcs/Optlcs (Continued)
While current fiber optics for aircraft have ample room for
improvement in terms of manufacture, installation, reliability,
and maintainability, they are mature enough for implementation on
a limited basis to address some particularly troublesome problems.
A wlde variety of potential benefits are commonly attributed to
the application of fiber optics as noted In Table 3.4-2; but EMI
protection, potential weight savings, performance requirements,
and higher data rates are driving FBL.
Optical Data Bus
The following fiber optics data bus issues have received a great
deal of attention, but have not been resolved:
A. Splltters/Coupler: Fused couplers are sensitive to humidity.
Grating types are sensitive to vibration and shock.
So Light Sources/Detectors: Temperature range is a significant
problem. LEDs lack reliability at high temperatures, while
lasers and photo detectors exhibit wavelength drift with
temperature variations. Peltler elements are sometimes
required for cooling or temperature stabilization. They are
unreliable and introduce added complexity to a system. For
wavelength discriminating sensor methods, a reliable, stable,
sold state broadband source is needed.
Co Connectors/Termlnatlons: Further progress must be made before
fiber optics can be generally considered for commercial
aircraft installation. Generally the available systems lack
reliability; some specific problems are llsted below:
l. High insertion losses
2. Loss variability from connector to connector
3. Unrepeatable losses for reconnect
4. High aging losses
5. Connector back reflection
6. Sensitivity to small amounts of contamination
A major concern is that current technology, particularly with
regard to connectors, uses adaptations of electrical technology
which do not address the unique properties of optical fibers. In
addition, there is a lack of standardization among airframe
manufacturers and fiber optic technology developers.
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SIMPLIFICATION BENEFITS
WEIGHT
LESS CABLE
LIGHTER CABLE
NO CABLE SHIELDING
FEWER CONNECTORS
RELIABILITY
FEWER TERMINATIONS
CORROSION-RES ISTANT
CABLES
INSTALLATION COSTS
FEWER RUNS
FEWER CLAMPS
MATERIAL COSTS
LESS CABLE
FEWER CONTACTS
DESIGN SIMPLIFICATION
FEWER SIGNAL PATHS
SIMPLER WIRING DIAGRAMS
PERFORMANCE BENEFITS
ELECTRICAL ISOLATION
NO SPARK OR FIRE HAZARDS
NO SHORT CIRCUITS
NO GROUND LOOPS
NO CROSS-TALK BETWEEN CABLES
IMMUNITY TO EMI
IMMUNITY TO LIGHTNING SURGE
CURRENT
WIDE BANDWIDTH
GREATER TRANSMISSION SECURITY
TABLE 3.4-2
Variety of Benefits Attributed to the Application of Fiber Optics
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3.4.1 Optical Data Bus (Continued)
Glass fiber is inherently fragile as compared to copper wire.
This is a factor which must be examined in attempting to adapt
fiber optics to aircraft. Currently copper wires are assembled
into bundles using tle-wraps every few inches. The bundles are
installed Into the aircraft sections after which the sections are
Joined and the wires mated via connectors. Repair can be
performed by slicing or in some cases by pulling a new length of
wire.
These installation and repair methods may not be acceptable for
fiber optics. The present system requires connectors at every
aircraft section and optical systems are sensltlve to connector
losses. Tle-wraps may induce mlcrobendlng losses. Efficient,
reliable splicing techniques for optical fibers have not yet been
demonstrated, and pulling a fiber through a tightly wrapped bundle
may cause breakage.
Some work is being advanced in the area of fiber optic
connectors. DAC is currently reviewing fiber optic ribbon cables
(12 optical fibers in a 1/4 Inch wide ribbon). All 12 fibers are
terminated as a unit with etched silicon wafers and then
polished. A I/3 inch diameter cable with 144 fibers weighs
1.4 pounds per lO0 feet. Thls order of density is not possible
with copper wire due to cross talk. The application of integrated
optics to connector technology is a positive step in applying
optics to aircraft use.
Some of the other shortfalls of fiber optics In aircraft
applications are:
A. Large differences in path losses of linear and multlstar
networks.
B. Optical receiver limitations with regard to these large and
varied path losses.
C. Optical transmitter limitations of coupling sufficient power
into lossy networks.
D. Difficult network installation and uncertain reliability in
avionic environments.
First, the limitations of linear networks will be discussed.
There are four basic linear topologies in consideration for a
FBL System (see Figures 3.4-I through 3.4-4). The shortfalls of
these configurations are high path losses and large differences in
path loss between adjacent terminals and widely separated
terminals. The number of terminals which can be implemented _n a
linear configuration is limited due to receiver sensitivity and
dynamic range, low coupled power from optical transmitters,
connector loss and a system margin for aging.
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FIGURE 3.4-1
Dual K Configuration (Two Bus Fibers)
• • • •
FIGURE 3.4-2
Linear Loop Configuration
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FIGURE 3.4-3
Dual K Configuration (One Bus Fibers)
_.°
v
CONTROLLER
FIGURE 3.4-4
Broken Linear Loop Configuration
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3.4 .I Optical Data Bus (Continued)
To analyze this problem quantitatively, a computer program for
which the data is presented in Figure 3.4-5, has been developed by
DAC. This program makes three assumptions about the couplers in
the network:
I. All couplers in a given network have identical insertion
loss.
2. The asymmetry of the couplers is constant, regardless of
the tap ratio.
3. The efficiency of the couplers is constant, regardless of
the tap ratio.
Our discussions with suppliers and lab tests to date indicate that
these assumptions are roughly true (+-15%) and adequately
conservative for the typical tap ratios which will be used
(I0-20 dB).
State-of-the-art multlmode fiber optic couplers can be produced at
any tap ratio between 3 and about 40 dB. In a multlterminal data
bus there will be some optimum tap ratio such that sufficient
energy is tapped from the bus but not so much that energy is
depleted for terminals further down the bus. The optimum ratio is
a function of the number and efficiency of the couplers on a bus
and the configuration utilization.
Applied to a typical FBL system (25 terminals), Figure 3.4-5 shows
the relationship between the maximum loss budget (loss between
Terminal l and 25) and the tap ratio for a dual K configuration
(Figure 3.4-6) with the characteristics noted in the figure. The
graph indicates the minimum loss is 48 dB and will occur when a
14 dB tap ratio is specified. Figure 3.4-7 shows the loss profile
of the dual K linear data bus which has the same characteristics
as the bus of Figure 3.4-5 and utilizes the 14 dB optimum tap
ratio. The discontinuities indicate the flve bus connector
locations (each tap fiber has one connector also). Also indicated
in this figure Is a typical wrap around loss (insertion loss
between the transmitter and receiver of a given terminal) for this
configuration. Two connectors are included in the wrap around
path. The importance of wrap around will become apparent in a
subsequent discussion of optical receiver limitations.
Closely related to the previous network loss budget considerations
are optical transmitter and receiver limitations. The transmitter
and receiver must operate properly with both the minimum and
maximum path losses of a given network. The critical requirements
are the amount of optical power which can be launched into the
network from the transmitters, and the capability of the receivers
to detect a wide range of optical power levels as a result of the
varied path losses of the linear networks indicated.
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25 NODE LINEAR NETWORK LOSS CHARACTERISTICS
DUAL K WITH
TWO BUS FIBERS
(FIGURE 1)
DUAL K WITH
ONE BUS FIBER
(FIGURE 3)
UNEAR LOOP
(FIGURE 2)
BROKEN'
LINEAR LOOP
LFIGURE 4)
OPTIMUM
rAP RATIO (dB
I
14
18
17
_7
MAXIMUM
LOSS (dB)
48
S7.S
67.5
37
MINIMUM
LOSS laB)
24
24
_2
COMMENTS
COMPLETE INSTALLATION
REQUIRES TWO NETWORKS
MAX LOSS INCLUDES
50 0.1 aB SPLICES AND
50 COUPLERS
TWO OF EACH PER TERMINAL)
MAX LOSS INCLUDES
10 BUS CONNECTORS
(S ON EACH SIDE)
AND 50 SPLICES
(25 ON EACH SID_
FIGURE 3.4-5
Results of Calculations for Each Linear Configuration
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FIGURE 3.4-6
Dual K Fiber Llnk Loss Vs. Tap Ratio
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FIGURE 3.4-7
Dual K Fiber Optic Llnk Loss Profile
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3.4.1 Optical Data Bus (Continued)
The launched power is limited by the fiber core size and the type
of optical source used. Candidate optical sources include laser
diodes, Burrus LEDs, edge emitting LEDs, and superlumlnescent
LEDs. Although the laser diode has the greatest launched power
capability, the drive circuitry is complex and must be temperature
stabilized. Typically thermoelectric coolers, which have large
power consumption, are used for temperature stabilization. The
laser diode is generally less reliable (lO6 hours compared to
lO7 hours) and more costly ($500-$2,000 compared to $I0-$300)
than a Burrus or edge emitting LEDs and presents a safety hazard
to the user. The superlumlnescent LED is also less reliable and
more costly, leaving the Burrus or edge emitter as the only
practical alternatives for avionic data bus applications. The
edge emitter, although more expensive than the Burrus LED
($200-$300 compared to $I0-$100) generally couples more power Into
a given fiber. The launched power improvement Is generally more
pronounced wlth smaller fiber core sizes (I00 micrometers or less).
The trade offs between edge emitting and Burrus LEDs are currently
being considered at DAC In the development of an optical
transceiver palr suitable for the ARINC 629 terminal avionics data
bus. The best surface emitting LED found to date will couple
0 dBm peak Into a lO0 micrometer core fiber but costs $600. The
receiver alternatives are more complex as Its sensitivity and
dynamic range specifications are not only a function of the
optical detector utilized (pin diode or avalanche photo diode) but
also a function of the associated electronics, signal format and
data rate. These design trade offs and alternatives wlll not be
discussed here as there are various papers avallable which discuss
these issues in detail.
A state-of-the-art receiver developed for a 2 megablts per second
(Mbps) Manchester II encoded multltransmltter data bus (ARINC 629)
has a sensitivity of -42 dBm minimum and a dynamic range of
20 dB. Assuming 0 dBm launched power these specifications fall
short of that required for each of the linear networks discussed
previously. One of the factors which limits the sensitivity of
thls particular receiver is the fact that it must be DC coupled.
This requirement is a result of the fact that the ARINC 629 data
stream has no preamble and operates in burst mode (i.e., there are
relatively long quiet periods between data transmissions). The DC
coupled design extends the bandwidth and therefore the noise in
the receiver limiting sensitivity.
A general consideration for a FBL System is a given termlnal's
capability to check itself during transmission and also to detect
the presence of a collision on the bus and respond accordingly.
In order for a terminal to check itself during transmission, it
must be able to receive Its own data from the bus. Thus the wrap
around loss as discussed previously must be accounted for when
determining a receivers dynamic range requirements. This loss
must be large enough such that a given terminal does not saturate
its own receiver when it Is transmitting.
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3.4.1 Optical Data Bus (Continued)
Thls Is particularly important in the dual K configuration where
the wrap-around loss Is considerably less than the loss between
two adjacent terminals. It seems tempting on the first look at
thls problem to temporarily "desensitize" a given terminals
receiver when that terminal is transmitting or simply disable the
receiver during that termlnal's transmission and provide the wrap
around signal electronically within the terminal itself. Although
either approach Is feasible, each would defeat that termlnal's
ability to detect a collision during its own transmission. Thls
would not be acceptable for a FBL application as fault tolerance
would be compromised. Thus wrap around loss and the associated
limitations are an additional shortfall of fiber optics, at least
in the dual K network configuration.
A third shortfall of fiber optic technology In aircraft
applications is a produciblllty issue. The Installatlon of fiber
networks, particularly in llnear configurations will involve
several challenges. To Install fiber optic network harnesses with
acceptable losses will require they be installed with a minimum of
connectors and splices implying harnesses be produced in as few
pieces as possible. This will require the capability to
manufacture sections of linear harnesses with couplers in single
pieces with accurate dimensions quickly and easily on the aircraft
assembly llne. Current technology requires an extremely labor
intensive process to produce couplers, terminations and splices
and cannot be readily adapted to aircraft manufacturing
environments. It is our experience that chipping and cracking
during these processes are not at all uncommon, even for the
experienced technician. Any fiber damage during the harness
development process will require rework and possibly additional
splices to avoid compromising the harness dimensions.
To address the link loss and some of the installation issues of
fiber optic networks, DAC can utilize the "Fiber Optic Integration
Interconnection System" which has been developed at DAC to offer a
new way to cost effectively incorporate fiber optics into a
production aircraft and minimize connections. This concept
involves new installation handling and protection techniques which
are needed to ensure flrst-tlme quality and to minimize production
and In-servlce costs of fiber optics. This approach is based upon
treating the entire aircraft as a single system. It has three
major components:
A. Trunk Line: This is a fiber optic cable assembly that runs
the entire length of the aircraft and has breakouts at
designated locations found within a given "zone". The trunk
consists primarily of AT&T's 12 fiber ribbon cable and
utilizes their multiple array connectors which connects all
12 fibers of the ribbon simultaneously.
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3.4.1 Optical Data Bus (Continued)
B. Zone: Divides the aircraft into Interconnectlon areas. These
"zones" are determined from the production procedures which
manufacturing utilizes to build and assemble the aircraft.
Co Fiber Optic Integration Unit Is a Junction box used to branch
the fiber optic cable from the "trunk llne" to the end
destination point (data bus terminal in this case) within a
designated "zone".
This installation approach offers many advantages such as the
optimization and standardization of engineering design,
maintainability, consistent quality installations, reduced parts
damage, reduced rework and increased production efficiency. A
prototype has been successfully installed in a MD-SO mockup. It
was a simple installation task to route the ribbon fiber through
the entire length of the fuselage with no connectors.
In order to take full advantage of this installation concept, a
local star configuration can be utilized. A FBL System would use
three transmissive stars as shown in Figure 3.4-8, one in the
avionics bay, one in wing root areas and one in the tall area. As
shown in Figure 3.4-9, using 16 X 16 star couplers with an
insertion loss of 14+- 1.5 dB with three receive fibers on each
star connected to three transmit fibers on each of the other two
stars a thirty terminal network is realized with a maximum and
minimum loss of 39 and 22 dB, respectively, assuming each transmit
and receive fiber has two connectors at 1.5+-0.5 dB each. This
only leaves a 3 dB system margin, leaving little room for
component variations or additional connectors.
In addition to improving the network loss profile previously
described, the transceivers can be improved to increase the
terminal count and system margin limitations. DAC is currently
investigating a Frequency Shift Keyed (FSK) signal format approach
instead of the standard Manchester II signal. A transceiver
manufacturer has realized an additional lO db of dynamic range
with this signal format. This is reflected in specifications of
an optical transceiver recently developed. To address the
limitations of receiver sensitivity a preamble can be added to the
data bus messages. This would require a modification to the
ARINC 629 and MIL-STD-1773. Preliminary investigations indicate a
5 to IO dB increase in receiver sensitivity can be realized.
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FIGURE 3.4-8
Terminal Local Transmissive Star Fly-By-Light Network
Compatible With Fiber Optic Integration Interconnectlon System
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Link Loss Termlnal 1 to N for Local Star
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3.4.2 Optical Sensors
Voluminous amounts of research and developmental work have been
done in investigating fiber optlc sensors. Except for an on/off
switch and a temperature sensor, however, not very many of these
sensors are available as products. The reason for thls Is that
most of the effort has been concentrated on demonstrating new
ideas and configurations of fiber sensors rather than on their
reliability over environmental conditions. As generally happens
wlth a new technology, product avallabillty depends largely on the
economics of replacing the existing technology. Limitations of
fiber optic sensors include the dynamic range and the sensitivity
to physical parameters other than the one being measured.
There are a variety of physical mechanisms that have been adapted
for use in sensors employing fiber optics, comprising a set of
optical modulation principles appropriate for optic sensors. In
each of these principles a sensing element mechanism modifies
power generated by some optical source to convey information about
the sensed physical parameter. These optical modulation
principles can be grouped Into flve major categories:
Interferometry, Time Division Multiplexing (TDM), Wavelength
Multiplexing (WDM), Intensity Modulation (IM), and Optically
Powered Sensors (OPS).
Interferometrlc type fiber optic sensors are more susceptible to
changes in physical conditions, such as temperature variation and
mechanical shock, than the intensity modulated type. However,
these problems can be over come through proper instrumentation.
For example, the fiber optic gyro Is a Sagnac Interferometer, and
it Is a highly sensitive rotation sensor. Honeywell has
demonstrated building an Interferometrlc fiber optic gyro as a
product for the Attitude Heading Reference Systems (AHRS). The
intrinsic or extrinsic IM type fiber optic sensors are based on
simple optical principles and have some limitations. These
include optical component contamination problems for sensors,
output intensity normalization requirements to compensate for
connector and other losses, and limited capability to multiplex
the output signals from several sensors on to a standard data
bus. TDM and WDM approaches have the disadvantage of complex
encoding schemes, hlgh insertion losses, and non-unlform bit
response. Since both of them are based on extrinsic IM, they have
the problems of encoder and fiber ends' contamination.
Fiber optic sensors to measure switch state, position, pressure,
and other parameters have been demonstrated In the laboratory, but
their use In harsh environments such as an aircraft Is very
limited. The present status and what might be needed to put some
of these fiber optic sensors In FBL systems are described In the
following subsections.
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3.4.2.1
3.4.2.2
3.4.2.3
Proximity and Other On/Off Switches
The push-button switch relies on reflections of optical power from
a mirror which is switched either into or out of the reflecting
position. Though good on/off ratios may be achievable, failure
modes include susceptibility to contamination of the optical
components and reliability considerations associated wlth the
mechanical switching mechanism. Hermetic sealing of these
switches is difficult. This problem can be solved by using some
sort of magnetic coupling to the switching element. Fiber optic
switches which would pass the aircraft specifications are seen as
plausible for the near term.
Pressure Sensors
Several fiber optic pressure sensors including Interferometrlc and
IM types have been proposed. Detection capability of these
sensors are often limited by their sensitivity to temperature
changes. In one IM type the pressure induced displaces a small
diaphragm which acts as a Fabry-perot cavity attached to an
optical fiber. Pressure is then measured as a function of the
resultant modified optical spectrum. Temperature sensitivity Is
minimized by using a small cavity and proper selection of
materials. Polarization cross coupling in a properly aligned
polarization maintaining fiber can be used as a pressure gauge.
Realization of pressure sensors for the FBL system may occur in
the range of lO years or less.
Position Sensors
Linear variable differential transformers (LVDTs) are the most
commonly used electrical position sensors used in aircraft and
have proven to be very reliable. Most of the fiber optic position
sensors are based on the principle of intensity modulation. The
position on a "n" bit gray-coded encoder is read with a read head,
which provides digital pulses that are wavelength or time division
multiplexed. Since the multiplexing needed for a lO bit
resolution is complex, non-unlform bit response is seen as a
common occurrence. In a delay-llne TDM sensor, the non-unlformlty
is caused by a imbalance of delay-llne taps or by imperfections in
the optical apertures of the read head. In a WDM system, it can
be caused by intensity modulations in the spectrum source, or by
the optical properties of the fibers, connectors, filters, etc.
The other most common problem wlth fiber optic position sensors
proposed in the past is that since light leaves the fiber,
contamination of optics can degrade their performance.
The dlgltal-optlcal time division multiplexed (TDM) method of
position measurement has been demonstrated on the Advanced Digital
Optical Control System (ADOCS) program and a second generation
TDM sensor is being developed under the Advanced Optical Position
Transducers (AOPT) program. In this concept a 20 nanosecond
optical interrogation pulse is split up into 12 delay lines. A
reflective grey code plate reflects bits of position information
back down the respective delay lines.
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3.4.2.3 Position Sensors (Continued)
Thus the interrogation pulse is split into 12 on/off serial
position bits at the receivers. Although simple in theory,
difficulties arise in connector losses and reflections. High
speed automatic gain control circuitry is required to accurately
read the serial data in the presence of blt Intermodulatlon from
connector reflections and delays.
Eldec Corporation is in the process of developing a hybrid
electrlcal/optlcal sensor concept termed "E1-Optlc". This family
of sensors uses existing electrical sensors powered by either a
battery or an optical power source supplied via optical fiber.
Sensor data is communicated by optical fiber. Two simple battery
powered sensors are now In flight testing In scheduled commercial
service. Optically powered sensors are in a research stage at
Eldec. Issues involved in the design of these sensors include a
lack of reliability data for batteries, mlcropowered circuit
design, and reliability at elevated temperatures. Advantages
include EMI immunity due to purely optical external connections
and a wide choice of sending functions.
A passive fiber sensor concept in development at Eldec is called
Tlme Delay Intenslty Normalization (TDIN). Based on the intensity
modulation sensor concept, an optical pulse is split into a
reference delay arm and a sensing arm. Some sort of transductlon
technique transforms an environmental parameter into a reflected
optical power level. The resulting signal pulse and delayed
reference pulse are compared at the detector.
After suitable analog pulse averaging and normalization,
accuracies approaching 0.25% (9 bits) have been demonstrated over
a source power variation of 12 dB. Thus, the prlnclpal problem of
analog Intenslty-based sensors has been addressed, namely source
intensity and connection loss variation. Concepts for
multiplexing have been presented. (Reference 5).
TDIN Is essentially a transducer readout concept and Is separable
from the actual transducer design. The transducers themselves are
still in a research/development stage. Accuracies and ripples are
on the order of I%. Optimization is still required. The main
concern for position sensors, for example, is sealing against
environmental effects. Temperature sensors and pressure sensors
have not yet been developed.
Litton is developing fiber sensor concepts based on the WDM
approach. Existing designs for rotary and linear position,
temperature and pressure sensing, are under development for
aircraft propulsion system applications. Areas of technology
advancement needed include better fiber Jacket temperature
performance for microbendlng losses, high reliability detectors
and circuitry for high temperature environments, and broad
spectrum LEDs.
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3.4.2.3
3.4.3
Position Sensors (Continued)
Fllghtworthy approaches for position sensing should incorporate
the following features:
o Light must not leave the fiber
o Multiplexing schemes must be kept simple
o Must have the capability to seal the sensor hermetically
o The insertion loss of the sensor must be kept as low as
possible through careful design
Passive optical sensors have achieved fllghtworthy status in some
cases, but cost, ruggedness and production engineering issues
still limit the applicability of these sensors in flight controls
systems.
Optically Powered Sensors
Electrically passive optical sensors as previously described are
ideal for immunity against EMI. However, an engineering penalty
is paid for such sensors. Without the benefit of reliable
electronic signal processing at the sensor, the types of sensors
that can fill this category are severely limited. For example,
the cost and maintainability penalties paid on the ADOCS program,
which used a passive optical displacement sensor, were significant.
It is conceivable that electrically passive fiber optic position
sensors that would satisfy the FBL system specifications can be
made available for second generation FBL commercial aircraft. For
the near term, Honeywell is investigating optically powered
sensors. In this concept, optical fiber provides EMI immunity by
electrically isolating the existing electrical sensor completely
and overcomes the disadvantages of the passive sensor by providing
powerful electronic signal processing capability.
What made this possible was a breakthrough in mlcropower circuit
elements. Honeywell was able to reduce normal power requirements
of I/O circuits and signal processing circuits to extremely low
levels and achieve high yields in production. Honeywell is thus
able to take full advantage of reliable and rugged sensors that
have been proven in the field on operational aircraft and simply
replace the I/O clrcu%try with those that could perform the same
function utilizing significantly less power. An optically powered
throttle lever angle (TLA) RVDT for a full authority digital
engine control system is being developed for the Optical
Propulsion Management Interface System (OPMIS) program and will be
flight tested on the Advanced Transport Operating System
(ATOPS) aircraft at NASA Langley. Honeywell is evaluating the
application of this technology to FBW aircraft and the extent of
EME immunity that is achievable. A proximity switch based on the
same technology has also been developed at Honeywell.
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3.4.3
3.4.3.1
Optically Powered Sensors (Continued)
Principle advantages of optical powered sensor (OPS) technology
include:
A. Mature electronic technologies
B. EMI immunity and verifiability
C. Established common interface - multlplexlbillty
OPS Technology Development Areas
Optlcally powered sensor development centers around several key
areas. These areas include:
o Temperature stabilization of sensor output.
o EME-immune sensor module packaglng/shleldlng.
o Optical source power and reliability.
o Multiplexing architectures and protocol.
o High temperature (250°C) circuitry.
These areas will be discussed briefly below.
A, Temperature stability is completely independent of optical
effects in an optically powered sensor since the optics are
used only as a digital information and power channel.
Electronics effects at the sensor alone determine the
temperature stability. Considerable progress has been made in
designing ratlometric calibrating mlcropower circuitry that to
a first order cancels temperature drift in components.
Circuitry for the TLA sensor provides less than 0.5% drift
over the temperature range of -55°C to +gO°C.
Beyond this temperature, leakage currents from components such
as diodes and CMOS gates become noticeable, requiring more
optical power to maintain the electrical power budget.
B, An isolated electrical circuit can be shielded to an arbitrary
level from EME at expected frequencies, i.e. to the GHz
range. When a small aperture in the shielding is opened for
optical connections, short wavelength radiation in the
GHz frequency range may be coupled to the optical photodlode
or LED. Low frequency cutoffs of KHz and MHz on these devices
will attenuate coupled microwave radiation to a large extent.
Another EME coupling aperture may be provided by the
electrical transducer itself, such as RVDT, LVDT or
temperature sensor. Further study and EME modeling is needed
to accurately determine the EME attenuation of the sensor
shielding. It is expected that the elimination of long
electrical or sensor cabling will virtually eliminate EME
coupling into the OPS system.
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3.4.3.1
3.4.3.2
OPS Technology Development Areas (Continued)
C. High power, hlgh reliability LED technology is being actively
pursued by Honeywell's Optoelectronlc Division (OED) and
Corporate Systems Development Center (CSOC). At OED, new
lenslng techniques that increase flber-coupled power by up to
a factor of slx for lOOm fiber are in development. At CSDC, a
dielectric quarter wave stack acts as a mirror to reflect
light towards the fiber, nearly doubling power output. These
technology developments wlll drive the demonstrated hlgh
reliability of LED's to a sufficient power margin for most
optically powered sensors.
For longer term sensor technology development, sensor
multiplexing and architecture issues indicate the use of laser
diodes as optical power sources. Reliability and temperature
issues are presently hindering the acceptability of these
devices. Lifetime enhancement by low duty cycle usage and
near threshold operation are being investigated by Honeywell.
Thermoelectric cooler technology is not yet reliable enough
for application. Further development is needed by the laser
and thermoelectric cooler manufacturers.
D. The development of h_gh power optical sources wlll drive the
multiplexing capabilities of optically powered sensors.
Issues to be analyzed include sensor architectures power
margins, redundancy, and data communication protocols. It may
be possible to interface in thls system to an ARINC 629 type
of optical network.
E, Operation over the range of -55 to +125% is expected with
sillcon-based technology. Longer term research will center on
the use of sillcon-on-lnsulatlon (SOl), Gallium
Arsenide (GaAs), and Silicon Carbide (SIC) technology. Higher
bandgaps in these semiconductors allow higher temperature
operation with reduced leakage current. Honeywell is active
In both SOI and GaAs technology, and significant progress is
being made in SIC technology at companies such as Cray
Research.
OPS Development in Industry
The optlcally powered sensor concept Is also known as
power-by-llght (PBL) and power-by-flber (PBF). EG&G and Slm_onds
Precision also are developing OPS systems. Moog, Inc., wlth Banks
E1ectronlcs and Varlon, has also developed a prototype OPS.
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3.4.4
3.4.4.1
Optical Gyro Technologies
Overview
Three types of technologies are currently being pursued for
gyros: the interferometric fiber optical gyroscope (IFOG), the
resonant fiber optic gyroscope (RFOG), and the ring laser
gyroscope (RLG). Currently, RLG's are widely used for many types
of military and commercial applications, while the other
technologies range from research and development to early product
development. All three kinds are based on the Sagnac effect.
This phenomena, discovered In 1913, states that two
counter-rotatlng optlcalbeams traveling around the same closed
optical path will experience pathlength differences that are
proportional to the rotatlon rate of the closed optical path.
The various optical gyro technologies are distinguished by
different techniques for measuring this rotatlon-lnduced
pathlength dlfference. The RFOG and RLG pathlength differences
are sensed by measuring the difference between two cavity resonant
frequencies. In the IFOG, the rate Is sensed through direct
measurement (open-loop) or the nulllng (closed-loop) of the
optical phase differences of the two beams.
The means of implementing the measurement of pathlength
differences are quite different among the RLG, the IFOG and the
RFOT. Both the IFOG and the RFOG utilize an external light source
to launch light into a passive fiber loop. The IFOG requires a
broadband light source to eliminate many error sources while the
RFOG, whose operation most closely resembles the RLG, requires an
extremely narrowband light source. For the RLG, a narrowband gas
laser wlth Its active galn medium is an integral part of the
sensing cavity. Therefore, the RLG is characterized as an
"active" optical gyro, as opposed to the IFOG and RFOG which are
considered passive.
The fiber optic gyroscope of choice is the IFOG because it can
meet the aforementioned objectives while offering additional
advantages. These include low weight, low power consumption,
rapid start-up time, long shelf llfe and flexible geometries. The
advantages of the IFOG are attributed to its solld-state
construction and its limited number of components, which are a
light source, a coupler to split light, a length of optical fiber
as the rotation sensing loop, a photodetector and a polarizer.
IFOG's are potentially low In cost.
As mentioned earlier, IFOG's are essentially classlfled as elther
open-loop or closed-loop.
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3.4.4.2 Open-Loop IFOG
In the open-loop IFOG, light is directed into the fiber to sense
the rotation rate. Upon exit, a photodetector captures the two
counter-propagating beams having some relative phase shift. (If
the gyro is at rest, the two beams will travel the same distance
and will be in phase, and the intensity of the combined beam will
be maximum.) Destructive interference due to any phase mismatch,
as a result of a rotating gyro, will result in a reduction of the
output intensity. The rotation rate can be determined by
monitoring signal changes at the output.
Despite Its presumed simplicity, the open-loop design is a
sophisticated instrument requiring additional refinements. The
output photocurrent, for example, Is a ralsed-coslne function of
the phase difference between the two counter-propagatlng beams.
Slnusoldal bias modulation is introduced at one end of the sensing
loop by means of an optical phase modulator that is used to
overcome at-rest minimum sensltlvlty. Synchronous demodulation of
the detected optical signal is then applied to recover the
rotation rate and direction of rotation. Such a modulation-
demodulation technique transforms the gyro transfer function from
that of a ralsed-coslne to a sine. The latter function exhlb!ts
maximum sensitivity at rest. The polarity of the signal indicates
the direction of rotation.
Problems arising from the slnusoldal transfer function are
twofold. First, the periodicity of the slnusoldal function yields
an unambiguous measurement only between -90 and 90 degrees. Thus,
the dynamic range is limited. Secondly, the scale factor
llnearlty becomes worse as rotation rates increase. Achieving
good scale factor performance over a large dynamic range is an
on-golng research topic for the IFOG.
Both dynamic range and scale factor llnearlty can be improved with
open-loop signal processing techniques and the use of a
closed-loop servo. Open loop processing relies on post processing
of the gyro output signal to llnearlze the slnusoldal dependence.
The closed-loop servo, on the other hand, uses a feedback loop to
force the gyro to operate at the null condition. Both techniques
help minimize the dependence of the output on fluctuations of
light source intensity, which is a sensitive design concern. Over
the past lO years, various open-loop processing approaches have
been proposed. The success of these open-loop techniques have
resulted In only modest gains in dynamic range and scale factor
accuracy. The open-loop IFOG is limited to low performance
applications because of the limited dynamic range and a scale
factor accuracy.
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3.4.4.3 Closed-Loop IGO (Serrodynlng)
To achieve appreciably improved performance, IFOGs are best
operated in a closed-loop mode, the present focus of IFOG
development. In a closed-loop IFOG, the Sagnac phase shift Is
compensated by introducing a phase shift of opposite polarity
using optical components within the fiber loop. One of the
preferred approaches for generating this phase nulllng effect is
to apply an optical frequency shift at one end of the fiber uslng
a technique known as serrodyne phase modulation. Serrodyne phase
modulatlon was first applied to microwave circuits to perform the
function of a frequency shifter. "Serra" in Latin means saw or
sawtooth.
By placing a phase modulator at one end of the fiber sensing loop,
and applying a sawtooth drive voltage to the modulator, clockwise
and counterclockwise waves each experience a saw-tooth phase
modulation but delay relative to each other by a time interval
equal to the loop's transit time. The effective phase shift at
the output of the loop is equal to the net phase difference of the
two sawtooth waveforms. Consequently, there is nonreciprocal
phase shift that is then used to counterbalance the
rotatlon-lnduced Sagnac phase shift. With this scheme, the sensor
Is always operated at Its most sensitive null condltlon. The
dynamic range of the serrodyne closed-loop IFOG wlll only be
limited by the bandwidth of the loop-closure transducer and the
serrodynlng electronics that return the sensor to its null
position.
In practical implementations, the output of the synchronous
demodulator is used as the error signal of a closed-loop servo.
This signal, after integration and amplification, is used to
control the frequency of the serrodyne electronics that drive the
phase modulator. The amount of phase shift applied to the sensing
loop is proportional to the serrodyne frequency which is a
measurement of rotation rate.
The null operation of closed-loop IFOGs also removes the problem
of source power fluctuation and electronic gain instability. The
digital readout electronics of the serrodyne IFOG generate a pulse
at the falling edge of each sawtooth cycle. Each pulse
corresponds to a small, fixed angular rotation and thus this
device integrates the rotation rate.
The two required elements for a high performance closed-loop IFOG
are a high speed serrodyne driver, and a high quality serrodyne
phase-modulator.
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3.4.4.4 IFOG Highlights
A. Open-loop IFOG
I. First FOG to be introduced as a product
2. Low-medlum scale-factor-performance applications
o Aircraft attitude, heading, and reference (AHRs)
o Space applications with modest scale factor
requlrements
3. AHRs flight test scheduled for latter 1989, 1990
4. Production to begin by 1991
5. Technical Data
o Slnusoldal output limits dynamic range to ±90 °
optical phase shift
o Scale factor llnearltles of lO00 ppm over
temperature demonstrated
o AHRs IFOG bias stability of l°/hr, random noise
O.O04°/sq. rt. (hr) demonstrated
o Higher performance open-loop gyro have
demonstrated O.l°/hr and O.O04°/sq. rt. (hr) bias
stability and random noise performance,
respectively
B. Serrodynlng IFOG
I. Closed-loop IFOG
2. Hlgh-performance appllcatlons
o Commercial airliners
o Military aircraft
3. On-golng prototype efforts
4. Hlgh-speed serrodyne driver
5. High-quallty serrodyne phase-modulator
6. Technical Data (ten-hour prototype run)
o Scale factor llnearlty Is 30 ppm from - 199 deg/s
to lO0 degs/s
o Bias stabillty 0.02 deg/hr
o Random noise of 0.0016 deg/sq, rt. (hr)
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3.4.4.4
3.4.4.5
IFOG Hlghllghts (Continued)
o Scale factor repeatability is better than 5 ppm at
room temperature, and better than 15 ppm from
-55°C to +45°C
o Optical phase shift stability of 0.4 microradlans
7. Forecasted flight test - two (2) years
Necessary Developments to Enable FOG
In order for the fiber optic gyroscope (closed-loop configuration)
to become fully operational and a prevalent product in commercial
and military aircraft markets, the following systems,
technological, and cost issues will have to be resolved. The
issues or concerns included in this document do not enumerate all
the problems associated with th%s project; however it does provide
details as to the developments required to enable this technology
for application in commercial avionics. Background information
about optical gyroscopes and specific fiber optics gyroscopes was
included to familiarize the reader with current technology and as
explanatory data.
A. Technology Issues
l. Wavelength stabilization of the light source to ensure
long term scale factor repeatability.
o Accurate measurement of the wavelength
o Temperature control/measurement compensation over
wlde environments
2. Testing over environments
o Thermal transient gradients across the sensing coll
o Radiation hardening
o Shock and vibration
3. Light source lifetime
4. Electronic development
B. Cost Issues
I. Fiber - reduce fiber costs
2. Components - current costs expected to go down rapidly
with large production volumes
3. Manufacturing and Production - unknowns
4. Factory Capital Costs - simple factory expected to be an
advantage for FOGs
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3.4.5
3.4.5.1
3.4.5.2
Some systems that have flown
There have been many fiber optic system flight test programs since
the late IgTO's. A variety of data links and a few optical sensor
systems have been reported. Most of the optical systems generally
performed up to expectations, although after extensive production
engineering for difficulties, especially with sensors. Problems
common to all systems centered on the Interconnection hardware.
The following are among the notable systems to date:
A. AV-8B Harrier Digital Data Link
B. ADOCS JUH-60A Digital Flight control side-arm controllers
position transducers
C. DC-IO Aileron Position - Sensor, Passenger Entertainment System
D. 73?-200 - Nose gear downlock sensor
E. Boeing 8 X 8 Star Bus Ethernet Command/Control
In general, connection hardware was the main problem on these
flight tests. Douglas Aircraft has conducted an extensive
connector evaluation program and has specific recommendations and
technology plans for solving these problems.
OPMIS
As part of its Fiber Optics Readiness program, Douglas Aircraft is
currently evaluating optical propulslon system technology in its
Optical Propulsion Management Interface System (OPMIS) program.
This is a cooperative program between DAC, United Technologies,
several fiber optic sensors vendors, and NASA Langley Research
Center. NASA is providing flight testing for vendor-supplled
fiber optic engine sensors and throttle sensors. This is an
opportunity for these vendors to gain valuable flight test data on
their optical components starting in 1990.
ADOCS
Production and flight testing of the first flber-optlc position
transducers revealed many of the problems of production and
reliability of electrically passive fiber sensors. Teledyne-Ryan
provided a set of TDM fiber sensors for the Advanced Digital
Optical Control System (ADOCS) program, based at the Army Applied
Technology Laboratory In Fort Huestls, VA.
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3.4.5.2 ADOCS (Continued)
3.4.5.3
3.5
Displacement transducers were designed to measure the position of
the helicopter swash plate and hence the main rotor angle. Short
stroke transducers were designed with 8 bits of precision, and
long stroke transducers wlth 12 bits of precision. Some 30 of
these sensors have logged over 500 hours of helicopter flight time
on the JUH-60 "Light Hawk" Some of the maln technology
development problems faced for these transducers were as follows:
A. Special 50m fiber delay llne coll technology, with thermally
matched mandrel and fiber.
B. Transducer sealing against "plstonlng" effect In a highly
contaminated environment.
C. High power pulsed laser diodes.
D. Extensive multiplexing, both on the bit level and on the
sensor level.
E. High frequency automatic gain control electronics required for
non-uniform bit response.
F. Optical code plate thermal expansion over the -65°F to 165°C
environment.
G. Low power budget margin.
H. Connector technology in a severe vibration environment. Fiber
breakage and connector contamination remains a problem.
The tremendous amount of engineering involved to overcome these
problems resulted in a price tag of $25,000 apiece for these
transducers. The system included 24 transducers. A second
generation of Teledyne-Ryan's TDM sensor is being developed under
the Advanced Optical Position Transducer (AOPT) program. It Is
evident from this program that the simple, elegant theoretical
idea of TDM sensors is very difficult to implement in a production
engineerlng sense.
FOCSI
The Fiber Optic Control System Integration (FOCSI) program has
concentrated on military applications of FBL FCSs.
FBW/FBL System Functions
The necessary functionality for commercial transport FBW/FBL is
generally agreed. In addition to augmented pltch/roll/yaw
control, full aircraft flight envelope protection is necessary.
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FBW/FBL System Functions (Continued)
Autoland is generally not considered to be a part of FBN/FBL.
Sidestlck control is llkely to be of the rate-command/attltude
hold type, or an equivalent.
FBW/FBL Computer to Sidestlck Interface
The technology drivers for sldestick controllers (SSC) indicate
that a fly-by-llght (FBL) configuration is desirable.
Fly-by-wlre (FBW) SSCs have used electrical transducers to detect
the motion of gimbals having mechanical mechanisms which provide
'feel' characteristics i11ustrated in Figure 3.6-1. The
controller always exhibits a return-to-center characteristic. The
force versus displacement characteristics are characterized by:
o Break-out force
o Primary force gradient
o Softstop stop
o Hardstop magnitude
The breakout force provides the pilot wlth a definite input force
threshold before manual control is applled. The softstop step
provides a definite cue to the pilot about the llmlt of the flight
regime. The softstop step can also be used to Implement different
control laws with the force gradient change, providing a cue to
the pllot.
Mechanization of conventional FBW aircraft SSC for roll and pitch
incorporates a base pivot in such a way that the grip pivots about
a point below the forearm, providing both force and displacement
to the pilot. Conventional force gradients are achieved by a
sprlng/sclssors mechanism allowing complete adjustability during
build. Viscous damping provides the best feel for aircraft SSCs.
The mechanisms incorporate a balanced pitch glmbal that prevents
inputs due to longitudinal aircraft acceleration.
Left and right hand grip configurations are provided. The switch
functions provided on each grip are tailored for each cockpit
configuration. Human factors specialists determine proper
location and force magnitude, optimized for ease of actuation.
Assemblies under mechanical loading where stress considerations
relate to safety hazards are:
o Column
o Pitch and roll gimbals
o Housing
o Boots
o Springs
o Rolls and pitch damper linkages
o Interconnect cabling flexing.
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FIGURE 3.6-I
Interactions of Force and Displacement, and Other Elements
That Enter Into Hand Controller Design Considerations
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FBW/FBL Computer to Sidestlck Interface (Continued)
Assemblies where mechanical wear-out-mechanlsms come into play are:
o Microswltches
o Roll and pitch glmba] bearings
o Damper seal mechanism
o Roll and pitch RVDTs
o External connectors
o Roll and pitch scissors mechanism.
These are typlcal parts for an SSC.
Active SSC
Lack of cross-cockplt coupling between SSC using conventional
FBW mechanical design may be overcome by active hand controller
technologies. Active SSCs use gimbals that are motor driven
rather than sprlng-restralned. The motors are actively controlled
by the flight control computer; thus, the two SSCs in the cockpit
will be electromechanlcally coupled. Forces exerted in opposite
directions will be algebraically added, with the net force
resulting in movement of the SSC.
Motor driven hand controllers are operational in our lab and
utilize the following components:
o Brushless dc torque motors
o Slnusoldal motor commutator
o Rotational variable differential transformers (RVDT) or
digital encoder plck-off
o Planetary gear reducers
o Internal torque sensors.
The hand controllers require real-tlme computer control where
position, rate, and force is output by the SSC and force command
is recelved. The flight control computer will provide the
processing capacity, performing the control algorithms for the
pilot and copilot SSCs.
The technologies for active SSCs are available without research
breakthrough. Areas such as high torque/low weight brushless
dc torque motors, available because of the new rare earth
permanent magnets coupled with relatively easy computation power
provided by microcomputers, makes active SSCs feasible.
Engineering implementation is the most significant factor to
consider the following critical commercial transport items:
o Safety
o Reliability
o Weight
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3.6.2
3.6.2.1
An FBL version of an active SSC requires optical data to be
transmitted between the SSC and flight control computer
(Figure 3.6-2). Since an active SSC uses internal electrical
signals, an optlcal-to-electrlcal converter is required.
SSC Sensors
SSCs for use In an FBL flight control system must provide an
optical output signal to the flight control computer. For
near-term applications, the output from an FBL SSC will be a
direct optical llnk to the flight control computer. As sensor
technology and optical data bus architecture mature, SSCs will
incorporate multiple axls sensors that interface both input and
output to a single optical fiber. The need for more than one
fiber wlll result from safety (redundancy) requirements rather
than data transmission needs. In the medlum-to-long, SSCs wlll
interface wlth flight control computers through a standard
avionics optical data bus.
Preliminary Analysis and Trades
For initial analysis of human factors, the slde sticks for air
transport FBL systems wlll employ standard electronic sensors with
the output converted to light by the use of a transmitter.
Coincident with human factors design, all position sensors used in
the FBL system wlll be reviewed for applicability to slde stick
controls.
The paragraphs below outline several options which exist for
suitable sensors, including:
Analog electrical sensors with output converted to
optical. These sensors require electric input and provide
a voltage output dependent on the magnitude of the stick
displacement.
Digital electronic sensors with output converted to
optical. These sensors require electric Input and output a
digital position signal to the flight control computer.
Digital optical sensors wlth or without multiplexed light
output. These sensors are passive since no electric power
(only light) Is required for input and output.
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Optical Interface of Sldestlck wlth Flight Control Computer
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Analog Electrical Sensors
Analog sensors such as RVDIs have been used as position sensors
for many years in flight control systems. They are essentially
transformers wlth a primary coll that couples two secondary coils
through a movable core. As the core is moved, a larger signal is
coupled into the secondary. The direction of motion is determined
by the phase of the output signal. Trlple or quad redundancy is
currently available. Other analog sensors are available such as
resolvers and synchros.
Demodulation circuitry is available to convert an RVDT output to a
digital signal. The digital signal can then be converted to a
digital optical output signal. However, the side stick unit will
require electric power to perform the conversion.
Digital Electronic Sensors
A second type of position sensor that has been used for side stick
control applications Is an absolute shaft angle encoder. Thls
device consists of LEDs and phototranslstors separated by a code
wheel. The wheel is a metal disk etched with an array of precise
holes. As the code wheel turns, the phototranslstors will provide
a digital output signal that depends on shaft position. Although
encoders can be made with 16-blt accuracy, hand controllers
require 12-blt accuracy. Thls type of sensor has several
advantages: (1) no moving electrical contacts, (2) the device
uses long llfe electronics, (3) the signal generated by the code
wheeT Is digital and doesn't require A-to-D conversion. The
disadvantage of encoders is that they are slngle-redundant; thus,
multiple sensors must be used to accomplish redundancy.
Digital Optical Sensors
The dlgital electronic output from any of the above devices may be
converted to light and injected into a fiber llnk using existing
transmltter/recelver circuitry. However, these devices require
electrical excitation and output digital electrical data. Optical
sensors, on the other hand, are passive since no electric power
(only light) is required for input and output.
For the short term, a small rugged optical sensor is available
from Litton Encoder. This sensor employs encoder technology as
described above; however, light originates from LEDs located
outboard of the sensor (e.g., in the flight control computer) and
is delivered to the sensor via fiber optic (F/O) bundles. The
encoded position of the shaft angle is then delivered to the
flight control computer via F/O bundles. These sensors offer
several advantages: (1) sensors are smaller than electronic
encoders, (2) F/O bundles will still function even If some fibers
break, and (3) the output of the control unit is available as
O-lO Vdc, as well as digital, thus providing dissimilar
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Digital Optical Sensors (Continued)
redundancy. Thls type of sensor may be incorporated into an
existing design immediately. The disadvantage of this sensor is
that dedicated links are required for optical transmission and
that the parallel 'word' output requires several transmission
channels.
For the medium term (three years), single fiber encoders may be
available. These sensors provide light input and output on a
single fiber. In addition, the Input/output of both the pitch and
roll axls may be placed on a single fiber using a splitter. Two
types of single fiber sensors are today available as prototypes.
TDM sensors were developed under the ADOCS program by
Teledyne-Ryan, and WDM encoders have been developed by
Litton-PolySclentlflc. The output of these sensors will be fed
directly to the flight control computer through a fiber optic llnk.
Long term sensors will be similar to those identified for medium
term except that their output will be interfaced to an optical
avionics bus.
Human Factors
Handling
The force per displacement and force per aircraft response
characteristics have been researched in previous studies, but
additional work remains to obtain the optimal levels for both
these characteristics. Figure 3.6-I illustrates the relationship
of the various sldestlck controller force per displacement
characteristics that will be determined. The tactile feedback for
the pilot to sense the neutral point is achieved with a breakout
force. A softstop position will be included In the sldestlck
controller design and the force and displacement limits will be
experimentally determined. The location of the sldestlck
controller X-Y axes should be rotated inboard and forward to
minimize cross-coupllng between the pitch and roll axes. If force
feedback is to be included in the sldestlck controller (forces
from either the other pilot or the autopllot), the time delay of
pilots input forces to the actuator movement should be lO0 ms to
maintain pilot-system stability.
These issues wlll be thoroughly reviewed in the available
literature. Especially relevant are those studies conducted by
Airbus, Boeing, and DAC. Unresolved Issues will be Inltlally
evaluated in the laboratory and later moving to a hlgh fidelity
simulator and then to flight test for final calibration.
Human Interface
The increasing number of female pilots in the alrllne industry
impacts future hand controller configurations. The anthropometlc
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Human Interface (Continued)
implications of the grip design and the adjustability of the grip
position with respect to the seat reference point will need to be
addressed.
If force feedback is to be incorporated in the design, male and
female strength capabilities must be considered during the
selection of human interface parameters.
Human factor specialists are utilized in the proper selection and
location of gyro mounted switches to insure ease of activation
without cross coupling to SSC motion.
FBW/FBL Computer to Actuator Interface
The application of smart actuators to commercial transport
aircraft is without production precedent. It is anticipated that
"smart" actuators which contain processors that perform most or
all of their own monitoring would be used for a FBW/FBL System.
This simplifies the interface since they need only be connected to
a common bidirectional data bus.
However, the aircraft is now potentially vulnerable to a generic
CPU or software fault. Relative to this concern, DAC/HI have been
actively evaluating a concept referred to as smart-actuator-
override. The actuator's processor/software could be bypassed by
the flight control computers and forced either to engage
unconditionally or disengage. Accordingly generic fault
protection could be provided for the smart actuator by the flight
control computer.
System Availability
The use of redundancy to extend the average interval of time
between required maintenance actions is of particular importance
for FBL. The mechanlcal systems being replaced by electronics are
themselves seldom replaced. It can be argued that to avoid
uncertainties and risks associated with comparatively frequent
equipment replacements, that the unit removal frequency for an FBL
System must be in the same range as the mechanical assemblies
being replaced.
The redundant elements which act in effect as "spares" have come
to be referred to as "secondary redundancy". Redundancy of the
more traditional type is by contrast referred to a "primary
redundancy". The failure of an element of "secondary redundancy"
results in no loss of functionality or reduction in safety level.
The mean-tlme-between-unlt-removal (MTBUR) that is believed
necessary is in the range of lO0,O00 hours. It should be noted
that such an extension of availability worsens the problem of
fault latency. Accordingly faults can be sustained without unit
removal despite internal "self-repalred" faults.
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System Availability (Continued)
The suggested task(s) to be performed address the benefits,
problems and, of course, costs associated wlth the incorporation
of "secondary redundancy" for extended availability.
Candidates must be developed and compared. The impact on
maintenance practices and installation mechanisms must be
addressed.
Two ways of controlling reconflguratlon of secondary redundancy
elements should be each investigated. Reconflguratlon decisions
can be made by hardware voters or vla software comparisons and
decision making algorithms or a combination of these methods.
Graceful Degradation
In Section 3.3, normal functionality was defined as requiring
augmented flight and automatic attitude hold. There is a need to
explore methods such that the system performance wlll
incrementally degrade as sensor sets are lost, rather than
shutdown, as is the predominant approach In current flight control
systems.
Generic Fault Tolerance
At the current time, N-verslon techniques are being applied by
most airframe manufacturers and avionic suppliers to provide
limited protection from certain types of generic faults. If thls
is to continue, we need to specify design guldellnes to maximize
version independence. A survey of experiences wlth N-verslon
techniques Is needed to aid In providing a quantification of
benefit.
System Recovery from Upset (Soft Fault Tolerance)
Introduction
Dependence upon electronic equipment to provide functions that are
critical to the safe flight and landing of aircraft, Is one of the
most profound of the recent advances in avionics. The conversion
of analog systems to a digital counter part is a natural extension
of this continuing evolution in avionics. Because of the immense
emphasis on research and development for the advancement of the
electronic devices associated wlth digital processors and the
extraordinary advancements that have been achieved as a result of
this emphasis, digital processing provides the opportunity for a
vast expanslon of the role of electronics In the control and
guidance of aircraft.
However, along wlth their data processing power, digital
processors have unique considerations that must be taken into
account. Digital processors are extremely complex general purpose
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3.11.1 Introduction (Continued)
machines. The complex software and hardware defy deterministic
assessment methodologies, thus, digital processor behavior should
be viewed as a probabillstlc issue. Soft faults refer to a
probablllstlc characteristic of digital processors that is not
found in analog processors and is, therefore, a relatively
unrecognized, unknown and unfamiliar factor. The more familiar
and commonly recognized failure characteristic Is referred to as a
hard fault where an electronic device has failed in a permanent or
irreversible fashion and is noncorrectlble (i.e., the device has
been destroyed and the needed operational characteristic
permanently lost). Hard faults are a characteristic that is
common to both digital and analog processors.
Unlike hard faults, soft faults can be corrected by correcting the
state of the logic circuits (program counters, registers, etc.)
that govern the control of the digital processor. When a soft
fault occurs a digital processor may not recover to a proper
operational state and may require some form of external
intervention to resume normal operation. Quite often this
intervention consists of recycling power to the digital
processor. When power is recycled, the control circuits are
automatically reset to legitimate states. Soft faults have been
identified by several aliases (digital computer disruption,
circuit upset, transient faults, correctable faults, single event
upsets, faults wlth nonstatlonary observabillty, etc.). They are
known to occur even when the operating environment is relatively
benign and despite the substantial design measures (timing
margins, transmission llne _nterconnects, ground and power planes,
and clock enables of digital circuits) taken to achieve a
relatively high degree of integrity In digital processor
operation. However, their occurrence, which Is relatively
infrequent and random, can be induced by any or all of the
following factors:
I. environment (electromagnetic, nuclear, etc.),
2. Hardware (timing margins, circuit layout, etc.),
3. Software.
Soft faults may be the limiting factor In achieving improved
reliability in the next generation of avionics. In-service
experience with dlgltal systems indicates that the confirmed
failure rates are better than the predicted values which, In turn,
are significantly better than previous analog equipment. However,
the unscheduled removal rate remains about the same. There are
several possible causes for this. A leading candidate is soft
faults, which cause the system to fall and result in a flight crew
wrlte-up, are no longer present when the llne or shop tests are
performed on the suspected unit. Airline anecdotal data indicates
many instances of "BITE check OK and returned to service".
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3.11.2 System Architecture Measures for Recovery
Until recently, soft fault in digital avionics were manually
corrected. More recently, the viability of systems level
measures for the automatic correction of soft faults has begun to
be Investlgated. It is perceived that significant benefits can be
gained through soft fault protection measures designed Into the
basic system mechanization. System-level soft fault protection
methodologies provide the ability to tolerate disruption of either
Input/output data or internal computation. Accordingly, there are
two distinct classes of disruption:
l , Disruption at the subsystem interface boundary causing
corruption of data flowing to or from the affected
subsystem.
. Disruption which reaches within the subsystem to corrupt
internal data and computation. As a worst-case scenario,
it must be presumed that all memory elements within the
computation system are affected at the tlme of disruption.
The short term disruption of Input/output data at a system
boundary can be managed via a variety of existing methodologies.
Data errors must be detected and the associated data suppressed
until the error status is cleared. The data processing algorithm
should tolerate data loss without signaling a hard fault. The
length of time that can be tolerated between valid refreshes is
dependent upon the data item and the associated time constants
(response) of the subsystem.
The ability to tolerate disruption which reaches computation and
memory elements internal to the subsystem, without propagation of
the associated fault effect, is a more difficult problem. For
systems with redundant channels, thls means toleration of the
disruption without loss of any of the redundant channels. Fault
clearing must be "transparent" relative to functional operation
and cockpit effect. Hence, the term "transparent recovery"
Transparent recovery requires that the disruption be detected and
the system to be restored. Safety critical systems are almost
always mechanized with redundant channels. Outputs of channels
are compared in real time, and an errant channel is blocked from
propagating a fault effect. One means available for
safety-crltlcal systems to detect disruption is the same
cross-channel monitor. If a mlscompare between channels occurs, a
recovery is attempted. For a hard fault, the mlscompare condition
will not have been remedied by the recovery attempt.
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3.11.3 Transparent Recovery
There are two basic approaches to transparent recovery. These are:
l . State variable data are transmitted from valid channels
to the channel which has been determined faulted and for
which a recovery is to be attempted (Figure 3.11-1).
. A valid set of state variables is stored away prior to
the disruption in memory which Is protected from the
effects of disruption to a level far greater than the
rest of the subsystem (Figure 3.11-2).
The cross-channel mechanization is ineffective against a
disruption which has the potential to affect all channels.
Accordingly, the In-channel methodology has been emphasized in
transparent recovery development activities.
Ideally, the goal of the system designer Is to provide a means to
tolerate the disruption without propagating the effects outside
the subsystem. Stated in a different way, the goal is to provide
a means such that disruption can be tolerated without causing a
"cockpit effect" It follows that for this to be possible the
duration of the disruption must be short relative to the time
response of the system, and mechanisms instituted to achieve
toleration of disruption must be capable of, in effect, clearing a
fault caused by the disruption rapidly relative to the time
response of the affected system.
The qualification relative to duration of disruption is reasonable
when dealing with a safety-crltlcal system. For such a system,
the probability which must be guaranteed relative to total system
dlsruRtlon is typically extremely small. In some cases, less than
a IO-V/hr probability of disruption (of a safety-crltlcal
system) must be guaranteed. As a result, system level
implementations which provide a means to tolerate a disruption
without propagation of an induced fault outside the affected
subsystem are perceived (for safety-crltlcal systems) to be
necessary. Without such mechanisms for commercial aircraft,
physical protection (and its maintenance) against EME which has
been designed into the subsystem, can become a potential
"slngle-polnt fault"
Because the occurrence of soft faults as an inherent feature of
digital processors should be acknowledged and accounted for, new
hardware elements are proposed for processor architectures that
would enhance traditional design practices to achieve an
extraordinary degree of processing integrity for the digital
processor. These new functional elements would provide the
detection of processing anomalies (upsets/soft faults), a
protected region for the preservation of state data (logic and
control), and the management of "transparent recovery" of data
processing.
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3.11.3 Transparent Recovery (Continued)
Detection of processing anomalies, protected storage of state
variable, and recovery of correct processing are additional
capacities needed to achieve the resulting increased processing
integrity that is associated wlth and achieved by transparent
recovery. Figures 3.11-3 and 3.11-4 are diagrams of a digital
processor architecture with transparent recovery elements.
The detection of processing anomalies might be accomplished
through a variety of measures. The most desirable measures would
be those that are inherent in the characteristics of processor
operation. Essentially, these measures would probably amount to
various types of reasonableness tests and could be In-llne or
cross-processor detectors or a combination of both. In addition
to rough checks on data reasonableness, primarily, In-llne
detectors would check the reasonableness of processor behavior.
For example, measures for concurrent In-llne monitoring could
correspond to checks of operational features of system
performance. Concurrent monitoring techniques have been studied
which can be implemented in the form of a separate hardware device
that operates in parallel with, and transparently to, the system.
A key aspect of the monitoring process is that its implementation,
whatever form it may take, should be relatively simple when
compared with the complex system being monitored. In other words,
the process is not meant to duplicate the performance of the
system.
The In-llne monitoring process would record signals from a set of
observation lines in the system to capture a data block and then
analyze this block of data to determine whether the system is
upset. The process is assumed to be dedicated; hence, its
two-phase function of first capturing and then analyzing a block
of data will be repeated continuously while the system executes
its application program. For specific equipment the effectiveness
of an In-llne detector could be further enhanced by taking into
account salient characteristics of the executing software
(e.g., program flow, constraints on data storage) associated with
that equipment.
Cross-lane monitoring becomes an option that naturally follows
from the redundancy associated with fault tolerant data processing
architectures. Cross-lane monitoring is an additional
complementary option to In-lane monitoring. Fault tolerant
architectures are absolutely necessary when flight critical
functions (e.g., FBW flight controls) are provided by
electrlcal/electronlc equipment. If the system architecture
consists of additional redundant processors (one or more
additional processors performing the same tasks), then
cross-processor detectors could be used to provide additional
coverage of processor upset. Data reasonableness would
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Transparent Recovery (Continued)
be the primary parameter to be monitored by a cross-processor
detector. This detector would complement the In-llne detector by
applying much finer criteria to corresponding data. As with
In-llne monitors (relative to the complex processors it is
monitoring), a cross-processor monitor should be a simple hardware
device.
Dynamic data are continually read from a storage region, updated
by the digital processor, and then written back into the storage
region. A certain portion of that data contains information that
has been developed over time by the processing activity and is not
reproducible. This type of data is referred to as state data.
The set of state data along with the set of sensor data
establishes the system state at each instant of time. In the
event of a temporary disruption of the digital processor, the
state and sensor data can be used to quickly recover the
processing activity in a relatively transparent manner.
Thus, from a macro time perspective, system functions will
continue to be performed, even though on a micro time basis a soft
fault occurred. The key to transparent recovery is the
availability of state data. To guarantee the availability of the
needed dynamic data, a protected storage region must be provided.
Isolation from the energy of a potentially disruptive
electromagnetic event or the use of storage devices that would not
be permanently changed by the energy in such an event, are two
general approaches to achieving a protected storage region.
When a soft fault has been detected, high-level supervisory
override hardware elements would cycle the digital processor
through the recovery process. Basically, this process would
involve relnitlallzatlon of the system state using the data from
the protected storage region, resetting the program counter to an
appropriate address to restart program execution, and then
restarting program execution. Another function of the supervisory
hardware would be to keep track of the number of restart attempts
within the appropriate period of time. If the number attempts
exceeds the appropriate criteria, a noncorrectible condition
(e.g., hard fault) has to be presumed to have occurred. In that
case, the supervisory electronics would provide a warning
indication, disengage the computer, or both.
Additional Considerations
It is appropriate to note at this point, that as a result of the
generalized nature of digital computers, such general-purpose
equipment can fall in a general manner (failure manifestation can
range from wholesale and obvious to subtle, unpredictable, and
insidious). Soft faults are a classic example of such general
unpredictable operation. Transparent recovery is an approach to
handling soft faults that is general in nature. As such, it is
consistent with the nature of digital processor based equipment
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Additional Considerations (Continued)
and wlll be effective for such general purpose programmable
machines. In addition, transparent recovery has received strong
endorsement by key technology specialists within the FAA. Generic
faults Is another example of a fault category that Is general In
nature. N-verslon hardware and software (dissimilar redundancy)
Is a general approach for handling generic faults. To ellmlnate
the threat of destroying or permanently scrambling program
instructions stored within digital avionic equipment memorles,
software resides In Read-Only Memory (ROM) so that even If the
logic states of ROM elements are momentarily changed by
transients, they will return to normal state after the transients
dle out. The use of ROM Is yet one more example of the
application of a general approach to effectively manage dlgltal
processor operation. The point being made here ts that general
purpose machines require approaches that are general and broad
enough In scope to provide the coverage needed to eliminate or
minimize (to an acceptable level of confidence) undesirable and
unpredictable operation.
When such general approaches are implemented, the resulting
general purpose machine will require correspondlngly general
purpose methodologies and associated capabilities to
verify/valldate its proper operation. Such capability would need
to be broad in scope and based upon an integrated top down
approach.
Backup System
Mechanical Backup
A mechanic backup provides the greatest degrees of dissimilarity
and physlcal isolation with regards to a microprocessor based
software implemented FBW primary flight control system. The
Airbus A320 has incorporated a "minimal fllght control" mechanical
backup. While a mechanical backup Is relatively easy to verify
with conventional FMEAs, it cannot be incorporated In the FCCs,
requlres special interfaces, and defeats some of the weight
savings achieved by a FBW system. Essentially a mechanical backup
Is a step backward for a FBW flight control system.
Electronic Backup
Electronic backups can either be packaged In separate LRUs or
incorporated in the FCCs. Electronic backup flight controls
packaged in separate LRUs provide a higher degree of physical
isolation, but also requires that the new electronics box(es) be
validated, shielded, and interfaced separately. Thus electronic
backups packaged in separate LRUs tend to increase system
complexity in terms of installation and maintenance. Since
sufflclent physlcal isolation can be achieved for an electronic
backup incorporated in the FCCs this method is more attractive and
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3.12.2.1
3.12.2.2
3.12.2.3
Electronic Backup (Continued)
cost effective than separately packaged LRUs. Furthermore, if the
electronic backup is incorporated in each FCCwe would have
redundant backups whereas if a separate backup LRUis used there
would probably be only a single backup LRU.
The particular type of electronic backup flight control system
chosen (e.g. analog vs digital) and whether a dedlcted backup
channel is needed or desirable will depend somewhaton the overall
FBWconfiguration.
Analog Backup
Analog backups have the benefit of being extremely dissimilar with
respect to mlcroprocessor based software implemented FBWflight
control systems. They are also relatively easy to verify using
standard FMEAs. It is presumeda separate analog backup channel
would be used.
Digital BackupUsing Discrete Hardware
Thls type of backup is very dissimilar with respect to
microprocessor based software implemented FBWflight control
systems. These systems can be verified using standard FMEAsbut
analyses are more difficult than in the analog case.
Digital Back Using Microprocessor Based Software Implementations
This technique could use a "minimal complexity" unique software or
a "recovery block" technique which reverts to a simplified primary
software. The unique method provides greater backup software
dissimilarity, but would cost more to develop. Both unique backup
software and simplified primary software would require extensive
Level l software verification if included as a production system.
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TABLE 4.0-1
FLY-BY-LIGHT Subsystems and Associated Optical Hardware
SUBSYSTEM OP]]CAL HARDWARE
Avionics Data Bus
Fty-gy-Lig/lt Data Bus
Sidestick Cm,,,,mnd Optical Ser_ing
Rudder Commm_nd Optical Son.Jag
Speedbroke Lever CommmmndOptical Scribing.
Optically Powered Flap and Slat Position Lndicating
Auto-Throttle Input Optical Sensing
Throttle Lever Co_mar_l Optical Sc_L_ing
Auto-Throttle Optical Switch Sensing
Linear .adler Star Data Bus with ARINC 629 or MIL-
STD-1553B Protoco|
IRS Optical Rate Gyro
Optical Taps
Bidirectional Couplers
Electro-Optic Converters
Tree Data Bt,s with ARINC 629 or
MIL-STD-1553B Protocol
Ix2 Bidirectional Couplers
Ix3 Bidirectional Couplers
Electro-Optic Converters
Position Sensors
Pressure Sensors
Optical Taps
lx2 Bidirectional Couplers
Multiplexers
ELectro-Optic Converters
Position Sensors
Pressure Sensors
IxZ Bidirectional Couplers
Mu|tiptexers
Electro-Optic Converters
Position Sensors
Rotary Switch
lx2 Bidirectional Couplers
Multiplexers
Electro-Optic Converters
Opt|catty Powered Modules
Position Sensors
Star Couplers
Ix2 Bidirectional Couplers
Multiplexers
Electro-Optic Converters
Acceterotion Sensor
Position Sensors
Data links
ELectro-Optic Converters
Position Sensors
Ix2 Bidirectional Couplers
Multiplexers
Electro-Optic Converters
Lever-Actuated Switches
Pushbutton Switches
Ix2, Ix3, Ix4 Bidirectional Couplers
Multip|exers
ELectro-Optic Converters
Fly-By-Light Subsystems and Associated Optical Hardware
4783S 4-I
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOR _NJALn'Y
Fly-By-L_ght
Technology Development Plan
FINAL REPORT
30 August 1990
4.0
4.1
4.1 .I
FLY-BY-LIGHT ARCHITECTURES AND TECHNOLOGY SUITES
A, In this section some possible architectures for near term,
medium term, and long term fly-by-wlre (FBW) are described.
Probable technology suites and some general subsystem designs
and approaches will also be provided and discussed.
Table 4.0-I is a summary of the fly-by-llght subsystems and
Associated Optical Hardware.
Flight Control Review
Fly-By-Wire/Fly-By-Light Flight Control Computer Internal
Architecture
A. The safety requirements associated with the introduction of
FBW/FBL systems for commercial transport aircraft
(i.e., I0-9 per hour and more) result in the incorporation of
a high degree of redundancy and redundancy management. The
flight control computer system which Douglas Aircraft
Company/Honeywell, Inc. (DAC/HI) has developed includes
sixteen (16) dlgltaI processors. This level of redundancy Is
without consideration of secondary redundancy.
S. It is anticipated that any near term supplier of FBL/FBW
systems will incorporate N-verslon techniques to yield a level
of protection from certain types of generic faults.
Honeywell, Inc. (HI) was the first organization to use
3-verslon techniques in a production aircraft (i.e., MD-ll,
3-verslon Hardware/Software (HDW/SW) In the flight control
computer/LSAS). The DAC/HI developed FBW/FBL flight control
computers use 3-verslon techniques.
C. Another technical advancement developed for the DAC/HI flight
control computers is transparent recovery, to provide enhanced
protection from the electromagnetic environment (EME) while
providing a means to, in effect, bypass "soft faults"
D° Various architectures, gathered from literature searches,
would be analyzed to ascertain the relative merits with regard
to complexity, reilablilty, maintainability, cost, etc. This
task should be completed assuming Fiber Optic
Architecture (FOA) technology.
E. All fiber optic architecture will require input and
output (I/O) interface electronics since the current
electronic systems are unlikely to be overtaken by a new
technology in the near future. Standard interface components
(fibers, sizes, sensors) are crucial to the success of an
optical architecture. Standard interfaces will reduce
maintainability and installation costs and complexity.
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4.1 .I
4.2
Fly-By-Wire/Fly-By-Light Flight Control Computer Internal
Architecture (Continued)
F. The first generation FBL data bus will be a linear,
multl-termlnal (one flight control computer and 9 to 24
actuators) network. The flight control computer will transmit
position commands to the actuators and each actuator will
provide the flight control computer with status and feedback
data. An ARINC 629 protocol wlll be used.
G, A second generation FBL data bus could evolve with the
maturity of fiber optics and fault tolerant computing. All
aircraft subsystems may communicate on a single high speed
bus. Such a system would most likely employ active networking
to accommodate the large number of terminals.
Fly-By-Light Data Bus
A. Fiber optic flight control systems need to be developed to
address such issues as higher immunity requirements for EME
effects, enhanced survivability and reliability, increased
data transmission capacity, and reduced aircraft weight. As
EME immunity requirements are being raised, the increased use
of composite structures on aircraft is decreasing the natural
EM shielding heretofore provided by all metal aircraft skins.
This situation creates some very real problems, especially for
FBW aircraft. While it is feasible to shield the llne
replaceable units (LRUs), shielding all the data busses and
sensor systems in remote areas of the aircraft would be costly
and add excessive weight. Because of their inherent EME
effects immunity, fiber optic systems provide a potential
solution to this problem. Integrated fiber optic flight
control systems use fiber optics for most data communications,
as well as for sensor and sensing subsystems.
B. Fiber optic data busses are the cornerstone of integrated
fiber optic flight control systems. Linear and/or star types
will be used for the avionics and communications data busses,
and tree types will be used for FBL data busses.
C , The linear and star types will be used to interconnect the
major LRUs. These data busses should be capable of supporting
32 or more bidirectional terminals. In general, star
configurations have a better power budget than their linear
counterparts. However, a single point failure may
incapacitate the entire bus.
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4.2
4.3
Fly-By-Light Data Bus (Continued)
O. For a llnear-type data bus, asymmetric couplers and
nonlntruslve taps are currently the most attractlve techniques
to couple the terminals to the bus fiber. There are three
basic linear data bus configurations. The dual-flber approach
has the best power budget and the least-lmpactlng slngle-polnt
failures, but it requires twice the number of transceivers and
termlnatlons as the slngle-flber loop conflguratlon as well as
a dual-flber installation. The slngle-flber configuration has
the worst power budget and requires twice the number of
transceivers and terminations as the slngle-flber loop
configuration. While a single failure has potentially more
impact on a slngle-flber configuration than on a dual-flber
approach, it cannot bring down the entire slngle-flber bus.
Presumably a slngle-flber configuration would be easier to
install than a dual-flber configuration. The slngle-flber
loop configuration uses the fewest transceivers and
terminations, has a better power budget than the single-flber
configuration, and would be relatively simple to install, but
a break at the loop would result in a failure of the entire
bus.
E+ If the star coupler fails in any of its configurations, then
the entire bus fails. The transmissive star configuration has
a better power budget than the reflective star configuration,
but requires twice as many fibers and terminations.
NOTE: The Ix2 couplers in the reflective star data bus would
be incorporated in the transceiver.
F. The bidirectional passive tree type FBL data busses are used
to communicate commands from the flight control computers to
the actuators, and status and position feedback from the
actuators to the flight control computers. In this
configuration, the actuators do not communicate with each
other. A failure in the coupler closest to the flight control
computer or the intervening Interconnectlon will cause the
entire bus to fail.
Fiber Optic Aircraft Architectures
Table 4.3-I summarizes the projected evolution of FBL aircraft
architectures.
4783S 4-5
Fly-By-Light
Technology Development Plan
FINAL REPORT
30 August 1990
4.3 Fiber Optic Aircraft Architectures (Continued)
In the near term, fiber optics wlll directly replace existing
electrical data busses and links. The current architectures wlll
retain the electronic feedback sensors and switches by using
opto-electric converters to interface with the fiber optic data
links. In the long term, DAC/HI will develop fiber optic bus
architectures with "star", "tree", and eventually "linear"
configurations. The electrical sensors will be replaced by fiber
optic sensors and switches which wlll be simple, passive devices
that are lighter and more EMI immune than their electrical
counterparts. Eventually, all optical aircraft systems wlll be
optically multiplexed for very high speed data busses to reduce
the wiring required and allow more channels on the same bus.
Ultimately, the aircraft fiber optic control system will be
integrated with the fiber optic filaments embedded in "smart skin"
composite structures to monitor structural health and failure.
As Configuration 1 (Figure 4.3-I) shows, the first step to
implementing FBL is to directly substitute fiber optic links into
current discrete LRU FBW systems. In thls example, quad redundant
flight control computers have dedicated data links to every flight
control surface and engine. Similarly, the triple redundant
secondary flight control computers each have a dedicated link to
each flap, slat, and spoiler surface. Thls is a typical
FBW architecture and has many wires. By substituting fiber optics
for wires, the aircraft architecture will show weight savings and
increased EMI immunity. The displays, propulsion controls, and
sensors will all have dedicated data links as they do now.
Configuration 2A (Figure 4.3-2) shows the next evolution of a
FBL aircraft. The aircraft sensors and video displays will still
have dedicated fiber optic links but now the primary and secondary
controls will each have their own integrated "tree" or "star"
fiber optic data bus. Thls will take advantage of the fiber optlc
medium's ability to handle higher data rates and to handle many
channels on the same bus. Here each branch or arm of the data bus
connects to a control surface. For the flight control computers,
each branch connects to a rudder, elevator, or aileron surface.
For the secondary flight control computers, each branch of the
"star" fiber optic data bus connects to a flap, slat, or spoiler.
This architecture reduces the amount of wiring or fiber optic
links from the previous architecture.
Configuration 2B (Figure 4.3-3) further simplifies the flight
control architecture after the "linear" fiber optic data bus has
been developed. In this configuration, all the flight control
computers primary surface and engine controls are multiplexed onto
a single linear data bus for each flight control computer and
duplicated for redundancy. Similarly, each secondary flight
control computer has a double redundant palr of linear data busses
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FIGURE 4.3-2
Fly-By-Llght Configuration 2A
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FIGURE 4.3-3
Fly-By-Light Configuration 2B
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4.3 Fiber Optic Aircraft Architectures (Continued)
routed throughout the plane to the secondary surfaces. Although
the displays and sensors still have dedicated data links, the
engine Full Authority Digital Engine Control will be integrated
with the primary flight controls in the flight control computers
and all the surfaces' data links will be reduced. This saves
manufacturing time and weight.
Standard Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) will provide the
technology to produce the architecture in Configuration 3
(Figure 4.3-4). Here, all the aircraft systems are integrated
into one avionics rack which contains standard processor modules
that perform specific aircraft functions. The Line Replaceable
Modules (LRMs) differ only in the software that has been
downloaded to them. The IMA rack is replicated four times for
redundancy. Fiber optic data busses also interconnect the racks
and modules to allow the processors to share tasks. All the
primary and secondary flight controls are integrated as well as
the sensors, displays, and radio systems. All the systems
communicate along a single fiber optic data bus routed throughout
the plane and duplicated for redundancy. The technology for IMA
should eventually become standard through the ARINC 651 program or
the USAF "Pave Pillar" program. The IMA architecture wlll allow
reduced maintenance cost, increased fault tolerance, increased
self healing, and reduced weight, space, and wiring. Also, by
then, the technology for fiber optic sensors and switches will be
developed. These will a11ow completely fiber optic systems to be
EME effects immune and will eliminate the need to route electrical
power for sensors.
Finally, by the 21st century, FBL should evolve to Configuration 4
(Figure 4.3-5). Here, the fiber optic technology uses optically
multiplexed high speed data busses and smart skins. Future
technology will take full advantage of the high bandwidth of fiber
optic busses to accomplish high speed optical multiplexing. This
will greatly reduce the number of data links required and will
save weight and space. The fiber optics embedded in the composite
skin will aid manufacturing while the composite is being processed
and can sense skin temperature, pressure, strain, and failure of
the structure skin while the plane is in service. This can be
integrated with the control laws for active surface control.
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4.4.2
4.4.3
Fiber Optics Subsystem Design
Avionics Data Bus Subsystem
The avionics data bus subsystem entails the development and
validation of a multi-termlnal (32 to 50) bidirectional optical
data bus. Both linear and star configurations need to be
developed for this application. ARINC 629 would be used for the
bus protocol in this subsystem, which is designed to interconnect
the main aircraft avlonics/flight control boxes.
A diagram of a typical Avionics Bus subsystem is shown in
Figure 4.4-I.
The optical technology areas required for the development of this
subsystem are:
Linear Data Bus - low loss taps, low loss couplers, transceivers.
Star Data Bus - Transmissive or reflective stars, low loss
couplers, transceivers.
Fly-By-Light Actuator Data Bus Subsystem
The fly-by-llght actuator data bus subsystem entails the
development and validation of a multl-termlnal (one flight control
computer and nine Actuators) bidirectional optical tree data bus.
This subsystem is designed such that the flight control computer
transmits position commands to the actuators and each actuator
provides the flight control computer with status and feedback
data. Communication among actuators is neither desired nor
permitted in this configuration. ARINC 629 would be used for the
bus protocol in this subsystem. A possible configuration for this
subsystem is shown in Figure 4.4-2. Also a more detailed diagram
is shown in Figure 4.4-3.
Sidestlck Command Optical Sensing Subsystem
The sldestlck command optical sensing subsystem entails the
development and valldatlon of optical position or pressure/force
sensors in a conventlonal sldestlck controller. An example of a
possible sldestlck is shown in Figure 4.5-4. This sldestlck would
require two optical sensors, one each in pitch and roll. The two
optlcal sensors are multlplexed on a single trunk fiber with the
command position data being decoded at a remote electronics unit.
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FIGURE 4.4-4
Sldestlck Command Optical Sensing Subsystem
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4.4.4
4.4.5
4.4.6
4.4.7
4.4.8
Rudder Command Optical Sensing Subsystem
The rudder command optical sensing subsystem entails the
development and validation of optical position or pressure sensors
to interface wlth conventional rudder pedals. The subsystem will
require one optical sensor for each rudder pedal. If both rudder
pedals are optically interfaced, optical multiplexing can be
incorporated Into the subsystem design. In Figure 4.5-5 is a
rudder command optical sensing subsystem that DAC Is developing
for an IRAD project.
Optically Powered Flap and Slat Position Indication Subsystem
The optically powered flap and slat position indication subsystem
entails the development and validation of ultra-low power
optically powered sensors and a multiplexing scheme. This
subsystem optically powers seven sensors vla a single trunk fiber
and returns position and status data to the microprocessor unit
over the same flber. The position data from the sensors is
interpreted by a microprocessor unit which In turn drives the
appropriate displays. This subsystem is shown In Figure 4.4-6;
also a more detailed diagram is shown in Figure 4.4-7.
Autothrottle Optlcal Sensor Subsystem
The autothrottle optical sensor system entails the development and
validation of optical accelerometers, posltlon sensors, and data
links. This subsystem is designed to permit different portions to
be implemented incrementally. A diagram of an autothrottle
optical sensor subsystem that DAC Is developlng for an IRAD Is
shown in Figure 4.4-8.
Throttle Lever Command Optical Sensing Subsystem
The throttle lever command optical sensing subsystem entails the
development and validation of an optical position sensor that is
interfaced with a conventional throttle quadrant. The subsystem
will require one optical sensor for each throttle lever. Optical
multiplexing can be incorporated into the subsystem design. A
typical throttle subsystem is shown in Figure 4.4-9.
Autothrottle Optical Switch Sensing Subsystem
The autothrottle optical switch sensing subsystem entails the
development and validation of optical limit switches to be
installed on the throttle quadrant to provide autothrottle
disconnect, TO/GA, low limit, and reverse thrust inputs to the
flight control computers. An autothrottle switch subsystem Is
shown In Figure 4.4-I0.
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FIGURE 4.4-6
Optically Powered Flap and Slat Position Indication Subsystem
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Throttle Lever Optlcal Command Position Sensing Subsystem
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Autothrottle Optical Switch Sensing Subsystem Diagram
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5.1 .l
5.1.2
IMPACT OF FLY-BY-LIGHT (BENEFIT ANALYSIS)
Background
In this section, the weight and cost benefits of
fly-by-llght (FBL) will be discussed for two classes of commercial
transport aircraft, a narrowbody and a wldebody.
EME Immunity
Immunity to the effects of the EME, weight savings, and high
bandwidth currently drive the development and implementation of
fiber optics on aircraft.
Both military and commercial aircraft users have experienced "soft
faults" or erroneous system failure messages resulting from
interference by the EME of their avionic systems. The long runs
of electrical signal wire and data busses act llke an antenna
running the length of the plane. These pick up electrical noise
from the environment and from each other. The airlines blame soft
faults for 40% of their aircraft downtime and claim that 60% of
the avlonlcs LRUs removed come back with "no fault found" messages
attached and the military suspects such interference causes
certain unexplained accidents. Since fiber optics are inherently
immune to EM fields, they will reduce or eliminate interference
caused by electromagnetic noise. The military customers need the
fiber optic components performance benefits. Specifically, the
military requires the high data transmission rate provided by
fiber optics, the weights savings they provide, and their immunity
to the EME for electronic warfare protection.
In addition, the commercial customer wlll benefit from fiber
optics through reduced manufacturing costs and a greater return on
their investment from the aircraft. Many manufacturing steps are
simplified with fiber optics. Also, aircraft fiber optic data
lines exhibit the performance advantages over their electrical
counterparts. Note that additional safety beneflts result from
the optical fiber's inherent immunity to short circuits and sparks.
Weight Savings
Directly substituting fiber optic data links for wire signal paths
would significantly reduce weight on aircraft. Furthermore, since
fiber optics have a higher bandwidth than wire, fiber optic data
busses have much higher data transmission rates than electrical
data busses. Video display drivers, backplane data busses, and
other high speed applications require these high transmission
rates. Also, the higher bandwidth allows equivalent electrical
data bus runs to be replaced with one tenth the amount of fiber
optic wlre runs to greatly reduce aircraft weight and production
cost.
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5.2
5.2.1
5.3
Narrowbody Aircraft
For the narrowbody, the MD-88 will be used as the baseline and a
series of evolutionary changes will be compared involving the
flight control and engine control systems. This will encompass
mechanical, fly-by-wlre (FBW), and near and medium term FBL. Both
sensor and data distributions are incorporated in this analysis.
Narrow Body Comparison
To estimate the weight savings expected for a narrowbody aircraft,
we calculated the wire weights for an MD-88 aircraft and scaled
these as appropriate to equivalent fiber optic weights.
Figure 5.2-1 shows the dimensions and general features of an MD-BO
derivative aircraft and all the primary and secondary flight
control surfaces which would have fiber optic lines routed to them
in a FBL configuration. Table 5.2-I summarizes the immediate
weight savings realized by direct substitution of fiber optics for
wlre on the aircraft in the current configuration. This shows a
352 Ibs weight savings in flight controls and 804 Ibs for the
aircraft. Table 5.2-2 shows a long-term FBW configuration giving
a 750 Ib weight savings over the current mechanical system. The
advanced FBL configuration would save 120O Ibs. The long-term
configuration would be designed to take full advantage of the
FBW technology.
Table 5.2-3 compares the three configurations in terms of
engineering, development and recurring cost and compares the three
maintenance llfe cycle costs. Notice that conventional electrical
cable requires maintenance for its shielding. Fiber optics do not
require this shielding and can save the cost of its maintenance.
Table 5.2-3 then totals the Direct Operating Cost and Return on
Investment for the three configurations. It shows a 7.5%
reduction in direct operating costs for FBW and a I0% reduction
for FBL. There is a 9.6% improvement in return on investment for
FBW and a 20% improvement for FBL. Therefore, implementing fiber
optics on aircraft would greatly reduce the cost of ownership of
aircraft and increase the profit of operating them.
Widebody Aircraft
For the wldebody, a concept aircraft similar to the MD-ll
(mechanical control with full time stability augmentation) will be
used as the baseline. For this study, to exemplify the benefits
achieved by converting long wire runs in data distribution systems
to fiber optics, only the flight control computers to actuation
system are converted to fiber optics.
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Direot (signal to signal) Conversion of Flight Control
81qnal Wires to Fiber Optics for a_LD-80 Type Aircraft
Fl_ght Control Aircraft
Total Signal Path Length 41,040 ft 93,540 ft
Signal Wire Weight 418 Ibs 954 ibs
Signal Fiber Optic Weight 66 lbs 150 Ibs
Approx. Weight Savings 352 lbs 804 lbs
* uire 20 9auge shiteded/jacketed
• fiber 10011&0 micron jacketed
* uire ground return |oo_ eliminated for fiber optics
* neu etectro-qp, tlc= (Ix & Ix) added
TABLE 5.2-1
Narrovbody Height Comparison
kdmtcal elv-lv-_ir_
Cockpit Corn=rids 105 94 94
(NANUAL COilTItOLS)
Faint md Prqputsion 279
Control Avionics
Avtonics
Etectricet Pouer
Fright and Proputsi¢_
and D(optay Cmltrot
90 85
380 200 380 200
1223 823 ?90 823 790
100 150 100 150
558 310 85 7O 18
A| rcrsft Sensors 3_ _ 426 140 1Q5
TOTAL 2,536 2,133 1.7a5 1.603 I ,]KS
• mat wights In I=aund=
• flight and Iwqlwtsion controt evienJcs i_¢tudlo Iw|mry and _¢¢mdary
flight control as NIL as _|no and actuJtor cantrot eLectrmics
• mch4nicmt or otMr bedu4) r/_tm not InctudN
• mchentcat beeetino ImludN mat
TABLE 5.2-2
Narrovbody Height Cowart son ORIGINAL PA_E _
OF PO0_ OUALFrY
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Ilmrrotdx_ F|lllht O0ntrois OevetoFment and PredzEtlen Cost C_qwlm
mec_icul ILueL ine
Projected
FIy-l_-V|r_ F|v-Iry- _ (llOq}
Engineering and
Oevato_
S8,400,000 $3&,420,000 S&9,570,000
Hcurrtrm Per Aircraft
NmterleL Colt S53,000 SIO,000 $32,000
Avionics AullWy Co S42,000 S21,000 S17,000
Equtpmnt Cost $831,000 S866,000 I;879,000
NanclL Ing/lnstaL Let i on Slg&,o00 $156,000 S180,000
TOTAL $1,120,000 S1,055,000 $1,099,000
Autoft ight
C_mJnf cat tans
FL Ight Controls
lrwtrtJmntet tm
NIIVJgot Jon
TOTAL
IMrrodboW Ilaintonmm Life Cycte Cost _ilmn
$_gl $/'ulfe $_ql S_ql.|fe $/11E $/l.tf9,
3.3 S200,000 2.8 S168,000 2.2 S132,000
1.3 $ 78,000 1.0 $ 60,000 0.8 S 48,000
1.2 S Y2o000 0.8 S &8,000 0.S S 30,000
1.1 S 66,000 0.9 $ 5&,000 0.7 $ 42,000
9.8 SSM,O00 7.9 S&7&,000 6.3 $378,000
16.7 $1,004,000 13.& $804,000 10.5 S6._),O00
hrroubody Fttgltt Controls Life Cycle Cost C_pm'tsan per Aircraft
lien- Recur ring
Itecurrtng
N41 ntlmonce (Labor
Equivalent Itm
(relative to laoeiine)
S32,000 $$1,000
(S6S,O00) (S21,000)
(S200,008) (S37&,O00)
(S2,6&2,000) nt (_,117,000) nt
TOTAL (1;2,875,000) (S6,L_I,000)
..... ............................. ....... ......................... .................... .....ooo ............ ..
DZIUtCT OPWP_kTING COST 7.5k reduction 10.0k reduct4on
_BTURN ON ZNq'J_8TI_]_L' 9.6k improvement 20. Ok improvement
* utilization 8 hrs/doy • we speed • 320 ml/hr
• 800 aircraft productian run * m_ yield • SO.lO/pesunller mt.
• r_ Life • 20 yre • load factor • 0.7
• 60,000 fl|ght hrs * snt= neer terzl m(ght savings
• =()• odditlorul profits Id:ove * costs estimted in 1909 dotters
the mcMnicst baseline elrcrmft * swroges for fty-lW-ulro end fty-lw-tight configurmt|ons
• ell tyFe Inct_le fll_t INidmce systm • mm_konlcst bosetlm Incl_llN fllijt engineer
TABLE 5.2-3
Narrovbody F11ght Controls Development, Production,
Hatntenance, and Ltfe Cycle Cost Comartsons
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5.3.1 Dimensions
Figure 5.3-I shows the dimensions for a typical DC-IO aircraft
used to estimate the cost and weight savings for a widebody class
aircraft. For simplicity, no flight control computer cross
channel conversion was considered. Tables 5.3-I through 5.3-3
repeat the same analysis for a DC-IO baseline widebody aircraft.
Here, the long-term FBW configuration saves 1290 Ibs and the
FBL configuration saves 1760 Ibs for near term direct substitution
of fiber for wire, for a direct signal wlre to fiber conversion we
save ll2O Ibs for flight controls and 2615 Ibs for aircraft. The
life cycle analysis shows a 4.5% DOC reduction for FBW and ?.4%
for FBL. The analysis estimates a 5.1% increase in return on
investment for FBW and a 10.2% improvement in direct operating
cost for FBL. Hence, implementing fiber optics on a widebody
aircraft results in even greater cost savings and profit increases
than on narrowbody aircraft.
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TABLE 5.3-1
Widebody Weight Comparison
Direct (signal to signal) Conversion of Flight Control
Signal Wires to Fiber Optics for a MD-11 Type Aircraft
Total Signal Path Length
Signal Wire Weight
Signal Fiber Optic Weight
Flight Control
130,500 ft
1,330 Ibs
210 ibs
Approx. Weight Savings 1,120 ibs
Aircraft
303,200 ft
3,100 ibs
485 Ibs
2,615 Ibs
* wire 20 gauge shielded/jacketed
* fiber 1001140 micron jacketed
* wire ground return loops eliminated for fiber optics
* new electro-optics (Tx & Rx) added
TABLE 5.3-2
Widebody Weight Comparison
Nechanicat Fly-By-Wire Fly-By-Light
Baseline Near Term Loncj Term Near Term Long Term
Cockpit Commands 180 110 110 110 100
(MANUAL CONTROLS)
Flight and Propulsion 300 420 200 420 200
Control Avionics
Avionics 1800 1350 1000 1350 1000
Electrical Power 300 400 300 400
Flight and Propulsion 950 450 150 180 40
and Disptay Control
Aircraft Sensors 420 500 500 200 150
TOTAL 3,650 3,130 2,360 2,560 1,890
* all weights in pounds
* flight and propulsion control avionics include primary and secondary
flight control as well as engine and actuator cor_trot electronics
* mechanical or other backup systems not included
* mechanical baseline includes dual SCAS
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V|ddxxly FLight Cmtrots Ot,mtemm¢ ard Predu_lm test C_lmri_ns
liechanice t Baseline
Projected
FLy-By-Wire Fty-I_ L_wr (1_1)
Er_t nmertr_ end
Deve Lol_mnt
$14,000,000 $38,000,000 S6O, 000,000
IKMrrinm Per Aircraft
kteriet ¢¢mt
Avionics A_d)iy Co
Equlpm_ Cost
HmrdLino/I nltoL Let t on
S90,O00 SSS,000 S63,000
$70°000 S43,000 S3S,O00
Sg_),O00 $1,000,000 Sl,030,O00
S_O,O00 _I00000 S220,(_0
TOTAL S1,370,0Q0 $1,30B,000 S1,344,000
Autoft fght
CommJnicst iens
fl{ght Controls
I_t_tetton
Navigation
TOTAL
Widda_ ILium Life CycLe Cast Capetian
$/m s/tile sill S/I.ife $/m s/Life
3.7 S222,000 3.2 S192,000 2.6 S156,000
1.8 $108,000 1.5 S 90,000 1.1 $ 66,000
1.7 $102,000 1.0 $ 60,000 0.7 S 42,000
1.6 S 96,000 1.2 S 72,000 0.8 S 48,000
10.4 S624,0(0) 8.3 S498,000 6.9 $414,000
19.2 $1,152,000 15.2 S912,000 12.1 $726,000
WideboW Flight Cmtrols Life Cycle Cost Cmpmrism per Aircraft
Non-ltecurr ing
Itecurr trNI
Na (ntwwnce (Labor
Equiwltint Itm
(reLative to lmseLtne)
S30,O00 IST,500
(S62,000) (S22,000)
(S2&O, OOOF (S_6,0OO)
(I;3,409,000) nt ($7,146,0(X)) nt
TOTAL (S3,681,000) (St, 536, SO0)
........ .......... ........
l_TURN ON Z]_r_B_(EIC? 5.1_ Improvement 10.2_ improvement
* utilization 8 hrs/dmy * eve s_eed • 329 mi/hr
* 800 aircraft ixlxt_tim run * eve yield • SO.lOIImSUnSer el.
* llve t|fe " 20 _ * Load factor - 0.7'
* 60,000 flight hrl * "nt • near tere _eisht minos
* ,()• ecldittonmi profits above * ¢o_te estimtod in 1_9 dotiara
the mechanical baseline ilircraft * 8vermges for fLy-iw-uire erd fty-Iw-tlght canfigurations
* iLL type include ftllht 9uicknce systm * mclmnicat beeetlhe In_Lud_ flight mlllno_'
TABLE 5.3-3
1657E/B18
Ntdebody Fl|ght Controls Development, Production,
Ha|ntenance, and Ltfe Cycle Cost Comparisons
5-9
ORIG!NAL PAG_ IS
OF POOR Q_AL#TY

Fly-By-Light
Technology Development Plan
FINAL REPORT
30 August Ig90
VERIFICATION, VALIDATION, AND CERTIFICATION
Introduction
It could be argued that designing and building a
fly-by-wlre (FBW)/ fly-by-llght (FBL) system is easy compared to
the associated validation, verification, and Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) certification problems. The selected VVC
approach must address the following major areas:
A. Electromagnetic Effects Protection
B. System Integrity
C. Software
O. Flight Test
E. Direct FAA FBL Program Participation
Proving that a FBW/FBL commercial aircraft Is fully protected
against hazardous effects associated with EME requires the ability
to fully test the aircraft while it is exposed to the threat. The
state-of-the-art technology in this area is generally regarded as
inadequate. In addition, analysis which can accurately predict
the effects of the EME propagation inside a complex airframe
structure is far from mature and yet is deemed essential to
FBW/FBL technology by most experts. SAE Committee AE4R is
struggling with these problems now.
System design integrity has, in the past, been demonstrated using
bench testing, fault insertion, and analysis. Many organlzatlons
tasked with development of FBW/FBL systems, including Douglas
Aircraft Company and Honeywell Inc., believe the complexity and
criticality of commercial transport FBW/FBL Systems will likely
render such methodologies inadequate.
A combination of Flight Test and FAA involvement will yield an
understanding of how to quantify technical, cost, and
certification risks associated with U.S. built and certified
tranport aircraft.
Direct FAA involvement in this program is essential to maximizlng
the benefits to U.S. industry.
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6.1 Introduction (Continued)
6.2
6.2.1
Within the context of the discussion in this section, validation,
verification, and certification are defined as follows:
A. Verification: Establishing the truth of correspondence
between a product and its specification; i.e., "Are we
building the product right?" (Boehm, 1981). Within the
context of the system llfe cycle, this means establishing that
the evolving system satisfies all of its requirements.
Verification should be performed in stages during full scale
development of the system.
B, Validation: Establishing the fitness or worth of a product
for its operational mission; i.e., "Are we building the right
product?" (Boehm, 1981). Within the context of the system
llfe cycle, this means establishing that the system
requirements are correct and complete. Validation should be
performed prior to full scale development of the system.
C, Certification: Obtaining regulatory agency approval for a
product by establishing that it complies with all applicable
government regulations.
Electromagnetic Effects Protection
Introduction
The modern trend to develop aircraft with nonmetallic composite
materials and FBL digital flight control systems (FCS) requires a
basic and fundamental understanding of the EME on such systems.
These fllght-crltlcal control systems must have failure rates
which are the same as other flight critical systems, on the order
of one failure in lO9 flight hours. Although FBL systems have
eliminated EM coupling effects on signal lines, what remains are
the problems associated with coupling to power cables and through
the box enclosures. The challenge that the aerospace community
now faces is how to evaluate and mitigate EME effects and achieve
these high rellabilitles. Meeting this challenge is a significant
task, because of the scope and complexity of the issues involved.
For example:
A. The frequency range of interest is from DC to 40 GHz. This
requires a wide variety of analysis, hardening, and test
techniques.
B. Aircraft are mechanically (and therefore electromagnetlcally)
complex in shape, materials, and construction techniques.
C, Digital systems are also complex, having many millions of
logic states, some of which are known and some of which are
unknown.
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6.2.1 Introduction (Continued)
6.2.2
D. There are significant problems associated with verifying these
high reliability rates.
The overall objective in the EME area is to develop a national
resource of applicable EME assessment technology. The overall
scope is to develop aircraft EME models and methods that are
experimentally validated.
As an integral step in an aircraft assessment using such a
national resource, EME threat levels inside the commercial
aircraft would also be defined. In addition, methods and
approaches for verification and validation of system immunity, and
for certification of the aircraft will be developed.
The flow chart shown in Figure 6.2-1 illustrates the complementary
and Iteratlve nature of an analysis and test cycle appropriate for
aircraft designs involving significant departures from traditional
practices (e.g., materials, geometries, flight critical electronic
control systems). The processes shown in Figure 6.2-I provide the
characterization of the various aircraft EM responses to an
aircraft EME interaction. Such responses are needed for
electrlcal/electronlc system designs that must deal with
protection against the effects of the EME threat.
The interplay between analysis and test will be present throughout
the design, verification, validation, and certification cycle.
Estimates of the aircraft EM responses, based upon predictions
derived from analytic models, could be used to help formulate the
test philosophy (e.g., fixturlzatlon, measurement points,
measurement levels). Test measurement data will be used to refine
analytic models.
Technical Approach
Consistent with the top level system position that the EME threat
issue occupies for flight critical electrical/electronlcs systems,
the EME assessment process would involve a comprehensive system
(top down) approach as depicted in Figure 6.2-I.
The design process is the primary means that ensures that an
aircraft system will be immune to the EME threat. The design
analysis data identifies the measures implemented and the
corresponding worst case assessments that establish the degree of
immunity expected.
Ideally, the design process would apply the capabilities made
available by the national resource assessment technology in a top
down approach that is in harmony with the system topology
perspective.
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6.2.2
6.2.2.1
6.2.2.2
6.2.2.3
Technical Approach (Continued)
The design process produces the data that provides the analytic
and empiric assessment foundation for the verification, validation
and certification basis and that enables the bottom up empirical
(spot testing) checking to be effective and meaningful. The
empirical measurements associated wlth the verification,
validation and certification process complement the data from the
design process and completes the data package needed for
verification, validation and certification. The empirical
activities identified for thls program include equipment testing,
in-situ cable current injections, aircraft simulated lightning
current injection and aircraft HIRF illumination.
Equipment Testing
Previous activities (analyses, measurements) have determined both
aircraft interior EM fields levels and bulk cable current response
levels for the various transient and CW environments. These
internal environments can then be translated into equipment
testing procedures which will involve simultaneous bulk cable
current injection techniques and field illumination. These
procedures will be applied to aircraft systems equipment on the
bench. The performance of these systems will be monitored and
verified during this exposure.
In-Situ Cable Current Injection
This activity involves the EM stimulus of aircraft systems as
installed in the aircraft. The objective here is to validate that
the bench test results are applicable to as-lnstalled equipment.
Cable current injection and local illumination will be done on
critical systems as installed on the aircraft to verify that
in-situ performance is the same as that of the bench test. The
systems will be cycled through all pertinent operational modes for
verification.
Aircraft Simulated Lightning Current Injection
The objective here is to validate the lightning coupling results
from scale model data. Low level simulated lightning currents
will be injected into the vehicle and cable responses will be
monitored and compared to previous data. These injected currents
may be either transient or swept CW. High level currents will
then be injected into the aircraft wlth all systems operating to
verify scaling and system performance. It is anticipated that the
airplane level lightning simulation testing identified for this
program will verify the effectiveness of design analysis and
subsystem/equipment testing, thus negating the need for airplane
level testing, for the verifications validation and certification
process.
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6.2.2.4
6.2.3
Aircraft HIRF Illumination
The objective is to validate performance in the
HIRF environments. The aircraft will be subject to threat level
environments. Measurements of internal fields and cable currents
will be done to validate the scale model efforts and the bench
testing environments. System performance In thls environment wlll
also be validated. It is anticipated that the airplane level
HIRF illumination testing identified wlth thls program will verify
the effectiveness of design analysis and subsystem/equlpment
testing, thus negating the need for airplane level testing, for
the verifications validation and certification process.
Certification Procedures
The design and verlflcatlon/valldatlon activities will provide the
experience and large data base which can be used to develop the
certification basis and assoclated procedures. The objective here
is to develop inexpensive requirements such as analysis and bench
testing procedures so that certification can be done without
having to fully illuminate or stimulate an entire aircraft. These
procedures will be well defined, documented and Justified.
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6.3
6.3.1
6.3.2
6.3.3
6.3.3.1
System Integrity (System Modeling)
Introduction
Extensive system fault effects modeling has, in general, not been
viewed as essential to proper development of previous generation
commercial transport systems such as CA7 IIIB autoland. The
introduction of FBW/FBL will likely require such modeling. The
complexity of this type system makes it essential that the
modeling work at the National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA),
LaRc Airlab Facility (e.g., SURE, CARE III, GGLOSS, HARP), be
enhanced and expanded to accommodate the complexities of systems
targeted for near term application to FBW/FBL.
The limiting factor for this technology will likely be available
computing resources. Both gate level and system level techniques
must be further developed and expanded. Many new approaches need
to be explored.
Technology Issues
The technologies with greatest impact on fault tolerant V&V are
broadly categorized into six areas:
o System and Component Level Modeling
o Circuit Simulation Software and Hardware
o System Reliability Software
o Integrated Computing Environment
o Rapid System Prototyping Environment
o Technology Acquisition and Transfer
Strategies
The strategy will be to develop the six technologies listed above
to a level where they are user-frlendly, cost-effectlve, and
comprehensive.
Modeling
The approach wll] define modeling methodology at the system,
board, and gate levels. At the system level, DAC/HI will
capitalize on the existing modeling tools available in the
marketplace and at NASA, and HI's modeling experience to develop
system prototype models to demonstrate new concepts for FBW/FBL
control systems verification and validation. At the board and
gate level modeling, the strategy will be to develop or procure
modeling
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6.3.3.1 Modeling (Continued)
6.3.3.1 .l
technologies compatible with simulation systems to provide the
means to detect faults at the gate level. The results of the
lower level simulations will be used at the system level for
failure modes and effects analysis.
0 Develop modeling techniques to be able to transition up or
down in hierarchy: starting at one end of the spectrum
with gate level circuit simulation, and transltlonlng that
information in a series of steps to the system level
reliability prediction programs. Dbvlously, there are many
steps In between with the reformatting of data and the
moving of a data base from one platform to another.
Utilize modeling technology to accelerate the development
of new architectures for FBW/FBL control system. Wlth
user-frlendly CAE systems, new configurations of FBL/FBW
can be designed and tested in a much more timely fashion
than conventional methods.
System Level Modellng
System level analysis will incorporate data and results from lower
level simulation and failure mode and effect analysis to determine
the ultimate consequence of injected faults on the
system/alrcraft. The starting points for this analysis could be
Mentor's Qulck-Sim circuit simulation. Going through the varlous
steps of gate level/chlp simulation, then module simulation, and
possibly even going to system circuit simulation (assuming there
is enough computing power available). The ultimate goal is to
predict reliability and failure mode effects.
0 Initial efforts will be targeted at modeling one lane of an
eight processor flight control system for circuit
simulation. The processor will be modeled at the
functional bus level primarily because the gate level model
for the processor is not available. Semiconductor vendors
consider this information proprietary. The approach then
is the logic and all the monitoring circuitry around the
microprocessor will be modeled such that faults can be
injected anywhere. To obtain realistic simulation results,
small pieces of application software will be transformed
into test vectors and simulated in the circuit.
Input a FBW/FBL prototype model consisting of an
B-processor system into SURE to evaluate SURE in Its
abll_ty to predict the reliability or large systems using
slngle-polnt failures. In parallel, the same model will be
input into HARP and evaluated in its ability to detect
transient and near-coincldent failures. The size of the
model will be expanded from 8 to 16 processors, and both
SURE and HARP will be evaluated on their suitability to
accurately perform reliability prediction of realistic
FBW/FBL flight control systems.
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6.3.3.1 .I
6.3.3.1.2
6.3.3.1.3
System Level Modeling (Continued)
Advance the development of system fault injection and
statistical analysis techniques to characterize the fault
recovery of fault tolerant systems. Determine arrival time
distribution for transient and near-colncldent faults.
Reliability modeling assumes that detection times of faults
are exponentially distributed. This assumption and current
sampling practices have shown to introduce significant
variations In system reliability estimation. 3olnt efforts
with NASA's AIRLAB will be pursued to determine new
sampling techniques and statistically robust parameter
estimation.
Module Card Level Modeling
The card level modeling simulates at the component level faults
can be injected at the pin I/O.
The information will be passed to a high level (system level)
simulation to manifest its system consequences.
o Develop/procure models to perform functional and fault
simulation of module with faults inserted at the pin level.
Develop the capability to generate Behavioral Language
Models (BLM) which can ald in our simulations of complex
mlcroprocessor-based modules. The capability can then be
used to input faults at the pin I/O level for failure mode
effects analysis and hlgher-level simulation.
Develop libraries to support functional fault simulation of
large microprocessor-based boards. Explore the advantage
of hardware verification models in terms of "bus cycles."
Evaluate the transition to VHDL (Very Hlgh Level
Description Language) as a standard modeling methodology
for the system and subsystem levels.
Gate Level Modeling
Gate level modeling is the functional circuit description of large
components (LSI, VLSI, and ASIC) using small scale integration
type of logic devices to descrlbe their behavior. It has been
classlflcally at this level that fault simulation of complex ICs
have been accomplished. Generic NAND gates, nor gates, Inverters,
etc., have been typically used for thls type of modeling.
Develop/procure gate level models to make possible gate
level fault simulation of processor cards on fault
simulation accelerators or hlgh-speed general-purpose
computers.
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6.3.3.1.3
6.3.3.1.4
6.3.3.2
Gate Level Modeling (Continued)
o Develop gate level models to perform fault simulation using
GGLOSS.
o Develop a generic gate level library to support the
generation of other libraries for fault simulation.
Modeling Tools Integration
These are software programs to ald in the generation of both gate
level and behavior language models and the conversion of libraries
using standard-data formats such as Electronic Design Interchange
Format (EDIF), Very Hlgh Level Description Language (VHDL), etc.
The tools developed should integrate the overall modeling system
to enable the interfacing for one level of hierarchy to the next.
Influence the development of integrated system, board, and gate
level modeling tools. Pursue the development of smart
knowledge-based models similar to Logic Automations' Behavior
Language SMARTMODELS to facilitate the debugging of system models.
Simulation Technologies
Simulatlon technologies are crltlcal tools In assessing system
performance and behavior. The approach uses very hlgh-speed fault
simulation to provide fault coverage at the pln and gate levels.
Failure mode effect simulations glve a measure of the system
archltecture's detection and tolerance of transient and
near-colncldent faults at system levels.
0 Define methods for mapping fault coverage at the gate level
to system levels to provide an automated interface from
low-level fault simulation to system level models. Also,
develop a method for communicating results of a failure
mode fault analysis run at low-level to a hlgher-level
simulation to obtain the ramifications.
0 Benchmark NASA's GGLOSS fault simulator using a
single-processor board executing software. Since GGLOSS is
a gate level fault simulator, the SDP-185-based processor
board Is a good candidate for gate level fault simulation
since HI has the gate level model. The SDP-185 design and
libraries will be netllsted and transferred to the GGLOSS
system for fault simulation on a VAX computing
environment. If satisfactory, attempts wlll be made at
simulating systems wlth multiple microprocessors. The
SDP-185 is a custom Honeywell-developed 2901-based
processor circuit.
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6.3.3.3
Simulation Technologies (Continued)
Investigate the capabilities of available and developing
fault simulators and their suitability to fault tolerant
V&V. Explore gate level hardware fault simulators versus
software-based fault simulators on hlgh-performance
computers. The initial effort wlll be to fault simulate
the SDP-185 board on the existing MACH-IOO0 simulation
accelerator, and compare the fault coverage to the results
from the GGLOSS fault simulation.
o Influence simulation vendors to modify their firmware to
handle very-hlgh-speed failure modes to affect the
simulations of processors running real-tlme software.
o Explore the advantages of mlxed-mode (both gate level and
behavioral language models) concurrent simulation on
hardware accelerators and hlgh-speed workstations. Thls
innovative system uses shared computing resource where a
hardware accelerator simulates at the gate/translstor
levels while coupled with a general-purpose hlgh-speed
workstation simulating at the behavioral model level.
Select/procure software simulators implemented In a
computing environment for deployment of a full-scale
FBW/FBL control system verification development.
Develop software tools to sift and auto-compare simulation
results at gate levels to study the propagation of inserted
faults to the hlgher levels In the system.
o Develop user-frlendly simulation tools designed to increase
productivity of system engineers.
Develop software tools to expedite the conversion of
appllcatlon software Into test vectors at the lower
levels. Test vectors have historically been a manually
intensive effort. Tools should be developed to aid this
effort.
Reliability Prediction
To obtain the overall system reliability (probability of
failure/mlsslon) and for parameter sensitivity studies, analytical
techniques such as Markov modeling must be used. A Markov
reliability model calculates the probability of a system being in
various states as a function of time. A state in the model
represents the system status as a function of the failed and
unfalled components and the system's redundancy management
strategy. Given the system architecture and reconfiguratlon
rules, the system reliability can be calculated. Other inputs to
the model will include fault data for sequence dependent failures,
correlated failures, near-coincldent failures, the coverage of
transient and permanent faults, and fault arrival rates.
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6.3.3.3
6.3.3.4
6.3.3.5
Reliability Prediction (Continued)
The starting point for the system reliability modeling will be the
software tools, SURE (Semi-Markov Unreliability Range Evaluator)
and HARP (Hybrid Automated Reliability Predictor), which were
developed by NASA. Initially, one-processor then four-processor,
(one box) and then elght-processor (two boxes) configurations of
the FBW/FBL Flight Control System will be modeled for permanent
failures in parallel with SURE and HARP. This should help in
assessing the capabilities and limitations of SURE and HARP in
modeling large systems. Once this is accomplished, other types of
failures and fault handling models will be added to the models.
Later, the model will be increased to 16-processor (four boxes)
and then generalized to any number.
Integrated Computing Environment
The integration of the various computer resources into a common
environment for modeling and reliability prediction is critical
for fault tolerant V&V. At the present, modelling and reliability
predicting time, lack of adequate processor capability
(throughput) and processor availability are the largest obstacles
identified. To simulate the amount of electronic circuitry in a
FBW/FBL flight control system on today's workstation networks or a
VAX cluster Is not realistically feasible. Hardware accelerators,
or a clever division of tasks, or very efflclent models will be
needed to make real progress at system analysis. Some of the
associated resources that will be needed include:
0 Parallel computer architectures with high processing
capabilities, such as large parallel processor mainframes
or parallel super workstations.
o Hardware simulation acceleration.
o Concurrent processing.
o Fault tolerant software engineering.
o Computer-alded englneerlng/network support personnel.
o Standard networks and protocols.
Rapid Prototyplng Technologies
The success of fault tolerant verification will depend on the
close technical cooperation between developers, customers, and
users. The traditional phase-orlented approach to system design
assumes a strictly linear ordering of development steps. This
approach is not only very costly but fails to include important
elements of communication and feedback in the development process,
making system evolution a lengthy process. Rapid prototyplng
technologies used within the system development context allows the
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6.3.3.5
6.3.3.6
Rapid Prototyplng Technologies (Continued)
design and building of prototypes (models) to demonstrate the
feasibility of systems or the evaluation of alternative system
designs using early customer or user requirements. The resulting
process provides a means of mapping system requirements Into a
sequence of cycles; re-design, re-lmplementatlon, and
re-evaluatlon, which allows new customer requirements to be
quickly captured, implemented, and evaluated before the target
system Is built.
The most important techniques used in rapid prototyplng are:
modular design, interactive human interface, and simulation.
Emerging development tools promote the use of these techniques at
various levels of the system design process. Our approach will
advance the integration of these tools wlth expert systems and
data base management to provide the environment tailored for
prototype development.
Introduce Computer Aided Software Engineering (CASE) tools
as a rapid prototyplng environment for fault tolerant
software development. Integrate expert systems and data
base management tools to the CASE system environment to
facilitate the creation, management, and automated
conversion of rapid prototypes Into target systems.
Develop a rapid prototype for a fault tolerant test-bed
system. Thls prototype facility wlll be used to
demonstrate feasibility of fault tolerant V&V concepts and
techniques.
O Develop a rapid prototype for the generation of self-test
programs suitable for automated validation and verification
of fault tolerant systems.
0 Introduce VHDL as the standard modeling and simulation tool
for the design and verification of fault tolerant v7v
systems.
0 Influence the adoption of design for testability guidelines
as a standard design methodology to facilitate the
generation of testable systems.
Technology Acquisition and Transfer
Thls strategy emphasizes the importance of forming effective
relationships wlth a variety of government, industry, and
educational organizations. Development of a national resource
capability for verification of FBW/FBL control systems technical
expertise In various disciplines is imperative. Thls expertise
wlll be acquired through teaming wlth industry technology groups,
government research centers, universities, and industry
organizations.
4785S 6-13
Fly-By-Light
Technology Development Plan
FINAL REPORT
30 August Ig90
6.3.3.6
6.4.2
6.4.2.1
6.4.2.2
Technology Acquisition and Transfer (Continued)
The critical disciplines are identified as modeling, simulation,
and supporting technologies.
Software
Evaluation of RTCA/DO-178A
DAC/HI will work with the FAA to evaluate the adequacy of
RTCA/DO-I?8A with regard to flight crucial systems. Specifically,
DAC/HI will attempt to show whether the Level l development
approach is sufficient to yield a system that can meet reliability
requirements in the TO-9 range.
Verification and The Software Development Cycle
DAC/HI will identify and evaluate verification tools and methods
that can be applied to each of the software development activities
depicted in Figure 6.4-I. Note that Figure 6.4-I represents a
baseline llfe cycle paradigm (similar to those suggested in
DOD-STD-2167 and RTCA/DO-17BA.
Software Requirements Verification
DAC/HI will identify and evaluate tools and methods that can be
used to verify that the software requirements are an adequate
translation of the system requirements allocated to software and
that implementation is feasible. Current state-of-the-art tools
and techniques include:
A. Structured analysis tools with built-ln consistency checking
(e.g., Excelerator and Teamwork).
B. Traceability matrices.
C. Walk-throughs and reviews.
D. Requlrements-based testing.
Software Design Verification
DAC/HI will identify and evaluate tools and methods that can be
used to verify that the software design (top level architecture
approach and detailed design) represents a clear, consistent, and
accurate translation of the software requirements, adequately
addresses all issues peculiar to real-time embedded software
design, and that the key algorithms are performed with the
required precision and accuracy. Current state-of-the-art tools
and techniques include:
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6.4.2.2
6.4.2.3
6.4.2.4.1
Software Design Verification (Continued)
A. Modellng tools that support top level architecture design and
simulate execution.
B. Structured design tools wlth bullt-in consistency checking.
C. Design diversity (multlverslon software development).
D. Traceablllty matrices.
E. Walk throughs and reviews.
F. Structure-based testing.
Software Implementation Verification
DAC/HI wlll identify and evaluate tools and methods that can be
used to verify that the software implementation (code) effectively
and efficiently represents a clear, consistent, and accurate
translation of the software detailed design and that It adequately
addresses all issues peculiar to the target environment. Current
state-of-the-art tools and techniques include:
A. Automatic code generation tools that accept textual (PDL) or
graphic detalled deslgn information and produce target code.
B. Implementation diversity (multlverslon software development).
C. Traceability matrices.
O. Walk-throughs and reviews.
E. Structure-based testing.
Overview of Mutation Testing for System Verification Validation
Software testing attempts to provide a partial answer to the
following question: If a program Is correct on a finite number of
test cases, Is It correct In general? Several techniques have
been devised for generating test cases, including input space
partitioning, symbolic testing, and functional testing. Because
software testing is insufficient to guarantee program correctness,
these techniques do not attempt to establish absolute program
correctness but to provide the tester wlth some level of
confidence In the program.
Although each of these techniques Is effective at detecting errors
In the program, mutation analysis goes one step further by
supplying the tester wlth information In the absence of known
errors. Thls unique ability helps the tester predict the
reliability of the program and indicates quantitatively when the
testing process can end. Mutation analysis has been shown
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6.4.2.4.1 Overview of Mutation Testing for System Verification Validation
(Continued)
analytically and experimentally to be a generalization of other
testing methodologies. Thus, a mutation analysis tool gives a
tester the capabilities of several other test techniques as well
as features that are unique to mutation. The following discussion
describes the mutation approach to software testing.
A. Theory of Mutation Analysis
Mutation analysis is a powerful technique for software testing
that assists the tester in creating test data and then
interacts with the tester to improve the quality of the test
data. Mutation analysis is based on the "competent programmer
hypothesis" - the assumption that the program to be tested has
been written by a competent programmer. Therefore, if the
program is not correct, it differs from the correct program by
at most a few small errors. Mutation analysis allows the
tester to determine whether at set of test data is adequate to
detect these errors. The first step in mutation analysis is
the construction of a collection of mutants of the test
program. Each mutant Is identical to the original program
except for a single syntactic change (for example, replacing
one operator by another or altering the value of a constant).
Such a change is called a mutation. Each mutant is then
executed, using the same set of test data each time. Many of
the mutants will produce different output than the original
program. The test data is said to kill these mutants; the
data was adequate to find the errors that these mutants
represent. Some mutants, however, may produce the same output
as the original program. These llve mutants provide value
information. A mutant may remain alive for one of two reasons:
The test data is inadequate. The test data failed to
distinguish the mutant from the original program. For
example, the test data may not exercise the portion of
the program that was mutated.
The mutant Is equivalent to the original program. The
mutant and the original program produce the same
output, hence no test case can distinguish between the
two.
Normally, only a small percentage of mutants are equivalent to
the original program; these are usually easy to locate and
remove from further consideration, more test cases can be
added in an effort to kill non-equlvalent mutants. The
adequacy of a test set of test cases is measured by an
adequacy score; a score of lOO% indicates that the test cases
kill all non-equlvalent mutants.
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6.4.2.4.1 Overview of Mutation Testing for System Verification Validation
(Continued)
B. Mutation Testing System
A mutatlon-based testing system allows a tester to perform
mutation analysis on a program (or sub-program). The tester
supplies the program to be tested and chooses the types of
mutations to be performed. The tester also supplies one or
more test cases. The testing system executes the original
program and each mutant on each test case and compares the
output produced by the two programs. If the output of the
mutant differs from the output of the original program, the
mutant is marked dead. Once execution is complete, the tester
can examine any mutants that are still alive. The tester can
then declare a mutant to be equivalent to the original
program, or the tester can supply additional test cases in an
effort to kill the mutant (and possibly other live mutants as
well). Some mutation systems are able to detect automatically
certain kinds of equivalent mutants.
Several mutatlon systems have been bullt over the past ten
years, including PIMS, EXPER and FMS.3, which supported
mutation analysis for Fortran programs, and CMS.I, which
handled COBOL. The most recent mutation-based system is the
Mothra, an integrated software testing environment under
development at Purdue University's Software Engineering
Research Center.
Experience with Mothra and earlier systems has shown mutation
analysis to be a powerful tool for program testing.
Mutatlon-based testing system have a number of attractive
features:
Mutation analysis includes - as special cases - most
other test methodologies. Statement coverage and
branch coverage are among the methodologies that
mutation analysis subsumes.
A mutation based system provides an interactive test
environment that allows the tester to locate and
remove errors.
o Mutation analysis a11ows a greater degree of
automation than most other testing methodologies.
Mutation analysis provides information that other test
methodologies do not. In particular, the mutation
score for a particular program indicates the adequacy
of the data used to test the program, thereby serving
as a quantitative measure of how well the program has
been testing.
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6.4.2.4.2
Overview of Mutation Testing for System Verification Validation
(Continued)
A potential problem of mutation based testing systems is the
amount of computer resources (both space and time) required
for the testing of large programs. The number of mutants
generated for a program tends to grow quadratically with the
number of names in the program. Storing huge numbers of
mutants can be difficult on many computer systems; executing
that many mutants is an even larger problem. Fortunately,
there are several ways to overcome the problem of limited
resources:
0 Mutant sampling. Mutation systems a11ows the tester
to specify random sampling of a certain percentage of
mutants. Often, sampling even a small percentage of
the possible mutants is enough to reveal inadequate
test data.
o Selective application of mutant operators. Mutation
systems also allow the tester to specify that only
certain kinds of mutations are to be performed. Thus,
the tester can select mutations that are likely to
have a high payoff relative to the amount of time they
require.
Use of high performance computers. Computationally
intensive tasks of mutation testing can be performed
on hlgh-speed computer systems such as parallel
architectures and vector machines.
C. Evaluation of Mutation Testing
Mutation testing covers the class of errors known as
blunders. Blunders are errors in which the software did not
do what the programmer intended. This contrasts with design
errors in which the software does what the programmer
intended, but the intended functionality is not correct.
Blunders include typographical errors, the "off-by-one" error,
the use of wrong variables, etc. This type of error is easier
to find than design errors. Most blunders are caught either
by compilers that translate strongly typed languages, such as
Ada; or by existing methodologies used in the development of
highly reliable software. The much more difficult problem of
testing for design errors still needs to be addressed.
Overview of Architectural Design and Assessment System (ADAS)
ADAS is a set of computer-alded engineering tools which support a
methodology for the architecture level design and analysis of
software algorithms and their hardware implementations. Through
an Iteratlve design process, software and hardware designs are
analyzed and refined to approach a final design.
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6.4.2.4.2 Overview of Architectural Design and Assessment System (ADAS)
(Continued)
ADAS uses directed graphics to model software and hardware
systems. An ADAS directed graph consists of node and arcs.
Nodes represent individual software operations or hardware
functional elements. Arcs represent the flow of data or control
from one node to another. Both nodes and arcs have name and other
attributes associated with them. The attributes provide the
information necessary for modeling the system under study. A
graph can contain a cycle, which represents a flow of data that
returns to the node that originates it. There Is nothing
Intrlnslc to the graph to indicate whether It represents a
software or hardware model. Some associated ADAS graph attributes
are defined as follows:
queue size is the maximum number of tokens allowed on the
arc.
firing delay is the length of time the node is busy after it
Is enabled to fire (input, resource, and output condltlons are
all met).
ha-module Is the hardware resource to whlch the node is
mapped. If two nodes are enabled to fire at the same time,
and the nodes have identical hardware resources, then their
firing Is serialized.
priority may be used when there is resource contention, to
allow determlnlstlc sequencing of the nodes. If the default
is used, ADAS schedules the nodes according to an internal
algorithm.
threshold defines the number of tokens which must be on a
given arc in order for the node to fire.
consume defines the number of tokens consumed from the arc
when the node fires.
produce Is the number of tokens the node produces when It Is
done firing.
In addition, nodes and arcs have many other attributes including
those which determine graph appearance, such as size, color and
position. There are also attributes which can point to files
which contain behavioral models or other user defined slmulatlon
data.
In order for an ADAS node to fire, certain criteria must be met.
There must be sufficient tokens on the input arcs to satisfy the
threshold and consume values of one or more arcs. The hardware
resource must be available. Finally, there must be sufficient
space on the output arcs to satisfy the produce values.
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6.4.3
6.4.3.1
Overview of Archltectural Design and Assessment System (ADAS)
(Continued)
When all the conditions are met for a node to fire, it first
consumes the tokens from its input arcs. If a behavioral model is
present, it is executed. Then the node delays for a specified
time equal to its firlng delay, locking out its resource from
other nodes. When the appropriate time has passed, the resource
is released and tokens are produced and placed on the output arcs.
If models more complicated than the basic ADAS model are required,
behavioral models written in Ada or C may be used. These allow
complex interaction between nodes, stochastic values of attributes
such as [/em node user file name] may be used to point to a file
containing any information the user defines. This could include
implementation technology (e.g. GaAs, Si), degree of parallelism
available in the node, type of fault tolerance used, etc. The
behavioral model would then be designed to use this information in
an appropriate fashion.
ADAS tools provide detailed simulation results for the performance
analysis and evaluation of a design. Statistics such as
utilization and latency may be collected for hardware modules and
software nodes. Flow rates and access frequencies may be
collected for arcs. ADAS uses both simulatlon-based and
analytical techniques to calculate performance characteristics.
A menu-drlven graphic editor is used to construct and modify the
software and hardware graphs. Other tools analyze the performance
of the models, allocate software tasks to hardware graph
components, and provide functional simulation capabilities.
Attributes associated with the model components are used to check
for design Inconslstencies.
Software Verification Effectiveness Measurement
Quantifying Software Reliability
Software reliability is the probability that the software will
meet requirements for a given period of time in a specified
environment. Software reliability measurements are based on the
frequency with which problems (i.e., design faults, operational
errors, etc.) occur. Unrecognized design defects are the primary
failure source for software, unlike hardware reliability where
physical causes and wear play important roles. Models are either
based on the external behavior of a system or on the system's
structure. The models represented here are all based on the
system's external behavior. The values of the parameters in the
modeling systems must be estimated sometimes. Different inference
procedures have been devised to calculate the parameters optimum
value. These prediction systems will not be discussed here.
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6.4.3.1 Quantifying Software Reliability (Continued)
In order to describe these software models, some terms need to be
defined. A failure is defined as the condition where software
does not meet Its requirements. A fault is a specific defect In
the software that, under certain circumstances, will cause a
failure. Tlme to Failure (TTF), Mean-Tlme-To-Failure (MTIF), Rate
of Occurrence of Failure (ROCOF), and failure intensity, (number
of fallures/unlt time) are terms used to describe software
reliability.
The following Is an overview of models used in software
reliability analysis:
A. Fault Manifestation Models
l , The product change statistical model (Currlt, et al)
calculates the MTTF as a product of the fractional
improvement, from each change, of the MTTF raised to the
power of the number of changes introduced and the
estimated initial MTTF.
. Deterministic Exponential Order Statistical (DET/EOS)
models, used for a uniform failure manifestation rate and
a fixed unknown number of failures, include the
Jelinskl-Moranda model. The DET/EOS model calculates a
likelihood function for TTF data as a probability density
function of observed time to next failures.
3. Doubly-Stochastlc Exponential Order Statistical (DS/EOS)
Models.
a. Independent Identically Distributed Order
Statistic (lIDOS) models, used For a manifestation
rate derived from order statistics from a probability
dlstrlbutlon function and a finite unknown number of
faults, include the Llttlewood Stochastic Reliability
Growth Model. Thls model uses a gamma distribution
for the individual fault manifestation rates to
calculate the ROCOF.
b. Non-Homogeneous Polsson Process (NHPP) models, used
for a manifestation rate derived from an NHPP and an
infinite number of faults or a Polsson distributed
number of faults, include the generalized
gamma DS/EOS Model.
C . Dlstrlbutlon-free model (Giammo) calculates the
manifestation rate using all possible distributions
bounded by the data.
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6.4.3.2
6.5
6.6
Quantifying software Reliability (Continued)
B. Interfallure Tlme Models
l . The basic execution time model calculates the failure
intensity for relatively uniform operational profiles
using the initial failure intensity at the start of
execution, the average number of failures experienced at
a given point In time, and the total number of failures
over all tlme as parameters.
The Littleton-Verrall Model calculates the ROCOF based on
the shape parameter of a gamma distribution, and a family
of scale parameters for that distrlbutlon.
. The logarithmic Poisson execution tlme model
(Musa and Okumoto) defines the failure intensity as a
function of the initial failure intensity multiplied by
the exponential function of the product of the average
number of failures experienced at a given point In time
and a failure intensity decay factor. Thls failure
intensity decay factor is the magnitude of the
derivative of the natural log of the failure intensity
with respect to the average number of failures
experienced. Musa demonstrates that this model is useful
for highly nonuniform operation profiles.
Relating Software Reliability to Software Verification Techniques
An area of required technology development wlll be to investigate
the feasibility of using parametric modeling techniques (analysis
of various software verification techniques and correlation to
historical reliability data) to develop a model that will predict
reliability as a function of the software development process.
Flight Test
Flight test is the ultimate stage in the verification of design
process. It Is the final proof of concept activity for any new
aircraft system approach and Is an indispensable step in such
situations. All other stages of design verification (laboratory
simulation and iron blrd studies) can only be approximate models
of the full up operational aircraft (see Section 7 for the
description of the Flight Test Program). However, flight test is
limited, it cannot examine every flight control system state.
Direct FAA/FBL Program Participation
The lack of established mature U.S. certification basis and
procedures for FBW/FBL stands as an impediment to
U.S. introduction of advanced technology commercial transport
aircraft into the world marketplace. This program, which includes
participation of the FAA, NASA, DoD, and several major aircraft
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6.6 Direct FAA/FBL Program Participation (Continued)
manufacturers, is defining the development path for advanced
technology certification crlterla which are crltlcal to the
U.S. manufacturers competitive posture with foreign manufacturers.
Currently digital systems immune to soft faults, tolerant to
EM environment upset, and demonstrating MTBF exceeding the llfe of
the airframe structure and without backup are being proposed for
design, yet the existing certification methods and criteria have
not addressed issues particular to the complexity of these
systems. In light of this, over the past one and a half (l-I/2)
years, DAC/HI has had many discussions with FAA personnel relative
to a certification basis for FBW/FBL systems.
Most recent discussions have centered specifically on how
FAA specialists would directly participate in this FBL Program.
These dlscussions are continuing at the detail stage with and
within the FAA. Current FAA plans call for direct partlclpat_on
by the following organizations:
A. Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office
B. Seattle Aircraft Certification Offlce
C. Transport Standards Office
O. FAA Technical Center via an Inter-agency agreement wlth
NASA-Langley (current in place)
FAA direct involvement is perceived to be of major importance.
Without established procedures, certlficatlon risks, financial,
schedule, and technical cannot be accurately quantified.
During the last half of 1989, the role of the FAA should be
clarified. Further, it is anticipated that the FBL Program will
heavily influence the content of a new certification "Advlsory
Circular" (AC) on the subject of FBW/FBL. Related workshops are
also anticipated.
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7.0 FLIGHT TEST
7.1 Background
7.2
7.2.1
7.2.2
Douglas Aircraft Company and Honeywell, Inc. (DAC/HI) are
currently involved in developing and verlfylng/valldatlng
fly-by-wire/fly-by-llght (FBN/FBL) concepts for application to
future transport aircraft. First delivery from HI to DAC of a set
of FBW units occurred in 3une, 1989. Upgrades are scheduled for
the next two years during which numerous technlcal issues must be
resolved.
Dellverables/Characterlstlcs of Flight Control Computer System
To facilitate Verification and Valldatlon (V&V) aspects of the
FBL program including flight test. DAC/HI suggest that they
supply one (option for two) set(s) of FBW/FBL flight control
computers to NASA. Early program results wlll directly Influence
the capabilities built into these units.
At the same time, DAC/HI suggests that they supply a flxed-base
test facility capable of full-fldellty on-ground verification of
the FBW/FBL flight control computers prior to flight test. This
would be integral to an "iron bird" facility. The simulation
quality would be adequate to validate aircraft handling and
performance requirements. This facility would be resident at the
Langley flight test facility and be the property of the National
Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA).
Flight Control Computer Physical Characteristics
The proposed basic flight equlp_ent consists of four fllght
control computers which are llne replaceable units (LRU) with the
following characteristics:
A. 41.2 Ibs. per flight control computer
B. 12B watts per flight control computer
C. lO MCU ARINC 600 chasls
During the course of the program certain techniques will be
evaluated and those with a high degree of merit and feasibility
will be incorporated into the flight control computers. These
techniques may be associated with the following areas of
investigation: Electromagnetic effect (EME) hardening, transient
fault protection, extended availability through secondary
redundance, etc.
Flight Control Computer System Dellverables
Deliverables associated with the program include the following:
A. Four flight control computers (one ship set) and one spare
flight control computer
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7.2.2
7.3.2
7.3.3
Flight Control Computer System Deliverables (Continued)
B. One (I) closed-loop validation facility
C. System Specification Document
D. Software Requirements Document
E. Flight control computer hardware/software updates as required
On-slte support will be provided continuously from initial
delivery until program completion. The type and magnitude of
on-slte support will be as dictated by program needs.
Basic Flight Control Computer Archltecture/Deslgn Overview
Basic Architecture
The basic aircraft configuration consists of four flight control
computers which are dual-lane fail-passlve, configured to provide
a fail-operatlonal Primary Flight Control (PFC) System. These
four flight control computers provide system generic fault
protection through three-verslon techniques. The basic redundancy
management architecture was originally developed as a
Honeywell, Inc. (HI) IR&D Project for application to FBW systems.
This architecture is now being adapted to the MD-ll flight control
computer/LSAS currently in development.
Generic Fault Protection
This system has been in development at HI for eight years.
N-verslon techniques have been developed and refined during the
737-300 and MD-ll systems developments as well as through
continuing research and development efforts, including Joint
research programs with University of California, Los Angeles
(UCLA). Currently, the base MD-11 equipment with modifications
made for a completely digital FBN system with ARINC 629
bidirectional bussing is being evaluated at DAC in their FBW/FBL
R&D Program.
Flexible Input/Output Interface Capability
The flight control computer architecture was designed specifically
to allow for substantial Input/Output (I/O) signal composition
changes with minimal to no changes to the hardware. Generic I/O
card connector interfaces allow addltlons/subtractlons/swaps of
I/O card types to increase or decrease the quantity of a given
signal type easily.
This flexibility will be used to match the flight control
computers to the other avionic subsystems onboard the flight test
aircraft, as necessary thus reducing the risk of an interface
mismatch and subsequent schedule delay.
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7.3.4
7.3.5
7.4
7.4.1
Partitioning of Software by Criticality
The flight control computer includes the capability to partition
(relative to fault effects) sections of the overall software
package that execute concurrently on a single processor. The
mechanism for achieving software-fault-effects partitioning is
being used on the DAC MD-II aircraft program and, as such, wlll
have a certification precedent. For most commercial digital
avionics systems, the entire software package associated with a
specific processor must be certified to the criticality of the
most critical software element. The problem this presents
relative to integration is obvious.
To facilitate partitioning, HI has developed a specialized
integrated circuit. The specific methodology is patented.
Electronic Design Practices
The electronic design rules adopted for the flight control
computer resulted from the experience gained through previous
digital LRU production programs at HI. This previous experience
has demonstrated the importance of many design precepts, including
the following:
A. Distinct electronic separation of the two lanes that make up
the dual flight control computer.
B. Design guidelines that maximize immunity to noise and external
Electromagnetic (EM) disturbances. Standardization of
parallel digital data bus and I/O interface protocols.
C. Design guldelines that provide effective Built-In-Test (BIT)
for fault detection and isolation.
The design approach used for the flight control computer Is that
of clear and distinct separation of redundant elements. This
results In easily understood and highly visible hardware
partitioning, including separate processors, memories, power
supplies, and I/O conversion.
Multllayer circuit boards and motherboards provide high integrity
ground and power systems within the flight control computers.
Logic clocking signals required between circuit boards are
transmitted differentially and are the only edge sensitive signals
communicated between circuit boards.
Closed-Loop Validation Facility Overview
Ratlonale for Closed-Loop Validation Facility
In order to test and verify the FBL/PFC system a sophisticated
closed-loop validation facility will be required to provide the
capability of both a high fidelity dynamic aircraft environment
simulation and a static simulation for flight control computer
validation.
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7.4.1
7.4.2
Rationale for Closed-Loop Validation Facility (Continued)
This facillty wlll augment the empirical portion of the V&V
process of the FCS, providing a means of testing and validating
the system prior to actual flight test. The facility is essential
for the flight test phase of the program for providing a means of
verifying any and all changes made to the flight control computers
before succeeding flights. A typical VALFAC system configuration
Is shown in Figure 7.4-I.
It will be used to simulate real-tlme aircraft and engine
dynamics, air data, navigation, and autofllght system, as well as
to provide a pilot interface and a Closed-Loop Validation Facility
operator's interface. It will provide all electrical and optical
interfaces to the flight control computers and have the capability
of injecting faults onto the electrical and optical interfaces for
testing the control system responses to different failures.
The Closed-Loop Validation Facility could also be used during
EME environment testing using an Iron blrd mock-up of the
FBL system for providing monitoring capability of the system and
actuator buses of the flight control system.
Simulation Capabillty/Descrlptlon
The fundamental purpose of the validation facility is two-fold as
outlined below.
A. To support the testing and validation of the FBL integrated
system by provlding simulations for the needed
functlons/subsystems, and to provide a means of validating the
entire integrated system, including all incremental changes,
prior to each test flight.
B, To support the testing and validation of the FBL/fllght
control computer suite during Its development and after
incremental changes by providing a simulation of its entire
environment.
In order to accomplish the above, the validation facility will
provide the following:
A. Aerodynamic and engine simulations.
B. Simulation of all avionics interfacing to the flight control
computer suite.
I. Inertial reference system
2. Rate gyro system
3. Air data system
4. 'Auto flight system
5. etc.
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7.4.2
7.4.2.1
7.4.2.2
4786S
Simulation Capabillty/Descrlptlon (Continued)
C. Simulation controls.
I. Pilot inputs
2. Dynamic testing mode
3. Static testing mode
The following sections describe the above requirements.
Aerodynamic Simulation
The computational capability of the computer system used for the
aerodynamic simulation will be sufficient to simulate the dynamics
of aircraft motion to the extent necessary to realistically
simulate flight of the aircraft throughout its operating envelope
as it would be seen by the flight control computer suite.
A realistic aerodynamic slmulatlon will require the following:
A. A full slx-degree-of-freedom aerodynamic model with an update
rate fast enough to generate all aircraft characteristics of
concern.
B. Experiment data from the test aircraft to model the aircraft
engines and aerodynamic effects due to all surface deflections.
Avionics Simulations
In addition to the flight control aerodynamic simulation, the
validation facility must also provide a simulation for all the
avionics systems that interface with the flight control
computers. The below paragraphs give a brief description of the
main systems that will be simulated.
A. Inertial Reference System (IRS): This simulation outputs the
necessary set of IRS data as required by the overall
simulation. Coordinate transformations must be made as
necessary to determine accelerations, velocities, attitude,
and position relative to the earth's coordinate system. In
some cases, the IRS data wlll need to be computed In double
precision to achieve the accuracy necessary for long distance
navigation. The effects of simulated winds must be included
in the calculation of velocities and positions. Multiple
outputs will need to be provided to simulate multiple IRSs.
Each output will need the capability of being separately
manipulated for the simulation of errors such as drift, noise,
and relative time skew.
Bo Air Data Computer (ADC): This simulation calculates the
airspeeds, pressures, temperatures, and altitude of the
aircraft. These computations must be based upon the
definition of the international standard atmosphere. The
model should have the capability of accepting barometric
corrections as needed.
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7.4.2.2
"/.4.2.3
7.4.2.4
7.4.2.4.1
Avionics Simulations (Continued)
C. Thrust Management Computer (TMC): Thls simulation provides
the necessary automatic throttle control to couple with the
flight control computer. The appropriate thrust commands are
computed by thls model for use by the engine model according
to mode and command information received from the autofllght
system model.
D. Autofllght System (AFS): This simulation provides the
autofllght functions of the validation facility. When
engaged, thls simulation drives the flight control computers
as well as the TMC simulation.
Avionics Interfaces
The specifications for the interfaces between the flight control
computer suite and the other aircraft avionics wlll be defined
according to the configuration of the test aircraft. These
interface specifications will describe exactly how the flight
control computer suite will interface with each of the other
avionic systems by describing bus type, bus electrical
characteristics, and the bus data formats and update rates.
The validation facility will emulate the avionic interfaces as
detailed in the above mentioned specifications accurately so as to
validate compatibility between the flight control computer suite
and the test aircraft avionics as development proceeds.
Simulation Controls
The following sections describe the various means by which the
operation of the Validation Facility may be controlled.
Pilot Station
The pilot station will provide the full instrumentation necessary
to accurately assess the functlonallty of the flight control
computers. Simulated or actual flight instruments, plasma panels,
CRT's, and other types of displays may be used for generating
visual outputs. Flight control panels and radio management panels
are typically installed in thls workstation to allow for user
selection of aircraft flight modes and annunciations as well as
radio frequencies. Engine and aircraft information is also
provided at the pilot station. Active pilot station control
inputs should include the following:
A. Sidestlcks
B. Speedbrake
C. Rudder controls
D. Throttle
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7.4.2.4.1
7.4.2.4.2
Pilot Station
E.
F.
G.
(Continued)
Flap/slat controls
Mode control panel
Pitch-trlm controls
An alternative to supplying the above cockpit controls would be to
interface the validation facility directly to the test aircraft,
using the cockpit controls of the test aircraft to drive the
facility. Although this may prove to be a difficult task, the
potential benefits may warrant further investigation.
Facility Operator Station
The Facility Operator Station will consist of the following
equipment:
A. Simulation status displays
B. Control development terminals
C. Strip chart recorders for real-tlme data recording
D. Printers for outputtlng non-real-tlme data
Between the operator station and the pilot station, control of the
facility will be maximized.
The operator station will provide the means to monitor the status
of the slmulatlons as well as to enter speclal modes of
operation. The two main modes of operation are dynamic test mode
and static test mode as outllned in the following two sections.
A. Dynamic Test Mode
The valldation facility will support a dynamic test mode that
can be initiated through the operator station. During dynamic
mode testing, the aerodynamic model Is enabled. During
operation In the dynamic mode, the operator will have the
capability to perform any of the following functions.
I. Fly the simulated aircraft to perform tests on the
integrated FBL system.
2. Record outputs from both the simulation of the flight
control computer suite.
3. Insert error offsets noise or wind into sensor output.
4. etc.
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7.4.2.4.2
7.4.2.5
Facility Operator Station (Continued)
The operator station will allow either initialization of or
intervention into the simulation during dynamic test mode
operation. During initialization, the capability of selecting
either default initial conditions or entering new initial
conditions prior to trimming the aircraft will be provided.
Some additional functions may be added as the integration
validation facility will be used to support EME environment
testing of the FBL system on the iron bird.
B. Statlc Test Mode
The validation facility will also support a static test mode
that can be initiated through the operator station. During
static test mode operation, the aerodynamic simulation is
disabled. The only functions supported In this mode are the
following:
I. I/O to the flight control computer suite.
2. Modification of the data being transmitted to the flight
control computers including any error code fields.
3. Examination of data being received from the flight
control computers.
4. Strip chart and printer setup for recording test results.
The static test mode is more flexible in a development
environment than the dynamic mode in that each variable output
to the flight control computers Is individually controllable.
Maintainability
It Is important to keep the closed-loop validation facility fully
functional durlng all phases of program development. Measures
must be taken to ensure a hlgh degree of integrity and
maintainability of the facility. The system should have the
following characteristics.
A. All I/O and control cards should be based on proven designs.
Spares must be available for immediate replacement should the
need arise.
B. Additional computer processor and control cards must be stored
as spares should a subsequent replacement be necessary.
C, Built-ln Test (BIT) features should be included in the
design. Computer diagnostics and any other simulator hardware
should have test programs that are capable of detecting faults
to the card level.
D. A software backup system must be provided.
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7.4.2.6
7.4.2.7
7.5
7.5.1
7.5.1 .I
Maintainability (Continued)
E. Preventive and corrective maintenance must be provided
according to maintenance agreement.
F, All documentation must accurately depict the configuration of
the system, and all software and hardware shall be maintained
under configuration control.
Documentation and Configuration Control
The closed-loop validation facility designs and implementation
methodologies will be documented In detail. A full definition of
the facility as a system wlll be generated. Each subsystem and
hardware function will be thoroughly described. Schematics,
wire lists, assembly drawings, and other written documentation
will be maintained. Overall software development wlll follow
D0-178 Guidelines. Software functions wlll be designed using
structured techniques. Detailed source language listings wlll
also be generated. Software and documentation wlll be archlved on
computer readable media.
Certification
The closed-loop validation facility wlll be designed, built,
inspected, and tested to levels required by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) and NASA. Certification of the closed-loop
validation facility wlll not be required, but the three basic
steps of conformity, acceptance test, and system test will be
taken.
Flight Test Issues
General Flight Test Issues
Handling Qualities and Crew Workload Evaluation
Flight test is used to evaluate both the handling qualities of the
aircraft and crew workload during different flight regimes. The
evaluation typically takes Into account the ergonomics of the
cockpit and the responsiveness of the control system to pilot
inputs In the maneuvering of the aircraft.
For the fly-by-llght aircraft flight test, the focus wlll be on
the response of the system rather than the ergonomics of the
cockpit since the purpose of flight test is to prove the concept
of the FBW/FBL system.
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7.5.1.2
7.5.1.3
7.5.2.2
7.5.2.3
Vehicle Aerodynamic Evaluation
Flight test is also typically used to evaluate the aerodynamics of
the test aircraft. Since the test aircraft Is of a proven
aerodynamic design, this particular part of the evaluation wlll be
focused on the testing and evaluation of the control law software
that has been programmed Into the flight control computers. Thls
evaluation will determine If the flight control system adequately
responds accordlng to the establlshed performance criteria set for
the aircraft type.
Shock/Vlbratlon and Other Operational Problems
Thls is crucial part of the flight test evaluation for the
avionics equipment to ascertain any observable operational
problems, such as shock and vibration effects on the system
components or any other mechanical type problems.
F11ght Test Issues Specific to Fly-By-Llght Aircraft
Proof of Concept
Flight test Is critical for the evaluation of the fully integrated
FBW/FBL system. Variation induced by actual flight will deviate
from the simulation slightly. Therefore, the flight test provides
the confidence In the control system that It perform safely and
functions correctly in the actual circumstances It was Intended to
operate In.
Shock/Vlbratlon and Environmental Evaluation of Fiber Optic
Connectors
An important aspect to the FBW/FBL flight test is the actual
vibration effects on fiber optic connectors known as
Vlbro-Mechanlcal Interference (VMI). In order to adequately
access if VMI Is a problem, the fiber optics must experience long
term vibration and environmental aging. This will require many
flight hours to be logged wlth the FBW/FBL system.
Also another concern for fiber optics is the exposure to the harsh
environment of the aircraft. Such as the different temperature
extremes, other mechanical stresses, and the contaminants
(hydraulic fluid, etc.) present in the fuselage of the aircraft.
Flight test will help assess these potential problems.
Evaluation of Fiber Optic EME Protection Effectiveness
This part of the flight test evaluation should help answer the
following questions:
A. Does fiber optics provide sufficient protection against the
EME threat?
B. What Is the protection effectiveness level that fiber optics
provide to the system?
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8.0 RECDMMENDATIONS
A. Establish a national resource for system modeling to include
redundancy management.
B. Establish a national resource for electromagnetic effect (EME)
assessments/analytlcal predictions.
C. Establish a national resource for EME full threat testing
capability.
D. Survey and document industry experience with the application
of N-verslon techniques.
E. Based upon experience gained in both industrial applications
and research experiments, one or more development
methodologies for N-verslon techniques should be documented.
It Is believed essential that formal mature methodologies be
clearly established.
F. Flight test validation via flight test of FBW/FBL flight
control system.
G. Optical data transmission validation.
H. Optical sensor development, post first generation fly-by-llght.
I. Evaluation of llfe cycle maintenance of FBL (extended
availability).
J. Validation of transient tolerant architectures, (system
recovery techniques).
K. Extension of software methodologles/valldatlon appropriate for
full-time fllght-critical commerclaI transport avionics
systems.
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9.0
9.1
9.1 .l
9.I .1.l
9.1.1.2
g.l .I.3
OVERVIEW OF FLY-BY-LIGHT TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PLAN
Outline of Phases (reference Table 9.0-I)
A. Phase I: Fly-By-Light (FBL) Architecture Development
B. Phase II: Verification and Validation (V&V) of FBL
C. Phase III: Integration of a FBL System
O. Phase IV: Flight Test of a FBL System
Description of Phases
Phase I: Fly-By-Light Architecture Development
This phase encompasses the definition and design of representative
new technology subsystems, their validation and integration as
needed for a first generation FBL/fllght control system which
incorporates an optimized blend of electronic and optical
technologies; and the development, prototyplng, acquisition, and
testing of new technologies, hardware, and subsystems that make up
the FBL system.
Phase II: Verification and Validation of Fly-By-Light
lhls phase encompasses the establishment of the criteria and
approach for the certification of a FBL/fllght control system; the
development of deslgn/optlmlzatlon tools; V&V tools for fault
tolerant operation at the subsystem and system levels; the
development of electromagnetic (EM) propagation models to predict
coupling levels, and effects through the aircraft and its systems;
and document proof of relevant correlation between the models and
"real" systems via an extensive hardware test and analysis program.
A major goal of this phase Is to develop and demonstrate the use
of tools for certification purposes by performing V&V via models
rather than exhaustive and expensive physical testing of hardware
and software. In association with this program the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) will directly participate in
deriving a FBL certification basls.
Phase III: Integration of a Fly-By-Light System
This phase encompasses the bench test plan development; the design
and construction of a FBL "Iron bird" integration and test
facility; the installation and integration of FBL system; and the
hot bench testing of the FBL/fllght control system.
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9.1 .I.4 Phase IV: Flight Test of a Fly-By-Light System
This phase encompasses the development of the flight test aircraft
installation designs and the flight test plan; the aircraft
modification; the aircraft installation of the FBL/fllght control
system, and the flight test.
Major Aspects
Phase I: Fly-By-Light Architecture Development (30M)
A. Identify/define methodologies wlth potential
application on next generation aircraft. (IM)
B. Contrast methodologies to provide subsystem
extended availability; i.e., effective
mean-time-between-fa%lure (MTBF) equal to or
greater than lO0,O00 hours. (2M)
C. Contrast methodologies for subsystem fault tolerance. (2M)
I. Hard faults.
2. Soft faults.
3. Generic faults.
D. Contrast potential next generation sensor methodologies. (3M)
I. Power-by-l%ght.
2. Passlve optical.
3. Tradltlonal sensors.
Contrast next generation actuation technology. (2M)
I. Smart versus simple.
2. Fault protection.
3. Interface.
Determine optimum data sharing/transmlss%on
methodologies. (SM)
I. Optical.
2. Electrical.
3. Hybrid.
Develop viable fly-by-light integrated architectures
for near and long term applications. (15M)
E.
F°
G.
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9.2.2.2
9.2.2.3
Phase II: Verification and Validation of Fly-By-Light
Electromagnetic Effect (EME) Verification and
Validation (V&V).
A. Develop a national resource for analytical
prediction of EMEs.
1 On surface of aircraft.
2 Inside structure.
3 On cables.
4 Within llne replaceable units (LRUs).
5 Wlth_n card assemblies.
6 Within electronic devices.
7. Predict results of EME tests/test configurations.
B. Develop technology necessary for limited full threat
EME testing of aircraft and associated subsystems.
C. Validate EME predlctlon resource.
Fault Tolerance V&V
A. Evaluate available means for modeling fault effects
(e.g., Seml-Markov Unreliability Range Evaluator
[SURE], CARE Ill, Hybrid Automated Reliability
Predictor [HARP]).
B. Define capabilities required to fully validate fault
handling capabillty/characterlstlcs.
I. Functional modeling.
2. Circuit modeling.
3. NAND-gate-equlvalent modeling.
C. Develop/enhance analytic modeling tools to provlde
needed capabilities through the year 2005.
D. Validate modellng/analysls tools.
FAA Participation
A. Integral FAA involvement will provide for development
of cost-effectlve certification procedures for
fly-by-wlre/fly-by-llght (FBW/FBL) aircraft built
in the USA.
(46M)
(30M)
(17M)
(SM)
(SM)
(16M)
(IM)
(IM)
(8M)
(6M)
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9.2.3
9.2.4
Phase III: Integration of a Fly-By-Llght System
A. Build new flight hardware.
B. Develop "iron bird" Integratlon/valldatlon facility.
I. Simulator.
2. Subsystem/component installation.
3. Evaluation testing.
4. Aircraft modeling.
5. Subsystem/component test facilities.
Phase IV: Flight Test of a Fly-By-Light System
A. Aircraft modification to accept new subsystems.
B. Deslgn/build/Installatlon of In-fllght data gathering
facilities for each major subsystem to be evaluated.
C. Subsystem/component installation.
D. Ground check test.
E. Test plans.
F. Test flights.
Thls plan includes $I72M total industry and government
funding.
(65M)
(4OM)
(25M)
(31M)
(9M)
(6M)
(TM)
(2M)
(]M)
(6M)
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